Army Regulation 50–5

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel

Nuclear Surety

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
7 August 1989

Unclassified

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 50–5
Nuclear Surety

This change--

- Revises chapter 1 to reflect realigned responsibilities as a result of Army reorganization under the DOD Reorganization Act and to allow installations that support only a single explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit to designate a nuclear surety coordinator instead of forming a nuclear surety board.

- Revises chapter 3 to clarify policy pertaining to the personnel reliability program (PRP), to align policy pertaining to personnel diagnosed as dependent on drugs or alcohol with AR 600-85, and to emphasize the requirement for administrative (levy) screening.

- Revises chapter 8 to implement the recommendations of the Department of the Army Inspector General’s report on Nuclear Management Evaluation (NME) for Evaluation and Qualification of Noncustodial Nuclear Capable Units and Organizations.

- Adds table 8-2, which establishes areas to be inspected during limited scope surety inspections.

- Revises figure 3-1, Sample of a Completed DA Form 3180, to reflect the form’s redesign and conversion to an R-form. (The new R-form is included at the back of the regulation.)

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
7 August 1989

*Army Regulation 50–5

Effective 1 October 1989

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel

Nuclear Surety

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
CARL E. VUONO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

History. This publication has been reorganized to make it compatible with the Army electronic publishing database. No content has been changed.

Summary. This regulation prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for implementing the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve. Other applicability is shown in specific chapters.

Proponent and exception authority. Not applicable.

Army management control process. This regulation is not subject to the requirements of AR 11–2. It does not contain internal control provisions.

Supplementation. Individual missions, geographic locations, and available resources may make it necessary for MACOM to issue supplementary guidance. If so, the guidance, which must be approved by HQDA(DAMO–SWS), WASH DC 20310–0430, will be kept to the minimum necessary to establish essential requirements caused by command uniqueness. Supplementation of this regulation below the MACOM level is not authorized.

Interim changes. Interim changes to this regulation are not official unless they are authenticated by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration date unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Suggested Improvements. The proponent agency of this regulation is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, U. S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, ATTN:MONA–SU, 7500 Backlick Rd, Bldg. 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198 with a copy furnished HQDA (DAMO–SWS), Washington, DC 20310–4030.

Distribution. Distribution of this publication is made in accordance with the requirements of DA Form 12–09–E, block number 2067, intended for command level A for Active Army, ARNG, and USAR.

Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

*This regulation supersedes AR 50–5, 3 October 1986.

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RESERVED

Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
Prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for implementing the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

1–2. References
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities
a. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)has overall Army Staff (ARSTAF) responsibility for management of the Army Nuclear Surety Program. Except for the functions related to physical security described in paragraph 1–4*a*(6) that are performed for the DCSOPS by the Director, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, Office of the DCSOPS(ODCSOPS), the Director, Space and Special Weapons, ODCSOPS(Director, SW, ODCSOPS), will—

(1) Coordinate overall policy for the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

(2) Establish uniform Department of the Army (DA) policies for the scope and responsibilities of command nuclear surety programs.

(3) Establish operational policies for nuclear weapons programs, including mission requirements and the scope of training and evaluations necessary to verify mission capability.

(4) Establish policies for nuclear accident and incident response and assistance (NAIRA).

(5) Establish policies for the control of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) hazards.

(6) Establish standards, policies, and procedures for physical security, physical security equipment, and physical security training for the Army Nuclear Surety and Nuclear Reactor Programs and ensure their effective and uniform implementation.

(7) With the Chief, Army Safety Office and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition), ASA(RDA), publish policy for the nuclear reactor surety program.

(8) Function as the ARSTAF single point of contact for nuclear surety matters.

(9) Integrate other ARSTAF program responsibilities into the overall Army Nuclear Surety Program.

b. The Commander, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency(USANCA) will—

(1) Conduct surety assistance visits to both Active Component(AC) and Reserve Component (RC) organizations to assess the effectiveness of the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

(2) Provide advice and assistance to ARSTAF and to Major Army Commands (MACOM) on nuclear surety matters by providing a unique interface between policy developers and operators.

(3) Provide clarification of DA surety policy through publication of a quarterly U.S. Army Surety Information Letter (SIL)and by response to inquiries.

(4) Perform other surety–related tasks as directed by the DCSOPS.

c. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) will provide general staff supervision for personnel reliability and establish personnel policies to support implementation of the Army Nuclear Surety Program. Through the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), will monitor personnel standards and procedures to ensure effective and uniform implementation of the personnel reliability program (PRP).

d. The Army Safety Office will—

(1) Establish personnel safety policies for nuclear systems.

(2) Supervise, coordinate, and direct Army–wide nuclear reactor system health and safety programs.

(3) Implement Nuclear Weapons Accident Investigation Board responsibilities per AR 15–22.

e. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) manages logistical aspects of the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

f. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition), ASA(RDA), will establish policy and guidance in the management of nuclear reactors used exclusively for research, development, and testing.

g. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) will supervise counterintelligence support to nuclear sites and activities and establish the Army Personnel Security Program (AR 380–67).

h. The Inspector General (TIG) will direct and perform an independent assessment of the Army Nuclear Surety and Nuclear Safety Programs to ensure compliance with the nuclear operational policies established by the DCSOPS, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), and other agencies within and outside the Department of Defense (DOD).

i. The Surgeon General (TSG) will establish medical policies and procedures in support of the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

j. The Chief of Public Affairs (CPA) will manage public affairs activities in support of the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

k. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), will develop and publish doctrine for NAIRA, tactical nuclear operations, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

l. Major Army commanders (MACOM) will ensure that command nuclear surety programs are consistent with this regulation.

m. Commanders of Army components of unified or specified commands will be guided by the policies and procedures of this regulation. When unified or specified command policies and procedures and those of this regulation differ, the more stringent will govern.

n. Commanders of organizations with a nuclear mission will establish a surety program per this regulation. Command surety programs will include all mission activities that directly support the unit's or activity's nuclear or nuclear support mission.

1–5. Program concept
a. The Army Nuclear Surety Program is designed to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of nuclear weapons in the custody of the U.S. Army. It also provides controls to prevent the loss of special nuclear material (SNM), nuclear accidents, incidents, or unauthorized weapons employment.

b. The correlation of a variety of Army functions and activities is necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons and materiel are kept in a safe and secure environment and that these weapons will function reliably when required. To be effective, this correlation must be within existing command and staff structures, consistent with operational requirements, and continually emphasized.

c. Nuclear surety program activities address every aspect of the stockpile–to–target sequence (STS) of nuclear weapons and the operational life of nuclear reactors. These activities include—

(1) Nuclear and explosive safety programs and procedures to ensure compliance with approved safety rules and technical procedures.

(2) Physical security measures to preclude unauthorized access to and use of nuclear weapons, materiel, ancillary equipment, and documents.

(3) Measures taken during peacetime to enhance the survivability of nuclear weapons.

(4) Procedures to ensure the reliability of personnel designated for or assigned to nuclear duty positions.

(5) Procedures to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon components, and nuclear weapon systems.

(6) Logistical procedures (i.e., procurement, issue, storage, handling, maintenance, and transportation).

(7) Operational procedures that impact on the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of nuclear weapons and the safety and security of nuclear reactors.

(8) NAIRA.

(9) EMR hazard control.

(10) Evaluation and certification of nuclear–capable units.

1–6. Nuclear surety boards and officers

a. AC and RC commanders down to installation, arsenal, depot, division, separate brigade, regiment, group, or community level who are responsible for nuclear surety programs will establish a surety board and appoint a nuclear surety officer to assist them in accomplishing their nuclear surety duties. (Commanders of CONUS installations that support a single explosive ordnance disposal(EOD) unit and have no other organization or activity with a nuclear surety mission may appoint a surety coordinator as the single point of contact on the installation command staff for nuclear surety matters. The surety coordinator will ensure that all installation nuclear surety program support requirements are met.) Commanders responsible for nuclear surety programs at levels below those listed above are not required to establish a nuclear surety board; however, they are encouraged to designate nuclear surety officers.

(1) AC nuclear surety boards below the installation, corps, or division level may be consolidated into a combined command and installation or command and community board. Combined surety boards are responsible for performing nuclear surety board functions for all consolidated activities.

(2) RC boards may be consolidated into either a National Guard State Adjutant General (AG) or Major U.S. Army Reserve Command(MUSARC) surety board. When consolidated, these boards are responsible for performing the nuclear surety board functions of all subordinate activities.

b. The commander or a command group member should chair the surety board.

c. An active and dynamic nuclear surety board is key to the success of a command's or activity's nuclear surety program. Surety boards will assist the commander by—

(1) Serving as a focal point for surety issues.

(2) Reviewing surety directives of higher headquarters to determine their impact on the organization's surety program.

(3) Developing the command's surety program.

(4) Reviewing and changing command administrative procedures, operational and contingency plans, standing operating procedures-(SOP), and emergency plans to ensure that surety matters are adequately considered.

(5) Developing solutions to command surety problems.

(6) Recommending allocation of resources to support surety–related operational and training activities.

(7) Monitoring and reviewing required nuclear training activities.

(8) Establishing local procedures to implement the command's PRP.

(9) Ensuring close coordination of all staff sections and activities that participate in the command's nuclear surety program.

d. Surety board membership

(1) Nuclear surety boards should include representatives from all staff elements and external support agencies that support the surety program. Actual board composition will depend on the command's nuclear mission and the staff elements and external support agencies that support it.

(2) Commanders will establish an orientation program to ensure that new board members understand the command's nuclear surety program and their responsibilities.

e. Nuclear surety officers and surety coordinators—

(1) Should be selected based on their knowledge of nuclear weapons technology, operational experience, and broad practical experience in nuclear surety management. These officers should have direct access to the commander.

(2) Are responsible to the commander for the day–to–day management of the command's nuclear surety program.

(3) Monitor and evaluate the command's surety status.

(4) Act as single point of contact for command nuclear surety matters.

(5) Maintain liaison with higher, adjacent, and lower surety boards.

1–7. Supplemental guidance

a. This regulation—

(1) Is designed to provide commanders maximum flexibility in selecting " optional" procedures to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of the nuclear weapons for which they are responsible.

(2) May be cited by commanders as the authority for requesting support or items of equipment necessary to implement authorized optional procedures that will enhance the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of nuclear weapons for which they are responsible.

(3) Does not restrict the authority of a commander to deviate from its policies and procedures in an emergency.

b. FM 100–50 prescribes doctrine and procedures for units with a nuclear mission operating under periods of increased defense readiness condition or in combat. It also contains guidance to commanders and staffs in functions peculiar to nuclear missions and capabilities.

Chapter 2
Physical Security and Survivability

2–1. Nuclear weapons security

AR 50–5–1 prescribes the physical security standards and criteria for fixed installations that store, handle, or have custody of nuclear weapons or nuclear components. Along with chapter 4 of this regulation, it establishes security requirements for the logistical movement of nuclear weapons or nuclear components.

2–2. Nuclear reactor security

AR 190–54 prescribes the physical security policy, criteria, and standards for securing reactor facilities and the SNM used as fuel by these reactors. AR 50–5–1 establishes policy for planning recovery operations of SNM.

2–3. Nuclear weapon survivability

AR 11–20 establishes Army policy for the implementation of the Army Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces Survivability, Security, and Safety (NSNFS3) Program.

Chapter 3
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

Section I
General

3–1. Scope

This chapter establishes the Army Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and implements DOD Directive 5210.42. The PRP is designed to ensure the highest possible standards of individual reliability in personnel assigned to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons, nuclear components, and reactor facilities. The PRP applies to U.S. citizens who are active duty military personnel, DOD civil service employees, and civilian contractor personnel.

3–2. PRP elements

The PRP is a DOD program. Its features include—

a. Identification and designation of critical and controlled nuclear duty positions.

b. Selection, screening, and evaluation of personnel on the basis of a personnel security investigation (PSI) that is valid and current for the PRP and a security clearance (para 3–6), a screening of local personnel records, and an evaluation of medical history and present physical condition.

c. A personal interview and briefing conducted by the certifying official.

d. Certification of acceptability for the PRP by the certifying official.

e. Certification of training and proficiency by the certifying official.

f. Assignment to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position.

g. Continuing evaluation.

h. Restriction from performance of nuclear duties, when required.

i. Temporary or permanent disqualification of unreliable personnel, when required.

j. Administrative termination of personnel when no longer assigned to a nuclear duty position.

k. Requalification of disqualified personnel.

3–3. PRP policy

a. It is DOD policy to ensure that nuclear weapons are not subject to loss, theft, sabotage, unauthorized use or destruction, accidental damage, or jettison. National security and welfare require that only those personnel who have demonstrated unswerving loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness, and discretion of the highest order be assigned to perform duties that meet the criteria established for critical or controlled nuclear duty positions(nuclear duties).

b. In peacetime the PRP program and all its administrative requirements apply to personnel who have access to, or control access to, war reserve nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, nuclear components, sealed authenticators, permissive action link(PAL) cipher system material, missile computer tapes, or nuclear reactors. These personnel perform nuclear duties. This program does not apply to the RC in peacetime. However, RC commanders should assign only the best and most reliable personnel to table of organization and equipment (TOE) or modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions that would, if war reserve nuclear weapons were present, be designated as nuclear duty positions (para 3–5).

c. In periods of increased defense readiness condition and wartime, commanders of nuclear–capable units will continue to apply the philosophy of the PRP. While not required to comply with its administrative requirements, commanders must continue to select only the most reliable individuals to perform wartime nuclear duties.

d. Except as noted in paragraph 3–3 *e*, only military or civilian DOD personnel who are U.S. citizens will be assigned to nuclear duty positions.

e. When it is determined that performance of nuclear duties by DOD personnel is not feasible, the MACOM commander may authorize a DOD contractor to perform those duties. However, DOD contractors will not be authorized to perform security functions associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear components.

(1) Contractor employees who perform nuclear duties will meet the reliability standards of this chapter.

(2) The requirements outlined in appendix B will be included in all contracts for such services. The contractor's security office will be advised of these requirements.

(3) Nuclear duties performed by contractor employees will be limited to those authorized by the MACOM commander. These duties will be performed only on those Army installations or in those cleared–contractor facilities authorized by the MACOM commander.

(4) The Army contracting officer's representative (COR), designated in the contract, will be the certifying official for those contractor employees authorized to perform nuclear duties.(The COR will be responsible for ensuring that contracts are updated to comply with revisions to this chapter.)

f. The certifying official–the immediate commander or if civil service, the director who is responsible for the performance of the unit's or activity's nuclear–related mission–is ultimately responsible for the proper implementation of the unit's or activity's PRP. Support agency personnel responsible for conducting initial screening and continuing evaluation of individuals being considered for or assigned to nuclear duty positions must ensure that all potentially disqualifying information is forwarded to the certifying official for consideration. Although the certifying official may request information or advice from any activity capable of providing or interpreting information, the decision to qualify an individual for, or to disqualify an individual from, the PRP is the responsibility of the certifying official.

g. No one will be assigned to a nuclear duty position until screened and certified by the certifying official as being suitable for the PRP.

(1) Personnel will not be school–trained for nuclear duties (para 3–5 *c*(3)) unless screened and determined suitable for the PRP. To avoid personnel turbulence, this evaluation will be completed as early in the assignment process as possible.

(2) Personnel may receive unit on–the–job training(OJT) during the PRP screening process if they have a security clearance equal to the level of classified information to which access will be required. These personnel will not be granted access to nuclear weapons, reactors, sealed authenticators, missile computer tapes containing actual targeting data, or PAL cipher material. OJT will be immediately terminated for those personnel disqualified from the PRP during the screening process.

h. Disqualification from the PRP is not an adverse personnel action and is not to be considered as such nor is it to be considered as an adverse reflection upon the individual.

i. Certifying officials will—

(1) Ensure that personnel being considered for assignment to the PRP receive a medical evaluation (para 3–15).

(2) Interview all candidates for assignment to PRP positions(para 3–13).

(3) Ensure that personnel assigned to PRP positions are continually evaluated (para 3–19).

(4) Promptly remove from nuclear duties any individual whose reliability becomes suspect and take action to expeditiously resolve the issue and either reinstate or permanently disqualify the individual (para 3–24).

(5) Ensure that individuals assigned to nuclear duties meet the standards of the PRP and are qualified (adequately trained) and proficient in the performance of nuclear duties.

j. Changes in an individual's PRP assignment status will be reported per AR 680–29, AR 640–10, and DA Pam 600–8–1.

k. A commander or director of an organization or activity authorized a colonel (O–6), civilian GM/GS–15, or above, as commander or director, may delegate to military or civilian chiefs of major subordinate elements, as well as to chiefs of appropriate staff sections, authority to perform the duties of the certifying official. This authority will only be delegated to supervisors who can maintain sufficient personal contact with individuals assigned to nuclear duty positions to allow for their continual evaluation. Commanders or directors who delegate this authority become the reviewing official (para 3–25).

l. Personnel who do not meet the criteria established for assignment to the PRP will not be selected for command of a nuclear–capable unit or activity. Before assuming command, personnel will be screened, evaluated, and determined to meet the criteria of the PRP.

m. Screening and evaluation for the chemical PRP, per AR 50–6, is commensurate with that for assignment to a controlled nuclear position.

Section II
Nuclear Duty Positions

3–4. Identifying nuclear duty positions

a. Certifying officials will identify nuclear duty positions required to accomplish their mission and designate each position as either critical or controlled.

(1) Only the minimum number of positions necessary to meet mission requirements will be designated. The certifying official will review these positions at least annually to ensure that they are kept to the minimum number required.

(2) Determination of whether or not a position is critical or controlled will be based on the actual duties to be performed regardless of either the TOE (MTOE) or TDA position title or required military occupational specialty (MOS).

(3) Designated positions will be correlated with the unit's or activity's TOE (MTOE)/TDA positions by the certifying official. The certifying official will ensure that these positions are requisition coded per AR 680–29, paragraph 3–9, and AR 614–200, paragraph 2–13, by the supporting Personnel Service Center (PSC) or by the Regional Personnel Center (RPC) and SIDPERS Interface Branch (SIB).

(4) Critical and controlled positions will be identified on the unit's nuclear duty position roster (NDPR) (para 3–8).

(5) Vacant nuclear duty positions will be filled as rapidly as possible.

b. Parent units will not duplicate designated nuclear duty positions identified by subordinate elements.

c. Documentation of the annual PRP position review may be fulfilled by listing all nuclear duty positions on an NDPR.Certifying officials that do not elect to list vacant PRP positions on their NDPR will maintain a separate listing of all PRP positions to satisfy this requirement.

3–5. Nuclear duty positions

Nuclear duty positions are designated as either critical or controlled (see glossary). Nuclear duty positions, by type, are described below.

a. Critical nuclear duty positions.

(1) Commanders of delivery units at battalion level and below.(Includes those individuals in units having peacetime custody of nuclear weapons who are delegated to act on behalf of the commander in ordering the launch or employment of a nuclear weapon.)

(2) Commanders of nuclear warhead support detachments and nuclear direct support (DS)/general support (GS) (DS/GS) support units.

(3) Nuclear support unit personnel and supervisors (to include quality assurance personnel) who perform, supervise, or inspect—

(a) Modifications.

(b) Retrofits.

(c) Limited–life component exchanges (LLCE).

(d) Nuclear weapons maintenance beyond the normal mission capability of a nuclear weapon delivery unit.

(4) Personnel in command and control (C2) positions including—

(a) Personnel who control, safeguard, or use sealed authenticators.

(b) PAL recode team and PAL management control team (PMCT)personnel.

(c) Personnel who control or use missile computer tapes for nuclear weapon systems.

(5) EOD personnel qualified for and assigned to an organization with a mission to render–safe nuclear weapons and/or improvised nuclear devices (IND).

(6) Nuclear weapons custodians and their alternates.

(7) Nuclear weapons couriers.

b. Controlled nuclear duty positions.

(1) Delivery unit or custodial personnel and supervisors who perform assembly, disassembly, maintenance, inspection, prefire, or fire procedures on war reserve nuclear weapons.

(2) Nuclear support unit personnel and supervisors who handle, transport, or launch nuclear weapons.

(3) Handling and transport personnel and supervisors, including crews of vehicles involved in the logistical movement of war reserve nuclear weapons.

(4) Crews of mission aircraft involved in the movement of war reserve nuclear weapons.

(5) Crew members of escort aircraft who are capable, through use of on–board weapons, of damaging nuclear weapons involved in air movements.

(6) Security personnel who—

(a) Control access into an exclusion or limited area.

(b) Monitor intrusion detection systems (IDS) for limited and exclusion areas.

(c) Are armed and assigned to security posts (both fixed and mobile) at fixed storage or alert sites and who have direct line of sight to and could damage a nuclear weapon.

(d) Control access to weapons during movements.

(7) Nuclear weapons accountable officers and their alternates.

(8) Personnel assigned to perform emergency destruction or emergency evacuation of nuclear weapons at fixed storage or alert sites.

(9) EOD personnel not qualified for render–safe procedures but who are assigned contingency duties for nuclear accidents or incidents that could require handling of nuclear weapons or nuclear materiel.

(10) Intrusion detection system (IDS) and weapons access delay system (WADS) maintenance and repair personnel.

(11) Personnel who perform or supervise operations on nuclear reactors.

(12) Armed personnel assigned to security posts at reactor facilities.

c. Supplemental guidance.

(1) Instructors who do not have access to nuclear weapons are not in nuclear duty positions.

(2) The nuclear duty position of inspector general (IG)personnel that conduct nuclear weapons technical inspections (NWTI)and who require access will be at least equal to that of the nuclear duty position being inspected.

(3) Personnel undergoing nuclear–related training for subsequent assignment to nuclear duty positions or award of a nuclear–related MOS do not occupy nuclear duty positions.However, once screened and determined suitable for the PRP, these personnel will be continually evaluated during the training program.Because dental problems are usually transitory, identification of dental records of students attending Army technical schools and reporting of medication administered to them as a result of dental treatment are not required.

(4) The position of certifying official will be designated as the highest category nuclear duty position certified. Unless otherwise required, the position of the reviewing official—the person who appoints and certifies the acceptability of the certifying official–need not be identified as a PRP position.

(5) Commanders of noncustodial units that do not possess nuclear weapons or provide custody for nuclear weapons except during conditions of increased defense readiness condition or during contingencies will identify only those critical C2 positions required to perform their mission and that of the certifying official as nuclear duty positions. Identification of controlled positions in noncustodial units is not authorized unless the unit has a Joint Tenancy Agreement, Memorandum of Agreement, or other agreement that requires support of operations at a fixed peacetime storage or active alert site. Commanders of these units will identify only those controlled positions required to meet the provisions of such agreements.

3–6. Personnel security investigations and clearance requirements (see table 3–1)

a. Critical nuclear duty positions.

(1) *Prerequisites.*

(a) Personnel assigned or scheduled for assignment to critical nuclear duty positions must have a favorable (para 3–6*a*(2) *(c)*) background investigation (BI) or special background investigation (SBI) completed within the past 5 years (the date completed is reflected in part II of the "Date Investigation Completed" block of DA Form 873, Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination) of the assignment and there must have been no break in active duty military service or DOD employment of more than 1 year since the investigation was completed (para 3–6 *c*(1).Once assigned, the 5–year periodic reinvestigation (PR)required by AR 380–67 will be complied with.

(b) For initial assignment and following completion of a PR, the certifying official must review the results (dossier) of the investigation (para 3–6 *a*(2)) if the U.S.Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) determined that the investigation revealed potentially disqualifying information. The certifying official will

make a determination of the individual's reliability based on this review using the criteria in paragraph 3–11.

(c) Pending dossier review, the certifying official may place an individual being considered for assignment to a critical nuclear duty position under continuing evaluation and begin nuclear–related training. However, the individual will not be assigned to a nuclear duty position until the dossier is reviewed and a determination of reliability is made.

(d) After review of the dossier and determination that the individual is suitable for assignment to a critical position, the certifying official may assign the individual to a critical nuclear duty position.

(e) The assignment status of individuals assigned to critical positions for whom a PR is requested after the 5–year anniversary of their PSI will change to interim certified pending completion of the BI or SBI.

(f) The assignment status of individuals assigned to critical positions for whom a PR is submitted prior to the 5–year anniversary will not change.

(g) The assignment status of individuals who have requested retirement from active duty will not change at the 5–year interval. A request for reinvestigation cannot be submitted per AR 380–67. These personnel may be retained in the PRP until retirement.

(2) *Dossier review.*

(a) Evidence of potentially disqualifying information will be reflected in part III (Remarks) of the computer–generated DA Form 873 from CCF by the notation" Dossier review required for critical nuclear duty." When this notation is present, CCF will forward the dossier to the address in the" return results to" block if—

1. Both " Nuclear Weapon Position" and "Other" with the notation" PRP/Surety Required" are checked in block 6 (Reason for Investigation) of DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation); and the statement " DOD 5200.2R, para 3–504, applies, the annotation Personnel Occupying Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Position" is present in block 20 (Remarks) or,

2. The " Top Secret" and " PRP/Surety" blocks in item 8 (Reason for Request) are checked and" Critical Nuclear Duty" is annotated in item 14(Remarks) of DA Form 5247–R (Request for Security Determination).

(b) If part III of the computer generated DA Form 873 from CCF is blank, a new DA Form 873 must be requested by submitting a DA Form 5247–R to CDR, CCF (PCCF–M). (Blocks indicated in preceding paragraph must be annotated.) The certifying official may assign the individual to a nuclear duty position pending receipt of the new DA Form 873. Individuals for whom a DA Form 873 has been locally prepared per AR 380–67 may also be assigned to a nuclear duty position pending receipt of the CCF computer–generated DA Form 873.

(c) When a dossier is devoid of potentially disqualifying information, the notation " PRP/Surety Considered"will appear in part III of the DA Form 873.

(d) When a new DA Form 873 that is based on completion of a PR is received and part III states " Dossier review required for critical nuclear duty" for an individual currently assigned to a critical nuclear duty position, the certifying official will request and review potentially disqualifying information; however, assignment to a critical nuclear duty position may be continued pending this review. For subsequent assignments, review of the same investigative results within a current 5–year PSI interval is not required.

(e) Units will normally receive the dossier within 10 work days of receipt of the DA Form 873 from CCF. If the dossier is not received, CCF's Customer Assistance Branch (AV 923–7613 or commercial (301) 677–7613) will be contacted for assistance.

(3) *Interim certification.*

(a) Interim certification and assignment to a critical nuclear duty position is authorized pending completion of either the required BI or PR provided that—

1. The individual possesses the proper security clearance.

2. There has been no break in active duty military service or DOD employment in excess of 1 year since completion of the last PSI(para 3–6 *c*(1)).

3. A favorably completed Entrance National Agency Check(ENTNAC), National Agency Check (NAC), or National Agency Check and Written Inquiries (NACI) has been completed within the past 5 years or a favorably completed but outdated BI or SBI exists.

4. A request for a new BI has been submitted to Defense Investigative Service (DIS). (DD Form 1879 will be filed in MPRJ per AR 640–10.)

5. The other requirements of the PRP screening process have been fulfilled.

(b) Once a new BI is requested, interim certification and assignment to a critical nuclear duty position is also authorized after receipt of the favorable results of the NAC portion of the BI.(Note: Advance notification of NAC results must be requested on DD Form 1879.)

(c) Personnel granted interim certification are not permitted to perform nuclear duties under the two–person concept with another interim–certified individual.

(d) If a new PSI is not received within 150 days of the date the request was sent, a DA Form 5247–R will be submitted to Commander, CCF, ATTN: PCCF–MCO, Fort Meade, MD 20755–5250. (See AR 380–67 for guidance on completing this form.) A copy of the DD Form 1879 annotated with "Tracer" and the current date written diagonally across the front of the form may be used instead of the DA Form 5247–R.The certifying official will determine whether to continue or terminate interim certification on the basis of CCF's reply to this follow–up.

b. Controlled nuclear duty positions.

(1) *Prerequisites.*

(a) Personnel assigned or scheduled for assignment to controlled nuclear duty positions must have a favorably completed ENTNAC or higher PSI completed within the past 5 years of assignment and there must have been no break in active duty military service or DOD employment of more than 1 year since the investigation was completed. (For military, the date the investigation was completed is reflected in part II, " Date Investigation Completed," block of DA Form 873. For civilians, this block reflects the date the initial PSI (NACI) was conducted for employment and security clearance. The date of subsequent PSI (NAC) for PRP purposes will be reflected in part III, " Remarks.")

(b) Assignment to controlled positions is also authorized when the PSI was completed more than 5 years prior to assignment if the person has been in a PRP position (either critical or controlled or in the chemical PRP) within the last 5 years. (The 5–year interval begins at administrative termination and ends when part IV, DA Form 3180–R, Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record, is completed.) If the individual's records do not show a previous PRP assignment and the certifying official determines by review of the individual's assignment record and through personal interview that the individual was assigned to a nuclear PRP or chemical PRP duty position within the preceding 5–year period, a new PSI is not required.

(2) *Dossier review.* Review of investigative results based upon an ENTNAC, NAC, or NACI by the certifying official is not required for personnel being assigned to controlled positions. Assignment to controlled nuclear duty positions is authorized for personnel being assigned to a controlled nuclear duty position pending review of investigative results of a BI or SBI.

(3) *Interim certification.*

(a) Interim certification and assignment to a controlled nuclear duty position is authorized pending completion of a new NAC or NACI provided that—

1. The individual possesses the proper security clearance.

2. There has been no break in active duty military service or DOD employment in excess of 1 year since the last PSI was completed.

3. A request for a new NAC or NACI has been submitted. (The PRP block in the" Reason for Request" section of DD Form 398–2 (Personnel Security Questionnaire (NAC)) must be annotated and "

PRP PR" written across the front of the form. This indicates that the request is for a PR for the PRP.)

4. The other requirements of the PRP screening process have been fulfilled.

(b) Personnel granted interim certification are not permitted to perform nuclear duties under the two–person concept with another interim–certified individual.

(c) If PSI results are not received within 90 days of the date the request was submitted, a DA Form 5247–R will be submitted.(A copy of the DD Form 398–2 annotated with " Tracer" and with the current date written diagonally across the front of the form may be used instead of the DA Form 5247–R.)The certifying official will determine whether to continue or terminate interim certification on the basis of CCF's reply to this follow–up.

c. Supplemental guidance.

(1) Service academy cadets are considered the same as active duty military when determining break in service. Reservists on active duty for training (ADT) and Reserve Officer Training Corp(ROTC) cadets are not considered to have been on active duty when determining break in service.

(2) Although requirements for mandatory review of investigative files (dossiers) are indicated above, certifying officials may request that they be made available for review whenever the certifying official believes it necessary (see AR 380–67).

(3) Individuals assigned to nuclear duty positions must have a security clearance commensurate with the security classification of the information to which access is required by the position.

(4) To ensure that personnel with MOSs 911A, 55D, or 55G and Quality Assurance Specialists—Ammunition Surveillance (QASAS, GS 1910–series) maintain PRP eligibility for worldwide assignment to critical nuclear duty positions, BIs or SBIs will be kept current per AR 380–67, paragraph 3–711, regardless of whether current duties require assignment to a nuclear duty position or access to top secret (TS)/sensitive compartmented information (SCI) material.

3–7. Training requirements

a. Personnel with a PRP–related MOS (app C), to include officers with specialty classification of 13 or 91, assigned to perform nuclear duties will be trained and qualified as specified in AR 611–201, AR 611–112, or AR 600–200.

b. Personnel with specialties not included above (e.g., 95B,64C) will be MOS qualified prior to performance of nuclear related duties.

c. With the exception of commanders of nuclear–capable units and nuclear weapons custodians who are considered qualified by virtue of their selection for these positions, all personnel assigned to perform nuclear duties for which attendance at Service school is not required (e.g., emergency action procedures (EAP), emergency destruction (ED)) will be trained by instruction and/or supervised training conducted at the local or unit level or both prior to performance of such duties.

3–8. The nuclear duty position roster (NDPR)

a. Units and activities that are assigned a nuclear related mission will establish and maintain an NDPR which lists nuclear duty positions identified by the certifying official.

b. Certifying officials will provide a copy of the NDPR and any changes to the supporting personnel office, medical activity or contract physician, dental facility, and alcohol and drug control officer.

c. The certifying official or an individual designated to sign for the certifying official will authenticate the last page of the NDPR. Individuals who authenticate the NDPR must be assigned to a PRP position listed on the NDPR.

d. At a minimum, the NDPR will be marked and protected as" FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

e. The NDPR, which may be in any format, will contain the following information:

(1) Unit designation.

(2) Effective date.

(3) Name (last, first, MI).

(4) Social Security Number (SSN).

(5) Category (critical or controlled) of each position.

(6) PSI and date PSI completed.

(7) Nuclear duty performed. When an individual is assigned additional nuclear duties, separate line entries are not required for each nuclear duty performed. When an MTOE or TDA position adequately describes the nuclear duties performed, list only that.

(8) Page of page.

f. Placing an individual's name on the NDPR certifies that the individual is qualified and proficient in assigned nuclear duties.Individuals who are interim–certified will be clearly indicated as such on the NDPR. (This documents the certifying official's justification of the need for interim certification.)

g. Names of personnel restricted (para 3–20) or temporarily disqualified (para 3–23) from performing nuclear duties will not be deleted from the NDPR.

h. Each certifying official is required to maintain an NDPR.It is permissible to consolidate NDPR at battalion or equivalent level provided that the NDPR information of each subordinate unit is listed separately and authenticated by each subordinate unit's certifying official or a designated individual (para 3–8 *c*).

i. An organization with both a nuclear and chemical surety mission may consolidate its NDPR and chemical duty position rosters(CDPR) provided that nuclear and chemical duty positions are separately identified. (CDPR data will not be included in the annual PRP status report.)

j. The name, rank, and SSN of personnel required to be under continuing evaluation (DA Form 3180–R (see fig 3–1)completed through part V) but who are pending certification and assignment to a nuclear duty position will be listed in a separate section of the NDPR or on a separate roster. When listed on the NDPR, these personnel will be clearly identified as not being certified and assigned to nuclear duties. If maintained separately, rosters will be distributed in the same manner as the NDPR.

3–9. General

Because of the unpredictability of human behavior, the concept of personnel reliability is a vital element of the Army Nuclear Surety Program. An individual is presumed reliable when there is no evidence to the contrary. In the absence of a test for reliability, the PRP provides a process for preassignment screening and continuing evaluation of an individual's health, attitude, behavior, and duty performance while assigned to a nuclear duty position. An individual's acceptance for and retention in the PRP are determined by the certifying official based on evidence of reliability and on the absence of evidence to the contrary.

a. Personnel will be screened and evaluated—

(1) Before being certified and assigned to a nuclear duty position.

(2) By the losing organization before departure when orders direct reassignment to training leading to the award of a nuclear–related MOS (see app C) or a critical or controlled PRP position at a follow–on unit of assignment.

b. DA Form 3180–R (see fig 3–1) will be completed for each individual screened and evaluated for the PRP. The sequence of medical and personnel screening and administrative processing may be adapted to meet the needs of the certifying official or supporting agencies. Facsimile stamps will not be used for signatures required on the DA Form 3180–R. A determination of unsuitability may be made by the certifying official at any time during the screening process. (DA Form 3180–R will be locally reproduced on 8½– by 11–inch paper. This form is located at the back of the regulation.)

c. The certifying official of units receiving medical support from non–Army medical facilities or from U.S. civilian contract physicians will provide a copy of this regulation to the supporting medical facility or contract physician for use in evaluating Army personnel for the PRP.

d. Individuals enlisting or reenlisting for training in a nuclear–related MOS (app C) or applying for civilian appointment to a position requiring PRP qualification will be screened and evaluated for the PRP before enlistment, reenlistment, or appointment. Responsibility for preenlistment screening, using special criteria established

by PERSCOM, rests with the Personnel Security Screening Program interviewer at the Military Entrance Processing Station. For individuals desiring to reenlist for a nuclear–related MOS, the officer responsible for authorizing a nuclear MOS training reenlistment commitment will screen, evaluate(parts I through IV, DA Form 3180–R completed), and find the individual suitable for the PRP before reenlistment is approved. For civil service preappointment screening, the certifying official having the vacant position is responsible for ensuring that individuals applying for a position requiring PRP qualification meet the criteria established in this chapter.

3–10. Previously screened personnel

a. When an individual's last assignment was to a nuclear duty position within the same MACOM, the individual may, at the option of the new certifying official, be assigned to a nuclear duty position based upon the previous screening and evaluation. At a minimum, the requirements indicated below will be met. The DA Form 3180–R from the individual's last duty assignment may be used. (The next blank line in part V, DA Form 3180–R, will be completed to indicate that required briefing was done. If all lines in part V are filled, the current DA Form 3180–R may be continued by entering the individual's name, grade and SSN and completing part V of a new DA Form 3180–R and stapling it to the current form.)

(1) PSI and security clearance will be verified.

(2) Personnel and health records will be reviewed by the certifying official. (This ensures that the certifying official has current information. It also serves to strengthen the working relationship between the certifying official and support agencies.)

(3) The individual will be briefed per paragraph 3–16 *c*.

(4) Copies of the individual's DA Form 3180–R will be distributed per paragraph 3–16 *e*.

b. When an individual's last assignment was to a nuclear duty position outside the MACOM or if the individual's last assignment was not to a nuclear duty position, a complete rescreening is required. (A new DA Form 3180–R will be completed.)

c. Upon a change of certifying official, the new certifying official will normally conduct the records review indicated in paragraph 3–10 *a*(2) within 30 days of assuming duty as the certifying official.

3–11. Reliability standards

a. Qualifying factors. Selection of personnel for the PRP will be based on the following factors:

(1) Physical competence, mental alertness, and technical proficiency or aptitude commensurate with duty or training requirements.

(2) Evidence of dependability in accepting responsibilities and effectively performing duties in an approved manner and flexibility in adjusting to changes in the working environment.

(3) Evidence of good social adjustment, emotional stability, and the ability to exercise sound judgment in meeting adverse or emergency situations.

(4) A positive attitude toward nuclear duties and the PRP.

b. Disqualifying factors. Any of the following traits or conduct will normally be considered disqualifying for the PRP:

(1) Alcohol abuse.

(a) Any irresponsible use of an alcoholic beverage leading to misconduct, unacceptable social behavior, or impairment of an individual's performance of duty, physical or mental health, financial responsibility, or personal relationships.

(b) Persons who are diagnosed dependent upon alcohol per current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)criteria by a medical doctor or clinical director of an alcohol and drug abuse prevention and control program (ADAPCP) facility will not be selected for or retained in the PRP and are not eligible for consideration for requalification until 1 year– beginning on the date the individual enters the program–after entry into and satisfactory completion of either Track II or Track III of ADAPCP rehabilitation. Both conditions (i.e., satisfactory completion of a Track II or Track III ADAPCP rehabilitation program and 1 year's passage of time since entry into either track) must be met before reconsideration for PRP eligibility is possible.

(2) Drug abuse.

(a) Drug abuse is the illegal, wrongful, or improper use of any narcotic substance or its derivatives, cannabis or its derivatives, or other controlled substances (to include prescribed medications).For the purposes of this regulation, drug abuse also includes the illegal or wrongful manufacture, possession, or distribution of these substances. It is not intended that isolated or experimental use of cannabis (i.e., marijuana or hashish) before entry into a PRP assignment be automatically disqualifying. Although the certifying official must determine what constitutes experimental (isolated)use, the following is provided as a basis for making this determination: Short–term use of cannabis that occurred solely out of curiosity may be considered experimental provided the use was limited in duration and the individual is not using and has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic substance in the future.

(b) Persons who are diagnosed as dependent on any narcotic substance or its derivatives, cannabis or its derivatives, or other controlled substance per current DSM criteria by a medical doctor will not be selected for or retained in the PRP and are not eligible for requalification.

(c) Persons who have used a hallucinogenic drug with a potential for flashback (including LSD, PCP or its derivatives, Psilocybin, mescaline, or any other substance with similar properties) will not be selected for or retained in the PRP.

(3) Negligence or delinquency in performance of duty.

(4) Conviction by a military or civil court of a serious offense or a pattern of behavior or actions that is reasonably indicative of a contemptuous attitude toward the law or other duly constituted authority.

(5) Significant physical or mental condition substantiated by competent medical authority or adverse behavioral characteristic or aberrant behavior (e.g., lack of emotional or mental maturity or sense of responsibility, evidence of inadequate social adjustment, or objection to bearing and use of arms when necessary) that the certifying official considers as prejudicial to the reliable performance of nuclear duties.

(6) Poor attitude or lack of motivation.

(7) Loss of PRP–related MOS qualification.

c. Information that the certifying official believes should be brought to the attention of future certifying officials may be noted on the reverse of the DA Form 3180–R. Such notations will comply with AR 600–37.

d. Adverse information that the certifying official considers to be potentially disqualifying that is not a matter of official record may be placed in the soldier's file provided that AR 600–37 has been complied with. The certifying official will request that servicing civilian personnel officers (CPO) document any such adverse information on civil service personnel per applicable Federal Personnel Manuals. The certifying official will report appropriate adverse information to CCF using DA Form 5248–R (Report of Unfavorable Information for Security Determination) per AR 380–67.

3–12. Administrative (levy) screening

a. Personnel with orders directing reassignment to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position or to training leading to the award of a nuclear–related MOS (app C) will be screened and evaluated by the losing organization prior to travel.

b. MACOM commanders will ensure that procedures for administrative levy screening are established within their command and made a matter of command emphasis.

c. Personnel who act as " certifying officials"only for the purpose of administrative screening need not be in the PRP.

d. Personnel and health records of individuals found suitable for the PRP will be identified per paragraphs 3–17 and 3–18 and the individual will be placed under continuing evaluation.

e. Individuals on levy who are in the PRP will not be administratively terminated from the PRP.

f. Individuals will not be found unsuitable for the PRP on the basis of an inadequate or outdated PSI. If the PSI is invalid for the

PRP (para 3–6), a request for a new PSI will be submitted as part of the screening. Travel will not be delayed pending completion of a PSI. However, prior to the individual's departure, the command will verify the status of the PSI and ensure that the individual has not been denied a security clearance. Travel will only be denied if final PSI results are unfavorable and/or if a clearance is denied.

g. Individuals found unsuitable for the PRP will be permanently disqualified from the PRP using procedures of paragraph 3–24.

h. Disqualified personnel will not depart the losing organization until new reassignment instructions are received.

3–13. Initial interview

a. Prior to initiating the screening process, the certifying official (or a designated representative of the certifying official)will interview each PRP candidate. During this interview, the certifying official will—

(1) Inform the candidate of the provisions of the Privacy Act.(A copy of the Privacy Act Statement (see fig 3–2) will be furnished, if requested.) If the candidate objects to the required screening, the screening process will be discontinued and the individual will be permanently disqualified (para 3–24) from the PRP. (Refusal per the Privacy Act will be cited as the reason for disqualification in part VIII, DA Form 3180–R.)

(2) Review with the candidate the concept of the PRP and the reliability standards, both qualifying and disqualifying (para 3–11), for assignment to or retention in the PRP. The certifying official will ensure that the candidate understands the traits and conduct normally considered disqualifying. The certifying official will—

(a) Determine whether the candidate has ever used an hallucinogenic drug with a potential for flashback.

(b) Determine whether any of the other traits or conduct normally considered disqualifying exist.

(3) Emphasize that individual records and performance data must show that the candidate meets the high standards of the PRP.

(4) Explain the importance of PRP assignments and the responsibilities involved in nuclear duties.

(5) Explain the continuing evaluation aspects of the PRP, to include each individual's responsibility to actively participate in this evaluation.

(6) Advise the candidate that personnel found suitable for the PRP remain under continuous evaluation until either permanently disqualified or administratively terminated from the PRP.

(7) Complete part I, DA Form 3180–R.

b. Should the certifying official determine that the candidate is unsuitable for the PRP, the certifying official will terminate the PRP screening process and follow procedures for permanent disqualification (para 3–24). For applicants for civil service positions who are not current Federal employees, the certifying official will return the interview referral slip to the placement specialist.

c. Should the certifying official determine that the candidate is acceptable for further screening, the screening process will be completed per local procedures.

3–14. Personnel records screening

Because of the time required to obtain PSI results, it is usually best to begin with personnel records screening. The personnel officer (PSC, CPO, or unit) or a designated representative will screen the Military Personnel Records Jacket (MPRJ) or the civil service employee's official personnel folder (OPF) and complete part II, DA Form 3180–R. The screening official will—

a. Determine whether the PSI is valid for PRP purposes (para 3–6). If the PSI is not valid, a request for a new PSI will be submitted per AR 380–67 as part of the screening process.

b. Verify that the individual has not had a break in active duty military service or DOD employment of more than 1 year since the PSI was completed.

c. Determine the individual's citizenship. If the individual is not a U.S. citizen, the certifying official will be advised that the individual is ineligible for the PRP. When required, initiate a request for deletion from permanent change of station (PCS)assignment.

d. Determine if information that may preclude qualification for and assignment to a nuclear duty position is contained in the individual's records. When potentially disqualifying information is identified, it will be placed in a sealed envelop marked "Exclusive For" and provided to the certifying official per local procedures.

e. Process the DA Form 3180–R per local procedures.

3–15. Medical evaluation

a. The certifying official will ensure that all candidates for the PRP are medically evaluated as part of the screening process.This evaluation will be based on a thorough review of the individual's medical history and records if sufficiently comprehensive and current for this purpose. Dental records need not be evaluated as part of the initial screening process.

(1) A U.S. military medical officer, a U.S. civilian physician under DOD contract or employed by the U.S. Government, or other qualified nonphysician medical personnel (officer or enlisted)specifically designated by the supporting U.S. military medical treatment facility commander to screen medical records must personally screen the individual's records and complete part III, DA Form 3180–R.

(2) If available medical records are inadequate for evaluation by designated nonphysician medical personnel, or if the review raises a question as to an individual's physical or mental suitability for assignment to a PRP position, the case will be referred to a military medical officer or civilian physician for further evaluation. This evaluation will also consider any psychiatric aspects of the case, to include psychiatric consultation when required. A request for psychiatric evaluation of a DA civilian will be submitted to the civilian personnel officer who will arrange a fitness for duty examination.

(3) The screening official will annotate the SF 600(Chronological Record of Medical Care) with the following or a similar statement: " Preceding entries screened per AR 50–5." This statement will be followed by the name, grade, and signature of the official conducting the screening and the date of the screening.

b. The medical officer or civilian physician will advise the certifying official and, when appropriate, the reviewing official of any condition that may reflect on an individual's suitability for assignment to a PRP position. The certifying official will be advised of any prescribed use of medication or treatment that may detract from the ability of an individual to perform nuclear duties.

(1) Certifying and reviewing officials are authorized to review health records of individuals being screened for or in the PRP to make determinations required by this chapter. This review will normally be done with the assistance of a physician or nonphysician medical personnel who can advise on health record data that might otherwise be misinterpreted. Due to the sensitive and confidential nature of the health records, authority for review extends only to certifying and reviewing officials.

(2) Under 5 USC 552a, Public Law 93–579, Privacy Act of 1974, medical records may be disclosed to certifying and reviewing officials for PRP suitability determinations without a request from, or the consent of, the individual to whom the records pertain.Certifying and reviewing officials may not release or discuss the content of health records except as provided in the preceding paragraph.

c. When potentially disqualifying information is identified, it will be placed in a sealed envelope that will be marked "Exclusive For" and provided to the certifying official per local procedures.

d. Upon completion of medical screening, the DA Form 3180–R will be processed per local procedures.

3–16. Certifying official's evaluation and briefing

After personnel and medical records screening, the certifying official will review the DA Form 3180–R and any potentially disqualifying information provided, ensure that the required PSI has been completed or initiated, and determine if the individual is suitable for the PRP.

a. For individuals found suitable for the PRP, the certifying official will complete part IV, DA Form 3180–R.

(1) If the individual is being assigned to a nuclear duty position

in the certifying official's organization, the individual will be briefed as indicated in paragraph 3–16 *c*.

(2) For individuals determined to be unsuitable for assignment to the PRP, the certifying official will terminate the PRP screening process, complete part IV, DA Form 3180–R, and follow procedures for permanent disqualification (para 3–24).

b. If the individual is scheduled for school training or for a nuclear duty assignment at another unit, the certifying official will brief the individual on the provisions of the PRP and the importance of nuclear duties.

c. The certifying official's briefing will cover the following:

(1) That the individual has been found suitable for the PRP.

(2) The duties and responsibilities of the individual's nuclear duty position.

(3) Any hazards associated with nuclear–related duties.

(4) Appropriate nuclear weapon system safety rules and that portion of unit's safety program directly related to operations involving nuclear weapons.

(5) The two–person concept to include restrictions placed on interim–certified personnel.

(6) The current threat to nuclear weapons (or nuclear reactors)and physical security procedures used to counter this threat.

(7) Each person's obligation under the continuing evaluation aspects of the PRP. The individual will be advised to report promptly any factor or condition (to include use of prescribed medications) that may adversely affect either the individual's duty performance or that of fellow workers. The individual will also be advised to report any medication prescribed by or medical treatment received from non–DOD medical personnel or when medication or treatment is received from a medical treatment or dental facility that does not provide primary medical and dental care to the unit.

d. At the close of the briefing, the individual and the certifying official will complete part V, DA Form 3180–R. The individual's signature indicates that a briefing on the standards and objectives of the PRP was received and understood.

e. The DA Form 3180–R will be distributed as follows:

(1) The original will be sent to the custodian of the individual's MRPJ or OPF. (Only the current DA Form 3180–R to include any continuations will be retained.)

(2) One copy will be sent to the supporting medical activity.

(3) One copy will be sent to the supporting dental activity.

3–17. Identification of personnel records

Upon receipt of a DA Form 3180–R showing an individual is suitable for the PRP and is to be placed under continuing evaluation (part IV and V, DA Form 3180–R completed), the personnel officer will affix DA Label 164(Nuclear/Chemical Personnel Record Label) to the MPRJ or OPF. The original DA Form 3180–R will be filed in the permanent section of the MPRJ or in the semipermanent section of the OPF.

3–18. Identification of medical records

Upon receipt of a DA Form 3180–R showing an individual is suitable for the PRP and is to be placed under continuing evaluation (part IV and V, DA Form 3180–R completed) the individual's medical and dental records will be identified per AR 40–66. If the individual's records are maintained in an Army medical treatment or dental facility, DA Form 4515 (Personnel Reliability Program Record Identifier) will be filed in the folder. When records are maintained in another Service's medical treatment facility, that Service's form(s) may be used to identify Army records. The following types of records will also be identified when maintained apart from the individual's health records:

a. Inpatient (Clinical) treatment records.

b. Outpatient treatment records.

c. Clinical psychology individual case files.

d. Social work individual case files.

e. Alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation files.

3–19. Continuing evaluation

a. Continuing evaluation of personnel (including persons assigned to nuclear duty positions, students, trainees, and persons projected for nuclear duty assignments in other units) is key to the success of the PRP. Personnel assigned to nuclear duty positions;fellow workers and supervisors; and those who support the PRP, particularly medical and dental personnel and personnel who maintain personnel records, must immediately report to the certifying official any changes in attitude, behavior, or medical conditions that may affect an individual's judgment or reliability. This includes prompt notification of any prescribed medication, medical condition, or short–term stress that may impair an individual's duty performance. Oral or telephonic notification by medical or dental personnel will be confirmed in writing per local procedures. When routine medical support is provided by the host nation, the certifying official should establish procedures with the supporting physician to ensure prompt notification of prescribed medications, medical conditions, or short–term stress that may impair an individual's duty performance.

b. To ensure that continuing evaluation is effective, the certifying official will establish and maintain a close working relationship with supporting activities to ensure that they are fully aware of their PRP–related responsibilities and that required support is provided.

3–20. Restriction

When performance of duties is or may be impaired by the use of prescribed medication, temporary medical conditions, or short–term stress, the certifying official will restrict the individual from performing nuclear duties. (Temporary disqualification (para 3–23) does not apply.) Examples of where restriction is appropriate include—

a. An individual taking a medically prescribed drug.

b. Emotional disorientation due to family problems or the death or illness of a relative or family member.

c. A physical injury or other condition that temporarily impairs the individual's ability to perform nuclear duties.

3–21. Administrative termination of PRP status

a. Administrative termination—

(1) Establishes the date an individual was removed from a nuclear duty position for reasons other than permanent disqualification.

(2) Eliminates the requirement for continuing evaluation.

b. Personnel in nuclear duty positions will be administratively terminated when—

(1) Permanently removed from nuclear duties within their unit under any condition other than permanent disqualification.

(2) Reassignment instructions do not indicate the individual is projected for assignment to a nuclear duty position in the gaining organization or for training leading to the award of a nuclear–related MOS (see app C).

c. The certifying official will notify supporting medical and dental facilities and the personnel officer in writing that the individual is no longer assigned to a nuclear duty position and that continuing evaluation is terminated.

d. The following actions will be taken:

(1) The personnel officer will complete part VII, DA Form 3180–R. Only the original DA Form 3180–R will be retained in the MPRJ or OPF.

(2) DA Form 4515 will be removed from the health records; DA Label 164 will be removed from the MPRJ or OPF.

(3) When a soldier is administratively terminated, the SIDPERS PRPAS transaction will be submitted by use of reporting code" J."

e. If an individual who was screened and evaluated for the purpose of attending a Service school course of instruction academically fails the course, the DA Form 3180–R, DA Form 4515, and DA Label 164 will be removed from all records. This will be done provided the individual is scheduled for reclassification or training in a nonnuclear–related MOS and is not projected for assignment to a nuclear duty position.

Section IV
Disqualification and Requalification

3–22. General

Certifying officials will immediately remove from nuclear duty positions and temporarily or permanently disqualify individuals from the PRP when they fail to meet, or if there is reasonable cause to suspect that they no longer meet, the reliability standards specified in this chapter.

a. The type of disqualification (temporary or permanent) will depend on the circumstances, character, and transitory or continuing nature of the cause of the unsuitability.

b. Disqualification will be based on substantive evidence such as official records, medical evaluations, or competent witnesses. If a person is to be permanently disqualified for mental reasons, a psychiatric medical evaluation must be conducted. When making a reliability determination, the issue is not an individual's guilt or innocence of some particular offense. The issue is whether or not a person should be trained for, assigned to, or retained in a PRP position. Therefore, it is not necessary for an investigation to be completed, for disciplinary action (either civil or military) to have been taken, or for other personnel actions to be completed before the certifying official decides whether an individual is to be disqualified from or retained in the PRP. The final assessment of an individual's reliability or unreliability rests with the certifying official.

c. Disqualification from the PRP is not an adverse personnel action or an adverse reflection upon the individual. However, the reason for disqualification may be adverse and warrant action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or civil law or require other personnel actions (e.g., reclassification, separation, suspension of access to classified information as reported to CCF per AR 380–67, or reassignment).

3–23. Temporary disqualification

When there is reason for the certifying official to suspect an individual's reliability, the individual will be temporarily disqualified from the PRP.

a. The certifying official will immediately remove the individual from assigned nuclear duties and advise the individual of the temporary disqualification and the reason for it. The individual's name will not, however, be removed from the NDPR. This action will be confirmed in writing within 15 work days, unless the individual is returned earlier to nuclear duties. Additionally, the custodian of the MPRJ or OPF will be notified and will enter (pencil entry) the effective date of temporary disqualification in part VI, DA Form 3180–R.

b. The certifying official will promptly obtain information required to determine whether to reinstate or permanently disqualify the individual. If reinstated, the certifying official will inform the individual and the custodian of the MPRJ or OPF. (The pencil entry in part VI, DA Form 3180–R will be erased upon notification).

c. Temporarily disqualified military personnel will not be permanently reassigned or separated until either reinstated or permanently disqualified.

3–24. Permanent disqualification

When the certifying official determines that an individual fails to meet the reliability standards of this chapter, the individual will be immediately removed from nuclear duties and the NDPR. The certifying official will advise the individual of the reason for initiating permanent disqualification. Within 5 work days, the certifying official will notify the individual in writing of the reason(s) for permanent disqualification. This written notification will cite specific circumstances that support the certifying official's decision to disqualify. Except for a physical or mental condition documented in the member's medical record, statements such as " Alcohol abuse,"" Drug abuse,"" Contemptuous attitude," or "Court–martial conviction" are inadequate by themselves.

a. The notification letter will—

(1) Provide the rationale for disqualification in sufficient detail so that, if required, a future reviewing official will have adequate information to act upon a request for requalification.(Part VIII, DA Form 3180–R, will be similarly detailed.)

(2) Advise the individual that the disqualification action is subject to mandatory review by the reviewing official before any permanent entries are made in the individual's personnel records and that the individual will be advised of the outcome of the review.

(3) Inform the individual that a written explanation or rebuttal may be submitted within 5 work days of receipt of the letter.

(4) Request written acknowledgment of receipt of the letter of notification. If receipt is not acknowledged, the certifying official will attach a statement explaining its absence to the notification letter.

b. Permanent entries concerning the disqualification will not be made on either the DA Form 3180–R or in the individual's personnel records before final action by the reviewing official(para 3–25).

(1) If the reviewing official sustains disqualification of an individual being screened for the PRP, the certifying official will complete parts IV and VIII, DA Form 3180–R.

(2) If the reviewing official sustains disqualification of an individual already in the PRP, the certifying official will complete part VIII, DA Form 3180–R. In the block titled " Reason for disqualification," the certifying official will check the appropriate block(s) and provide a brief summary of the rationale for disqualification.

(3) When a reviewing official sustains disqualification of an individual, the certifying official will notify the supporting personnel administration center (PAC) (SIDPERS clerk) to submit the appropriate SIDPERS PRPAS transaction, reporting either code P(critical) or code R (controlled).

c. Within 10 work days of receipt of the reviewing official's approval of disqualification, the DA Form 3180–R will be distributed as follows:

(1) Original, with copies of the letter of notification, the signed acknowledgment or an explanation for its absence, and a copy of the reviewing official's approval will be forwarded through the PSC/ RPC to the service " S" fiche of the official military personnel file (OMPF) or directly to the civilian personnel officer (if civil service) for filing in the OPF. (The disqualifying DA Form 3180–R of a contractor employee will not be provided to the employer when a contractor employee is disqualified (para *i* below).)

(2) One copy and a copy of the reviewing official's approval will be provided to the custodian of the MPRJ for necessary action(para *d, g,* and *h* below) and filing.

(3) One copy or other written notification of disqualification will be provided to the custodians of the individual's medical and dental records for necessary action (para *e* and *f* below).

(4) One reproduced copy of the DA Form 3180–R will be sent directly from the unit to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN:PCCF–LNO, ALEX VA 22332–0400. Reports of disqualified contractor personnel will also be sent to this address. (Transmittal documents are not necessary.)

d. DA Form 2–1 (Personnel Qualification Record, Part II)of disqualified enlisted personnel will be annotated by the PSC with the following or a similar statement" Disqualified (date) for assignment to nuclear duty positions per AR 50–5," as prescribed in AR 640–2–1.

e. DA Form 4515 will be removed from the individual's medical and dental records. DA Label 164 will be removed from the MPRJ or OPF.

f. If the individual is disqualified for medical reasons, the physician will annotate SF 600 with the following or a similar statement" Disqualified (date) for assignment to nuclear duty positions per AR 50–5" and state the medical reasons.

g. Pending review of the action and/or the results of reclassification or placement action, disqualified personnel will be reassigned or detailed to duty positions that most effectively use their qualifications. Separation from the Service will not terminate an individual's disqualification status from the PRP.

h. When the disqualified individual has an MOS listed in appendix C, the MOS will be withdrawn. This action will be taken

regardless of command or Army strength status. A board is not required and space imbalanced military occupational specialty(SIMOS) restrictions do not apply.

(1) Reclassification authority in such cases is delegated for all enlisted personnel in grades E–8 who are not on a promotion list and below per AR 600–200, paragraph 2–31 *d*(5).

(2) Requests for mandatory reclassification of warrant officers(WO) or enlisted personnel in grades E–8 who are on a promotion list or E–9 will include the commander's recommendation, a copy of the signed acknowledgment or an explanation for its absence, a copy of any written explanation or rebuttal submitted by the individual, a copy of the reviewing official's approval, and, when appropriate, the status of any pending or completed administrative or punitive actions. The servicing CPO will provide assistance on placement action for a civilian employee who has been disqualified.

i. When the disqualification of a contractor employee is sustained, the contractor will be advised ONLY that the employee has been disqualified from the PRP and must be removed from nuclear duties.

j. When the disqualification is based on credible derogatory information that could affect the individual's security clearance, a DA Form 5248–R will be submitted to Commander, CCF, per AR 380–67.

3–25. Review of permanent disqualification

Permanent disqualification's will be reviewed by a reviewing official.

a. A copy of the letter of notification, the signed acknowledgment or an explanation of its absence, a written explanation or rebuttal submitted by the individual, and any other pertinent information will normally be forwarded to the reviewing official within 10 work days of the disqualification.

b. The reviewing official will review the case and within 15 work days of receipt of the disqualification documents furnish a written decision to the individual through the certifying official who recommended the disqualification. If the disqualification is sustained, the certifying official will complete the remaining procedures of paragraph 3–24. (If the individual has departed the certifying official's organization, the certifying official will forward a reproduced copy of the approval directly to the individual if the individual is no longer in government service, or through the individual's new commander.)

c. When disqualification is disapproved, no entries will be made in the individual's records. The individual's records will continue to show the individual as PRP qualified. Such action, however, does not require assignment of the individual to a nuclear duty position. Such assignments will be at the discretion of the certifying official. If reassigned to a nuclear duty position, the certifying official will add the individual's name to the NDPR. If not reassigned to nuclear duties, the individual will be administratively terminated from the PRP.

3–26. Requalification of disqualified personnel

A permanently disqualified individual may be requalified for assignment to nuclear duties upon approval of a request for requalification by the reviewing official (para 3–25) of the unit to which the individual is currently assigned.

a. A request for requalification will be submitted by the individual to the unit's or activity's commander or director. This request will explain the circumstances leading to the disqualification, the criteria upon which the disqualification was based, and actions the individual has taken to correct or eliminate the reason for disqualification. Should the request be disapproved, the commander will return it to the individual with the rationale for disapproval. If the commander decides to recommend requalification, the individual will be screened and evaluated(completion of parts I through IV, DA Form 3180–R). If found suitable for the PRP, the commander will forward the request for requalification and the DA Form 3180–R to the reviewing official for decision.

b. If the reviewing official denies requalification, the new DA Form 3180–R will be destroyed and the request for requalification will be returned to the individual. The DA Form 3180–R reflecting permanent disqualification and associated correspondence will be retained in the MPRJ or OPF.

3–27. Action upon requalification

a. Approval of requalification by the reviewing official does not require assignment to a nuclear duty position.

b. The DA Form 3180–R showing disqualification and associated correspondence will be removed from the MPRJ or OPF, destroyed, and replaced by the new one. Additionally, personnel and medical records (if the individual was disqualified for medical reasons) will be annotated with the following or a similar statement: " Requalified (date) for assignment to nuclear duty positions per AR 50–5."

(1) If the individual is to be assigned a nuclear duty position, the certifying official will complete the procedures outlined in paragraph 3–16.

(2) Individuals not selected for assignment to a nuclear duty position will be administratively terminated (para 3–21).

c. The original of the approved request/recommendation for requalification (less the DA Form 3180–R) will be endorsed to the individual for permanent retention. Copies will be forwarded to the custodian of the OMPF or OPF and to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN:PCCF–LNO, ALEX VA 22332–0400.

Section V
Annual PRP Status Report (RCS DDPOL(A)1403)

3–28. Information requirements

MACOM, Army components of unified commands, and elements of the ARSTAF having personnel in nuclear weapon duty positions will prepare an annual PRP status report as of 31 December of each year.This report will be sent to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN:PCCF–LNO, Alexandria, VA 22332–0400, to arrive February 1st of the following year. (This report does not apply to personnel performing duties associated with nuclear reactors.)

3–29. Preparation guidance

Reports will contain three separate sections; one for military personnel, one for civil service employees, and one for contractor employees. Each section will be prepared in two parts.

a. Part I.

(1) The number of personnel by geographical area (i.e., Europe, Pacific, Continental United States (CONUS)) actually assigned to critical or controlled nuclear duty positions as of 31 December.Critical and controlled totals will be listed separately.

(2) The number of personnel by geographical area permanently disqualified while actually assigned to critical or controlled positions. Critical and controlled totals will be listed separately.

b. Part II. The totals (critical and controlled combined) disqualified by geographical area categorized by primary reason for disqualification. The disqualifying factors listed in paragraph 3–11 *b* will be used. For the total disqualified for drug abuse, subtotals by class of drug used (i.e., narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and cannabis)will be shown.

Chapter 4
Transportation of Nuclear Weapons and Components

Section I
General

4–1. Introduction

This chapter establishes policies and procedures for the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materiel during logistical movements. AR 700–65 contains policy and procedures

for other aspects of logistical movement. Procedures for the tactical movement of nuclear weapons are found in FM 100–50.

4–2. Nuclear weapons safety and security

Commanders will ensure that a safe and secure environment is maintained for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materiel during logistical movements.

4–3. Logistical movements considerations

a. Nuclear cargo will be moved by the safest means and over the safest routes possible. Movement of nuclear weapons will be kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements. Overflight and travel through heavily populated areas will be avoided, if possible.

b. Military airlift is the preferred mode of transport for logistical movements. Surface logistical movement off military installations in CONUS is prohibited. Surface logistical movements within oversea areas must receive prior approval by the commander of the unified or specified command. Regardless of the mode of transport, U.S. custody will always be maintained. (See AR 700–65.)

c. In planning for nuclear weapon movements, the following will be considered:

(1) Known and potential hazards.

(2) Current intelligence estimates of the general and local threat relating to the point of origin, routes, en route stops, and destination of the movement (AR 50–5–1).

(3) Type and mode of shipment.

(4) Availability of security resources.

(5) Available emergency assistance and resources.

(6) Operations security (OPSEC).

d. Shipment emergency plans and procedures will be made known in detail to the proper agencies. Plans will include communications systems; liaison with outside law enforcement agencies or host nations; and actions to be taken in the event of civil disturbance, attempted hijacking, or other emergency (for example, accident, incident, unusual delays, or emergency destruction). When emergencies occur in areas where military assistance is not available, physical security assistance may be requested from civil law enforcement agencies. (The preference of augmentation is Federal, State, and local—in that order.)

e. Emergency destruction of nuclear weapons will be in accord with TM 39–50–8. When the theater or MACOM commander requires emergency destruction (ED) materiel to accompany a logistical movement, the loading and tiedown of this materiel will be in accord with appropriate system transportation procedures.

f. Excessive handling of nuclear weapons and components during movement operations will be avoided. Weapons and containers must not be dropped, bumped, or marred. During periods of adverse weather(for example, high winds and thunderstorms), loading or unloading may be delayed by the custodian of the nuclear cargo.

g. Shipping containers will be arranged and secured as prescribed by applicable technical and field manuals for U.S.vehicles and aircraft, and approved loading and tiedown procedures for non–U.S. vehicles.

h. Movement of nuclear training devices, including U.S.Department of Energy (DOE) designated training items, will be conducted using the same standards as those established for the movement mission assigned to the unit (logistical or tactical), except that serviceable tiedown straps may be used without regard to published service life limits. These standards provide realism in the training for and inspection of movements, and ensure that costly training items are not damaged, lost, or compromised during movement. However, type " X" trainers must often be moved in an administrative environment between garrison and training areas, between owning unit and ordnance repair facilities, and between other areas where nuclear weapons convoys are either infeasible or impractical. In such cases, the minimum standards for administrative movement of type " X" trainers are listed below.

(1) Tiedowns.

(a) When military vehicles or aircraft that have approved tiedowns are used for administrative movement, trainers will be tied down as prescribed in the appropriate technical manuals.

(b) If vehicles or aircraft that have no approved tiedowns are used, trainers will be secured to prevent unnecessary movement and damage during normal " over road" or inflight operations.

(2) Physical security commensurate with the classification of the trainer will be provided throughout the administrative move.

(3) Continuous U.S. military custody will be maintained throughout the move.

(4) Trainers will not be shipped by commercial carrier. (This does not apply to supply shipment procedures. Supply shipments of trainers will continue to be made in accordance with AR 700–65, AR 55–203, and AR 55–355.)

(5) Trainers will not be transported in privately owned conveyances.

i. Nuclear weapons will not be jettisoned from U.S. aircraft.During emergency movements (para 4–31) the inflight emergency procedures prescribed by the appropriate aircraft operators manual will apply.

j. Single engine fixed wing aircraft will not be used for the movement of nuclear weapons under instrument flight rules (IFR)conditions.

k. Only U.S. military aircraft and aircrews will be used for nuclear weapon logistical air movements. Use of civilian aircraft or nonfederal National Guard or Reserve aircrews require the specific prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. Requests for such approval, along with detailed justification will be submitted to HQDA (DALO–TSP) WASH DC 20310.

l. Nuclear weapons will not be moved by external helicopter transport except in emergency conditions (for example, emergency evacuation ordered to maintain U.S. custody or to prevent loss because of fire or flood). External helicopter movement will only be used when the situation does not allow time to prepare and move the nuclear weapons by internal transport.

m. Weapons systems safety rules (AR 50–115) will be followed during logistical movements. Personnel who perform only logistical movements are not required to be trained or knowledgeable about the safety rules that apply only during the assembly or employment phases of the stockpile to target sequence.

n. When Army nuclear weapons are transported by another military service, the directives of that Service pertaining to the operation and safety of surface vehicles, aircraft, naval vessels, and their crews, including the PRP, apply during loading, transporting, and unloading.

o. Before loading, all load–carrying vehicles and aircraft, including the alternate load–carrying aircraft, will be searched and inspected for unauthorized personnel or equipment and any possible sabotage. Entry controls will be established to maintain security until mission completion.

p. Loading and unloading areas should be isolated and concealed to minimize observation of the operation.

q. With the exception of waterborne movement and during momentary stops during ground movement, an exclusion area will be established around the weapon carrier. This will include its prime mover whenever it is stopped, parked, or being loaded or off–loaded. Establishment of a limited area is not required.However, all nuclear weapons will be guarded continuously by at least two qualified guards.

r. Appropriate rules of engagement will be included in the unit plans and procedures for intransit security of nuclear weapons.Rules of engagement will be prescribed by the commander responsible for the movement, subject to approval of the major command.Personnel accompanying the movement will be briefed on the rules of engagement before departure.

s. Each unit or installation responsible for the storage and handling of nuclear weapons involving movement within a limited area or on the installation will develop standard operating procedures for such operations to ensure adequate safety and security is continuously provided.

t. Other policies and procedures for the logistical movement of nuclear cargo are in AR 700–65, AR 55–203, and AR 55–228.

4–4. Information control

a. There will be formal, written procedures for close control of all information on planned and actual movements of nuclear weapons off military reservations.

b. Times, flight plans, routes, and destinations will be handled on a strict need–to–know basis and classified in accord with appropriate regulations. Dissemination or display of, and access to, information on impending or actual movements will be limited to personnel essential to support the mission. (TB 9–1100–811–40 provides classification guidance.)

4–5. Command and control (C2)

a. During movement of nuclear weapons where the weapon is removed from the direct control of the assigned custodian, the responsible commander will assign and designate, in writing, a commissioned or WO as courier. The designated individual will be responsible for custody, safety, and security during the movement. A sample checklist for courier officers is shown at figure 4–1.(See AR 700–65.)

b. Before moving nuclear weapons, the command that will be immediately responsible for responding to any security incident will be clearly identified and will acknowledge its responsibility.

c. A communications link, with multifrequency capability, will be maintained (through a communications control center, if necessary) between the courier officer and the designated movement monitor to report the progress of the shipment and to request assistance. Escort aircraft radios will be included in the radio net when accompanying the mission. Progress reports will be made at least every 15 minutes, taking every precaution not to reveal the purpose of the movement, the speed and direction, the current location, or the identity of its en route or final destination.

4–6. Malfunctions and hazardous conditions

a. If a malfunction occurs during loading or unloading, the operation in progress will be stopped. The condition will be reported immediately to the weapons custodian. The operation will not be resumed until the malfunction has been corrected and the weapon custodian or courier approves resumption of operations.

b. If a hazardous or unsatisfactory condition is observed during any phase of operations, all personnel are responsible for ensuring corrective action is taken. As soon as possible, report the condition to the weapon custodian or courier.

c. Introduction of flame or spark producing devices into any limited or exclusion area containing nuclear weapons or other explosives is prohibited except when specifically authorized by the commander. Since such a device constitutes a potential hazard, it is incumbent upon the commander to ensure that the controls and procedures are adequate to protect the weapons from any damage that could result from the accidental or improper use of these devices.

4–7. Accident or incident occurring during handling, loading, or unloading

a. If a nuclear weapon is damaged during handling, loading, or unloading (other than superficial damage to the container) the following actions will be taken:

(1) Stop the operation.

(2) Evacuate nonessential personnel to a safe area. If a fire is involved or a fire hazard exists, evacuate these personnel to at least 2,000 feet (610 meters) upwind.

(3) Implement NAIRA procedures (chap 5).

b. If the weapon is involved in a fire and the fire department is not immediately available, personnel at the scene of the accident will extinguish the fire to the extent the available equipment permits. Actions in *a* above will be taken.

c. EOD teams are responsible for conducting render–safe and disposal procedures.

4–8. Security personnel and equipment requirements

a. The number of couriers and guards and the quantity and type of escort vehicles to accompany each shipment depend upon the mode of transportation, transit time, size of shipment, hazards involved, and current intelligence estimates of any threat to the movement.Security requirements exceeding the minimum standards in this regulation and AR 50–5–1 will be determined and provided for by the commander responsible for the security of the shipment.

b. The M–16 or equivalent weapon will be the standard weapon for assignment to security force personnel. Crew–served weapons, 40mm grenade launchers, and/or shotguns will be provided when appropriate.

4–9. Movement training

a. Before being assigned duties in conjunction with nuclear weapon logistical movement missions, personnel will be trained in the procedures and practices that are necessary for safe and secure movement. Under proper supervision, individuals may accompany logistic movements for training purposes.

b. Commanders will establish training programs that are commensurate with the movement duties the individual is expected to perform. While all personnel are not expected to be fully qualified in each of the areas listed below, sufficient personnel accompanying the movement will be cross–trained to assume other duties in the event certain individuals become incapacitated.

(1) Loading and tiedown procedures.

(2) Radiation and explosive hazards.

(3) Security requirements.

(4) The two–person concept.

(5) En route requirements and procedures.

(6) Initial nuclear weapon accident and incident response and reporting procedures.

(7) Courier responsibilities, including those of custody and security.

(8) Routing—to avoid heavily populated or built–up areas.

(9) Communications procedures and en route reporting requirements.

(10) Load limitations, including radioactive material and high explosive quantity–distance requirements.

(11) Carrier maintenance standards with nuclear weapon cargo aboard.

(12) Procedures for handling opportune cargo.

(13) Ground handling and support equipment and procedures.

(14) Explosive and radiation placard requirements.

(15) Carrier electrical grounding requirements.

(16) Operational procedures for aircraft carrying hazardous materials, (Foreign Clearance Guide Requirements and USAF Special Overflight Guide), when appropriate.

(17) Emergency destruction requirements and procedures.

(18) Procedures for coping with possible en route emergencies.

(19) Lightning protection.

(20) Safe parking areas.

(21) Threat orientation.

Section II
Responsibilities

4–10. Consignor

The shipping unit will—

a. Ensure proper identification and authority of the courier and movement personnel (para 4–15 *a*).

b. Brief all personnel involved in the logistical movement(for example, courier officer, guards, aircrew members, or vehicle drivers) on the details of the mission. Personnel will be given only that information needed to perform their duties and commensurate with their security clearance. This briefing will include—

(1) The mission.

(2) The authorized consignee for the nuclear cargo.

(3) The chain of command.

(4) The two–person concept.

(5) The identification, classification, quantity, and hazards of the cargo, including quantity–distance parking requirements.

(6) Instructions on control of access pertinent to the mode of transportation, including procedures to maintain continual surveillance during stops en route and to obtain additional security support, if required.

(7) The procedures for communication within the movement and for communication with external agencies.

(8) The routing and traffic control procedures. Pertinent safety matters (for example, gross weight limitations, hours of operation, parking, prior permission requirements, unusual weather conditions, and traffic congestion periods) will also be included.

(9) Additional cargo or passenger restrictions.

(10) The hostile threat.

(11) Actions to be taken in the event of civil disturbance, attempted hijacking, or other en route emergency (for example, an accident or incident, unusual delays, or emergency destruction).

(12) Rules of engagement.

(13) Other special instructions for customs restrictions, refueling procedures, loading and unloading responsibilities, restrictions against jettison (for air movement), and so forth.

c. Ensure that weapons are properly prepared for shipment, as prescribed in the applicable technical manuals.

d. Deliver the weapons, together with the appropriate documents, to the courier.

e. Ensure that adequate and properly certified handling and support equipment is available.

f. Ensure that personnel loading the weapon have been trained.

g. When requested, assist the courier in the loading and tiedown of nuclear cargo for surface movements.

h. Under the supervision of the aircrew, perform the loading and tiedown operations for aircraft movements.

i. Transmit REPSHIP messages in accordance with the provisions of AR 55–203 and AR 700–65.

j. Ensure proper transfer of accountability or custody in accord with AR 700–65.

4–11. Consignee

The receiving unit will—

a. Ensure that adequate and properly certified handling and support equipment is available.

b. Ensure that unit personnel involved in the unloading operation have been trained.

c. When requested, assist in the unloading operation.

d. Send report of arrival messages (AR 55–203).

e. Conduct verification or receipt inspection, as appropriate.See AR 700–65 and the appropriate system manual for detailed procedures concerning verification/receipt requirements.

4–12. Unit providing transportation

This unit will ensure that—

a. The capability exists to meet the required pickup and delivery schedules.

b. Adequate, properly inspected transportation equipment is available.

c. All aircrew members or military drivers have been trained(para 4–9) and meet the personnel reliability standards prescribed in chapter 3.

d. All aircrew members or drivers understand the mission and their duties.

e. All aircrew members are familiar with the provisions of AR 95–27.

f. Loading, tiedown, and unloading are as prescribed in appropriate publications (aircraft movements).

4–13. Installation ground support

Commanders of the Army facility where the mission aircraft lands (for loading, unloading, or a temporary stop en route) will provide—

a. A restricted area for the aircraft. The area may be surrounded by fixed barriers or by temporary measures (for example, guards, rope, or stanchions). The area delineated as the exclusion area surrounding the aircraft, must be clearly identifiable and have a designated entry control point.

b. If requested, provide sufficient security forces to enforce entry controls and to react to security incidents. An entry control roster will be provided to the security forces at the entry control point by the courier officer.

c. Permanent or temporary security lighting during hours of darkness.

d. Security communications with at least two systems of communication between the exclusion area around the aircraft and the location responsible for notifying additional security forces.

4–14. Security support

When requested, intransit security forces or assistance will be provided as shown below.

a. Within U.S. Army military installations—by installation commanders.

b. Within CONUS but outside a military or DOE installation(including Alaska and Hawaii)—by Forces Command (FORSCOM).

c. Within an oversea area—by major Army commanders or the host country.

d. Military installations will provide temporary storage and security forces to any DOD or DOE courier (AR 50–111).

4–15. Courier officer

a. Each nuclear weapon shipment will be accompanied by an armed military courier appointed on orders (or otherwise designated in writing). The courier will be responsible for the receipt, custody, security, safety, and delivery of the nuclear weapon to an authorized recipient. The courier will execute the courier responsibilities until transfer of custody to an authorized individual has been accomplished. Courier responsibilities are subject only to the following limitations:

(1) *Airborne.* The courier is subordinate to the aircraft commander only in matters pertaining to flight operations and flight safety.

(2) *Waterborne.* The courier is subordinate to the ship's master or commanding officer only in matters pertaining to ship underway operations and ship safety.

(3) *At a nuclear accident or significant incident scene.* The courier and all personnel accompanying the movement fall under the command of the on–scene commander and assist as directed.

b. Couriers will have a security clearance at least equal to the highest security classification of the materiel or shipment.They will also meet the PRP standards of chapter 3.

c. Couriers will be familiar with the use of security equipment, the provisions of this regulation, and the provisions of other directives pertaining to the transportation, safety, and firefighting procedures for nuclear weapons, including emergency destruction where it applies.

d. The courier is custodian of a shipment from the time he or she signs for it until custody is transferred to an authorized recipient. If the accountable officer or alternate is the courier, DD Form 1348–1 (DOD Single Line Item Release/Receipt Document)will be used in lieu of DD Form 1911. Container contents will be verified at the point of origin. If the accountable officer or alternate transfers custody, the following forms will be used: DD Form 1150 (Request For Issue or Turn–in) to custodian; DD Form 1348–1 to another accountable officer, or DD Form 1911 to a courier. A courier should never sign a receipt for materiel over which he or she cannot maintain custody. Even though additional security may be furnished from sources other than the assigned security guard personnel, the courier will remain responsible for security at all times. An exchange of nuclear weapons between couriers (including interservice couriers) will be coordinated with the local military authorities. This will ensure that an adequate security force is available until the shipment is again in progress.On extended trips with overnight stops, couriers are authorized to transfer custody of nuclear weapons to an appropriate commander who has a nuclear weapons exclusion

area. Additional security support to counter unusual risks or emergency will be the responsibility of the commander through whose area the move is being made.

e. The courier, regardless of rank, is in command of all security guards during a movement. The courier will designate a chain of command, based upon the individual's qualifications, to carry out courier duties if he or she should become incapacitated.Before departure, the courier will ensure that security personnel are properly equipped (para 4–8 and AR 50–5–1), have proper security clearances and, if required for the particular movement, have been issued travel orders. The courier will also verify that the drivers of load–carrying vehicles and aircrew of the load–carrying aircraft are properly cleared and PRP–qualified.

f. The courier will ensure that all guard personnel are familiar with the following information, as appropriate, for the performance of their duties and commensurate with their security clearance:

(1) Duties and conduct while en route, including rules of engagement.

(2) Actions to be taken in the event of civil disturbance, attempted hijacking, or other emergency (for example, accident, incident, unusual delay, or emergency destruction).

(3) The hazardous nature of the mission and its importance to national defense.

(4) The security classification of the materiel and details of the movement.

(5) Known threat information as it pertains to the mission.

g. The courier may inform, as necessary, State and local officials that the shipment is sensitive military cargo which is to be expedited in movement. If assistance is obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, personnel of the agency may be informed of the nature of the materiel.

h. At destination, the courier will ensure that the authorized recipient is identified from information provided by the consignor.In cases of doubt, the courier will contact the consignor, the commanding officer of the consignee unit, or the movement monitor for further instructions.

Section III
Logistical Transportation by Motor Vehicle

4–16. General

a. Before moving nuclear weapons, DD Form 836 will be completed (TM 9–1300–206) and military drivers will be briefed on the provisions of TB 385–2.

b. Appropriate placards will be displayed on the front, rear, and each side of load–carrying vehicles.

c. Two portable fire extinguishers will be available for immediate use during loading and unloading operations. (See TB 5–4200–200–10.)

d. When movement is by other than closed vehicle or trailers, nuclear warheads in shipping and storage containers will be covered.

e. If necessary, guard force personnel may drive military vehicles accompanying the shipment.

4–17. Vehicle inspection and maintenance

a. All load–carrying vehicles and ancillary equipment used in the logistical movement of nuclear weapons will meet the maintenance and serviceability standards prescribed in pertinent technical manuals.

b. Vehicles transporting nuclear weapons will be inspected before loading in accord with TM 9–1300–206. Results of the inspection will be recorded in accordance with appropriate maintenance publications for U.S. tactical vehicles and on DD Form 626 (Motor Vehicle Inspection) for commercial and non–U.S.vehicles. All unsatisfactory conditions affecting the safety or operability of the vehicle will be corrected before accepting vehicles for loading.

c. Preventive maintenance may be performed on loaded vehicles-.Minor repairs may also be made if they are necessary for safe movement. Functions that increase the probability of fire or weapon damage (for example, maintenance requiring the use of flame or heat–producing devices and maintenance involving fuel tank repair) are prohibited. Loaded vehicles will not be taken into a repair facility for repair or storage.

d. All load–carrying vehicles will have at least one full, serviceable fire extinguisher, 10–BC rated, carbon dioxide or dry chemical or non–U.S. equivalent.

4–18. Loading, tiedown, and unloading

a. Loading and unloading procedures are prescribed in the pertinent TM 9–1100 series operators and maintenance manuals.Additional procedures are in the AMC 19–48–series drawings (DA Pam 75–5).

b. Vehicles will have brakes set and at least one wheel chocked during all loading, unloading, and tiedown operations.

c. Tiedown procedures are prescribed in the applicable technical manuals for U.S. vehicles and by approved tiedown procedures for non–U.S. vehicles.

4–19. Communication security

During ground movements, particular caution must be taken to avoid disclosure of classified information, particularly that nuclear weapons are present. In an emergency situation, disclosures of such information will be made only when, in the judgment of the courier officer, it is essential to the safety and security of the weapon in his or her custody. TM 39–20–11 line item numbers may be used to convey information about the classified cargo without revealing the items involved.

4–20. Security requirements

See AR 50–5–1 for guidance.

Section IV
Logistical Transportation by Aircraft

4–21. General

a. The number of different aircrews, couriers, and guards involved in nuclear airlift operations will be kept to the minimum necessary for effective movement.

b. The number of qualified aircrew members required for the type of aircraft and the mission will be specified.

c. Aircrews will comply with the communications, security, and clearance requirements that apply to their specific mission. Further guidance is in AR 95–27, AR 55–203 and the USAF Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG).

d. Unused space aboard nuclear cargo missions may be used for properly cleared personnel only if their presence is essential to the mission. Personnel will not be transported for the convenience of the Government. Unused space may be used for opportune cargo if the—

(1) Command directing the shipment approves.

(2) Loading and unloading of the nuclear cargo is not required to accommodate the additional opportune cargo.

(3) Mission is not delayed.

(4) Added cargo does not require additional landings or rerouting of the mission.

(5) Added cargo is properly identified and packaged to ensure compatibility with the nuclear cargo. No Department of Transportation (DOT) regulated articles that require a label will be added to the load unless the items are included in the mission directive.

e. Before movement, the pilot in command and aircrew will be briefed by the consignor on the firefighting provisions of TB 385–2 and TM 39–20–11.

f. At times, supplementary special mission equipment may be required aboard the aircraft. Personal effects on board the aircraft, will be held to a minimum. Matches, lighters, other flame–producing devices, and lighter fluid will not be included in personal effects. Survival gear will be carried, as required. The need for other equipment and supplies will be governed by the maintenance requirements of the particular aircraft.Commanders will determine the need for additional weapons over and above those required for the courier and guards.

g. For every three load–carrying aircraft or any portion thereof, at least one alternate Army aircraft, capable of transporting the load of a mission aircraft, will either accompany the mission aircraft or be inspected and placed on ground alert, ready for immediate dispatch, if needed. In determining whether the alternate aircraft will accompany the mission, or be placed on ground alert, the consignor, in coordination with the mission commander, will consider the—

(1) Response time required to reach a downed load–carrying aircraft from the alert site.

(2) Forecasted weather conditions along the flight route.

(3) Communications capabilities between the alert site and the airborne load–carrying aircraft. Where feasible, ground support equipment (for example, straps, roller conveyors, plywood)required to transfer a load from the mission aircraft to an alternate aircraft should accompany the cargo on the mission aircraft.

h. Civilian airfield facilities for air movements of Army weapons should be avoided unless operational requirements make their use necessary. If civilian airfield facilities are to be used, the shipping command will ensure that requirements in paragraph 4–13 are provided for as appropriate. The possibility of increased threat will be a special consideration. Appropriate compensatory security precautions will be taken.

i. Mission requests will be prepared by the consignor and forwarded to the supporting aviation unit and the consignee. As a minimum, mission requests will contain the—

(1) Consignor, the name and telephone number of the contact, and the date cargo will be available.

(2) Consignee, the name and telephone number, and the date cargo is required.

(3) Nomenclature of the nuclear cargo.

(4) Total weight of the nuclear cargo.

(5) Number of containers.

(6) Net explosives weight in each container.

(7) Identification and total weight of proposed opportune cargo.

4–22. Aircraft inspection

a. Designated mission aircraft will meet the serviceability criteria of the pertinent aircraft operator and unit maintenance manuals. Established inspection and maintenance requirements prescribed in these publications ensure aircraft safety of flight and mission performance capability. With the exception of those requirements established by this regulation, there is no need for more stringent maintenance and inspection criteria to be complied with before a nuclear mission.

b. Designated mission aircraft must have operational navigation equipment required by AR 95–1 for instrument flight rules and visual flight rules (VFR) flights, as appropriate. All mission aircraft will be equipped with a radio transmitter and receiver, capable of communicating with air traffic control facilities and mission related agencies (for example, movement monitor).

c. Aviation units will comply with safety of flight messages.

4–23. Aircraft maintenance

a. Preventive maintenance and minor repair may be performed on loaded aircraft parked in a designated explosive parking area.Maintenance and repair functions that may cause fire or weapon damage (for example, maintenance requiring the use of flame or heat–producing devices, or involving fuel cell repair) are prohibited. No maintenance will be performed on loaded aircraft inside hangers.

b. When authorized maintenance is performed on loaded aircraft, the air mission commander will ensure that the—

(1) Aircraft parking areas where maintenance is performed satisfy explosive safety distance (quantity–distance)criteria.

(2) Aircraft is electrically grounded in accordance with pertinent technical manuals.

c. Functional flight testing of aircraft will not be performed while nuclear weapons or components are aboard.

d. Under normal conditions, all aircraft will be refueled before being loaded with nuclear weapons or components. Refueling or defueling while loading or unloading nuclear weapons is prohibited, except under emergency conditions. If possible, flights should be planned to preclude the necessity for en route refueling. En route refueling operations are authorized when the cargo is not disturbed and proper grounding and firefighting protection are provided.Aircraft engines will be shut down during refueling operations.Aircraft will not be fueled or defueled in hangers.

4–24. Aircraft parking requirements

a. To determine applicable quantity–distance for parking, aircraft loaded with explosives (other than signaling pyrotechnics and fire extinguisher cartridges) are classified as unbarricaded above–ground magazines.

b. Aircraft carrying explosives will be loaded, unloaded, and parked in designated explosive parking areas. These areas will be designated in accord with the provisions of TM 9–1300–206.

(1) To determine the explosive content of nuclear weapons, see TM 39–20–7.

(2) Quantity–distance will be computed on the maximum amount of explosives in any one aircraft (net explosives weight).

(3) Aircraft in an explosive parking area should be separated by inter–magazine distance.

(4) If magazine distances are not maintained between aircraft, quantity–distance will be based upon the cumulative quantity–distance of explosives contained in all aircraft in the parking area.

4–25. Cargo handling concepts

a. Loading and tiedown procedures for nuclear weapons are prescribed in TM 55–series or FM 55–series manuals.Nuclear cargo will only be carried on Army aircraft which have DA–approved loading and tiedown procedures.

b. The pilot in command is responsible for supervision of the loading and unloading operations, and ensuring that DD Form 365F(Weight and Balance Clearance Form F) is completed. Under the pilot's supervision, the crew chief will direct the loading, unloading, and tiedown procedures which include—

(1) Operating the aircraft hoist and winch equipment.

(2) Ensuring that loading, tiedown, and unloading procedures are as prescribed in TM 55–series and FM 55–series manuals.

4–26. Aircraft loading or unloading preparations

The following actions will be taken before each loading or unloading operation:

a. The main landing gear of the aircraft will be chocked fore–and–aft. (When aircraft have dual or multiwheels, any combination of chocking that will restrain fore–and–aft movement may be applied.)

b. The aircraft will be electrically grounded in accordance with pertinent technical manuals.

c. Aircraft switches will be in the OFF position, except those necessary for the loading or unloading function and for radios essential to security control.

d. At installations that have a fire department, notification will be made in advance of loading, unloading, or servicing of aircraft with weapons aboard. Firefighting vehicles need not be placed on standby during these operations if the type and number of fire extinguishers required in *e* below are available.

e. When firefighting vehicles are not on standby for loading and unloading, at least four portable fire extinguishers will be immediately available. Recommended extinguishers are: two pressurized water–type extinguishers, using aqueous film–forming–foam (AFFF) liquid concentrate, 6 percent(MIL–F–24385); and two 30–pound capacity potassium bicarbonate base, dry chemical extinguishers. Positioning of the fire extinguishers is the responsibility of the aviation mission commander. At emergency facilities where the specified fire extinguishers are not available, firefighting equipment that is integral to the aircraft is adequate.

f. Communications will be established and maintained between the loading and unloading area and the fire department. This may be done by using the aircraft radio in conjunction with the control

tower. If a fire truck stands by the aircraft during loading or unloading, radio contact between the aircraft or fire truck and the control tower or installation fire department will be maintained.

4–27. Flight planning

a. Operating requirements for IFR and VFR will be in accord with AR 95–1.

b. Operation procedures for aircraft transporting nuclear cargo will be in accord with AR 95–27.

c. All flight plans for Army aircraft involved in the movement of nuclear cargo will include provisions for avoiding en route built–up and heavily populated areas. If an air traffic control clearance for a proposed IFR flight plan cannot be approved as requested or cannot be modified to avoid heavily populated areas, the flight will not be made until the requested or modified clearance is granted. When further clarification is necessary, the air traffic control agency will be informed that the aircraft has hazardous cargo aboard.

d. Flight routes will be selected so that the security force escorting the shipment has timely reaction capability throughout the flight route. Flight routes over areas where the escort helicopter could not land to assist a downed mission aircraft will be avoided to the maximum extent possible.

e. Itineraries will be planned to allow for the minimum number of en route landings that will provide for necessary refueling, crew rest, customs clearance, and nuclear cargo loading and unloading operations. Additional landings are prohibited, except when—

(1) Aviation mission commanders determine that landings are necessary for flight safety.

(2) Authorized by the originator of the request.

(3) Directed by the movement monitor (for example, inadequate security at destination or terrorist activity).

f. The crew will be briefed on procedures to be followed in the event of aircraft emergencies.

4–28. Itinerary notification procedures

A preliminary message will be sent well in advance of the mission operating date to ensure its receipt by the proper agencies(AR 55–203). Every effort will be made to ensure that addressees receive this message at least 72 hours before arrival of the cargo at the first loading station.

4–29. Itinerary deviation procedures

When a mission deviates 2 or more hours from the last published itinerary, the aviation mission commander or designated representative will send a revised itinerary message. (When possible, contacts at the next destination will be telephonically advised if the original or revised arrival time is less than 4 hours from the time a change message is transmitted.) The remarks section of the message will include the dangerous cargo information required by AR 95–27. Messages will be transmitted as follows:

a. By IMMEDIATE precedence to loading and unloading contacts where pickup or delivery is scheduled within the next 12 hours.

b. By PRIORITY precedence, as applicable, to—

(1) Loading and unloading contacts other than those listed in *a* above.

(2) AMCCOM, Rock Island, IL, if the mission is directed by that agency.

(3) Army areas concerned.

(4) Other addresses listed in mission directive.

c. When a delay occurs in CONUS at a civilian airport not having a military communication facility, the aviation mission commander or courier officer will inform the appropriate control headquarters by telephone of the revised itinerary. It will be the dual responsibility of the control headquarters and the aviation mission commander or courier officer to see that revised itineraries are transmitted to the proper addressees.

d. When the transmission of messages described in *a* and *b* above is impractical, itinerary deviation information will be furnished by the most expeditious and practical means available.

4–30. Start, taxi, runup, and takeoff

a. Fire fighting personnel will maintain area surveillance during the entire start, runup, taxi, and takeoff operation.Communications with the fire department normally will be established through the tower.

b. The fire extinguishers or fire trucks required by paragraph 4–26 *d* and *e*, will be available during engine starts.

c. The aircraft should be separated as far as possible from other aircraft. Quantity–distance separation requirements for explosives necessitate discretion at all times.

d. Aircraft moving nuclear weapons will achieve flight altitude, if feasible, before leaving or entering controlled loading and unloading areas to reduce small arms vulnerability. The intent of this requirement is not to jeopardize flight safety in any way but merely to reduce exposure of the carrier to the possibility of damage from small arms fire.

4–31. Inflight

a. Communications. Communications procedures for movement of nuclear cargo must provide security for sensitive information as well as meet the requirements of nuclear safety. Voice transmission of terms that reveal there is nuclear cargo aboard will not be used. Under no circumstances will an effort be made to talk around classified information by substituting terms such as " components,"" devices," or " special weapons" in voice transmissions by radio or telephone or in unclassified electrical messages. TM 39–20–11 line item numbers may be used to convey the type items on board the mission aircraft.

b. Emergency notification procedures. When an inflight emergency occurs, the aviation mission commander will decide whether to continue the flight, to land at the first available airfield, or to make an emergency landing. If unable to continue to the planned destination, he or she will first consider using a military facility. Inflight emergency notification procedures in AR 95–27 will apply.

4–32. Landing

Landing clearance and notification procedures for an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and components differ from normal aircraft operations only in that the aircraft is carrying hazardous cargo. Prior notification of arrival must be furnished in all cases.The procedures in AR 95–27 will apply.

4–33. Aircraft struck by lightning

When an airborne aircraft transporting nuclear weapons is struck or suspected of having been struck by lightning, a landing at the first suitable airfield will be made and the aircraft inspected for damage. The courier officer will notify the controlling Army agency by the most expeditious means available that are commensurate with security, giving aircraft and cargo damage. If no damage is observed, the aircraft may proceed with the mission.

4–34. Emergency security procedures

Under emergency conditions, the courier retains primary responsibility for the physical security of the nuclear weapon. For purposes of this regulation, an unscheduled landing by an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons is an emergency. Aviation mission commanders will aid couriers in requesting assistance from commanders at military activities or civil law enforcement agencies as required. The courier's guard personnel will control access to the mission aircraft.

4–35. Unscheduled landings

a. If an unscheduled landing is made in CONUS or in a friendly foreign country, the aviation mission commander will provide the following information to the movement monitor by airborne communications (if the information has not been previously provided):

(1) Aircraft tail number or call sign.

(2) Explosive cargo aboard.

(3) Type of aircraft.

(4) Airport (or position if not at an airport) of intended landing and estimated time of arrival (ETA).

(5) Number of persons aboard.

(6) Estimated hours of delay on ground.

(7) Assistance required.

(8) Reason for unscheduled landing.

b. The movement monitor will relay the information in *a* above to the Department of the Army Operations Center(AOC) and to the appropriate major Army commander by the most expeditious means available.

c. As soon as the mission commander has access to a communications center, the information in *a* above will be sent by IMMEDIATE precedence message to the recipients in *b* above. The courier will submit a nuclear accident–incident report in accord with chapter 5.

d. If flight is planned near Canada, instructions given the courier will include appropriate contacts in the Canadian Armed Forces and the U.S. Air Force.

e. Pending arrival of official instructions through military or diplomatic channels, the courier will—

(1) Bar foreign officials from performing more than a perfunctory examination of the aircraft and from viewing the containers.

(2) Post guards at the aircraft until relieved by competent authority or until classified materiel has been removed.

(3) As soon as practicable, and by the most expeditious means of communication available, report the landing to and request assistance from the nearest U.S. Army commanders (the U.S. Army attache or a U.S. Department of State official).

4–36. Action in unfriendly territory

Prior to each mission, if appropriate, the aircrew will be briefed on mandatory procedures to be followed in the event of inadvertent overflight of unfriendly territory.

4–37. Aircraft accidents involving nuclear weapons or components

If a weapon–bearing aircraft crash occurs, the courier (or surviving successor) will take the actions in *a* through *d* below. (Refer to chap 5 for additional guidance.)

a. Withdraw all individuals, other than essential security personnel, firefighters, and rescue personnel, at least 2,000 feet(610 meters) from the accident and seek shelter for protection from a possible explosion.

b. Implement NAIRA procedures.

c. Provide security protection for classified information and equipment.

d. Ensure immediate reporting of all known facts on the accident, by telephone or other expeditious means, to the nearest military installation.

4–38. Security requirements

See AR 50–5–1 for guidance.

Section V
Logistical Waterborne Transportation

4–39. General

a. Normally, waterborne movement of nuclear weapons will be aboard U.S. Navy ships or craft or aboard specially equipped U.S.-national, civil–service–manned ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). To meet urgent operational requirements or emergency evacuation, the appropriate unified or specified commander may authorize the use of other U.S. military or U.S.–manned MSC ships to transport weapons under U.S. military custody.

b. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) area representative will brief the master of the vessel or designated representative on the procedures to be followed in emergencies, including a review of the provisions of TB 385–2 and TM 39–20–11.

c. At ports, loading and unloading of nuclear weapons will be only through military terminal facilities.

d. The shipmaster will ensure that nuclear weapons are properly stowed.

e. A courier will accompany each vessel carrying nuclear weapons.

f. Additional guidance for water shipment of nuclear weapons is in AR 55–228 and AR 700–65.

4–40. Security requirements

See AR 50–5–1 for guidance.

Section VI
Logistical Transportation by Rail

4–41. General

a. Movement between CONUS military installations by rail is prohibited. Shipment by rail in oversea areas may be authorized by a unified or specified commander for an urgent operational requirement.

b. Less than carload shipments of weapons are authorized only if exclusive use of the car is specified. If boxcars are used, all doors except the one used for loading will be fastened from the inside and sealed on the outside. After loading, the loading door will be locked and sealed on the outside. If existing door hasps, other locking mechanisms, or apertures do not permit interior door fastening or the use of high–security padlocks on loading doors, one of the substitute measures below will be applied. These substitute measures do not eliminate seal requirements.

(1) A steel nut and bolt will be installed through the hasp or apertures in the door–locking or door–closing mechanism.After installation, the exposed threads of the bolt will be burred or crimped to prevent easy removal by unauthorized persons.

(2) A U–shaped piece of 5–gauge steel wire, or heavier, will be installed through the door–locking or door–closing mechanisms and twisted two or more times.

(3) To facilitate the removal of these substitute measures for an emergency entrance or for any other authorized requirement, the escort personnel will carry an appropriate cutting tool that is not flame–producing.

c. Loading and tiedown procedures are specified in AMC 19–48 series drawings (DA Pam 75–5).

4–42. Security requirements

See AR 50–5–1 for guidance.

Chapter 5
Nuclear Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (NAIRA)

5–1. Objectives

NAIRA is intended to minimize loss of life, personal injury, hazardous effects, and destruction of property. It also assists in securing classified nuclear materiel and help maintain public confidence in the ability of the Army to respond to a nuclear accident or incident.

5–2. Explanation of NAIRA terms

A nuclear weapon is a device in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission, fusion, or both. For the purpose of this regulation, radiological nuclear weapon components and nuclear reactors are also included.

a. Nuclear weapon war risk accident (flagword: OPREP–3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH). An event which results in either of the following:

(1) An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation.

(2) An accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces or U.S.–supported Allied Forces of a nuclear–capable weapon system which could create the risk of an outbreak of war.

b. Nuclear weapon accident (flagword: OPREP–3 PINNACLE

BROKEN ARROW). An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or radiological nuclear weapon components that results in any of the following:

(1) Nonnuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component.

(2) Radioactive contamination.

(3) Seizure, theft, loss, or destruction of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.

(4) Public hazard, actual or suspected.

c. Nuclear weapon significant incident (flagword:OPREP–3 BENT SPEAR). An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or radiological nuclear weapon components that does not fall in the nuclear weapon accident category. Examples of unexpected events include—

(1) Evident damage to a nuclear weapon(s) or radiological nuclear weapon components to the extent that major rework, complete replacement or examination, or recertification by the DOE is required.

(2) The striking of a nuclear weapon by lightning, or when a commander suspects that lightning has degraded the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon system.

(3) Known or suspected arming (partially or fully) of a nuclear weapon.

(4) Probable high interest by the public or news media that may result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or premature release of classified information.

(5) An attempted penetration, actual penetration, or other unexpected degradation of the security of nuclear weapons sites, activities, or logistical movements.

(6) A threat, actual or implied, of an attempt to seize a nuclear weapon. This includes a threat to attack or inflict damage on a nuclear weapons storage site, nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons security forces.

d. Nuclear weapon minor incident (flagword: DULL SWORD). An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons that is not reportable as a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident, but that results in any of the following:

(1) Damage to the warhead or warhead section which Army organizations are authorized to repair, or malfunctions of associated equipment that could result in damage to the warhead or warhead section. (Associated equipment includes test, handling, launch, control, arming, and monitoring systems.)

(2) Damage, loss, or destruction of a nuclear–type training weapon, warhead, or warhead section. Of particular concern are instances of damage or equipment failure when the same technical procedures and equipment prescribed for use with nuclear weapons were being used on a trainer.

(3) Unauthorized acts that degrade the safety of a nuclear weapon, unless they are reportable as accidents or significant incidents.

(4) A nuclear–capable missile system accident inflight that does not meet the definition of a NUCFLASH (*a*above) or while being transported or stored, even though no nuclear warhead or warhead joint–flight–test assembly is attached at the time. Missile system accidents will be reported and will contain the flagword DULL SWORD.

(5) Any other condition which is reportable in the judgment of the commander or custodian of a nuclear weapon.

e. Nuclear reactor occurrences (flagword: OPREP–3 FADED GIANT). Nuclear reactor occurrences fall into three general categories. The same flagword is used for reporting all three occurrences. The occurrences, with criteria, are as follows:

(1) *Nuclear reactor accident.* An uncontrolled reactor criticality resulting in damage to the reactor core or release of fission products from the reactor core to the atmosphere or surrounding environment. Criteria for determining whether an accident within this general description has occurred include—

(a) Individual fatality as a direct result of the accident.

(b) Individual injury resulting in a lost workday.

(c) The loss of any reactor fuel.

(d) Damage to property in excess of $100,000.

(e) Release of radioactive material exceeding 5,000 times the limits specified for materials listed in appendix B, table II, title 10, CFR Part 20, when averaged over a period of 24 hours.

(f) Exposure of the whole body of any individual to 25 rems or more radiation; exposure of the skin of the whole body to 150 rems or more of radiation; or exposure of the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms to 375 rems or more of radiation.

(g) A loss of 1 workweek or more of scheduled reactor operations.

(2) *Nuclear reactor seizure or attempted seizure.* Any unauthorized seizure or attempted seizure of a reactor facility or reactor special nuclear materiel, by any hostile group, force, or person.

(3) *Significant nuclear reactor incident.* An unexpected event resulting in any of the following:

(a) Exceeding a safety limit as defined in the technical specifications.

(b) Exposure of personnel to any radiation in excess of allowable limits set by AR 40–14.

(c) Release of radioactive material in excess of 500 times the limit for materials listed in appendix B, table II, title 10, CFR Part 20, when averaged over a period of 24 hours.

(d) A loss of one day or more of scheduled reactor operations.

(e) Damage to property in excess of $10,000.

(f) Unusual interest by the public or news media.

5–3. Army policies and roles of other agencies

a. Procedures described in this chapter are primarily intended for peacetime use. While incident reporting and contamination control are still necessary in wartime, units may adopt wartime reporting formats that best suit command needs. The tactical situation may dictate that units mark and report contaminated areas initially, with cleanup operations following at a later time based on availability of properly trained and equipped units and the tactical situation. Additional wartime NAIRA guidance can be found in FM 100–50.

b. Primary responsibility for command and control at the scene of an accident or significant incident involving radioactive materials, to include nuclear weapons, rests with—

(1) The Service or agency in charge or command of a military installation or DOE facility on which the accident or incident occurs.

(2) The Service or agency having custody of the radioactive materials or nuclear weapon at the time the accident or incident occurs, should the accident occur off or beyond installation or facility boundaries described above.

c. The DOD or DOE official first to arrive at the scene of a nuclear accident or significant incident will take initial emergency actions within their capability to establish control of the accident site, to safeguard classified material, and to advise military and DOE personnel of the possible radiological hazard. Prior to the arrival of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)representative, the DOD or DOE official will seek the assistance and cooperation of State and local authorities for off–site support. The DOD or DOE official will remain at the scene until relieved by the Service on–scene commander (OSC), or DOE Team Leader having the primary accident responsibility as set forth in *b* above.

d. Public release of information will be in accordance with AR 360–5.

e. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) will assume initial national–level command and control, and request the response of military resources until conditions have stabilized.After conditions have stabilized, command and control will be transferred to the appropriate Service Operations Center.

f. The FEMA—

(1) Coordinates the off–site response actions of all Federal agencies to ensure that all necessary Federal assistance is being provided and that off–site activities of State and local officials do not conflict with on–site activities.

(2) Coordinates Federal emergency response activities with State and local emergency response efforts.

(3) Receives requests from State and local officials for assistance

from the Federal Government and coordinates these requests with the appropriate agency.

g. The DOE—

(1) Dispatches the appropriate response organizations to the scene of a nuclear accident or incident. The specific composition of the organization (for example, Accident Response Group (ARG) or Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST)), to include any necessary specialized equipment, will be designed to meet the requirements of the accident or incident as determined by the OSC.

(2) Operates its response organizations under the control of the OSC for on–site activities while at an Army nuclear accident or incident scene. The response organization provides technical advice and assistance for—

(a) Determining the extent of any radioactive hazard and minimizing the hazards to the public.

(b) Collecting, identifying, and disposing of weapon components, weapon debris, and the resulting radioactive material.

(c) Identifying and protecting critical nuclear weapons design information (CNWDI) and other restricted data.

(d) Determining render–safe and recovery procedures to be used by EOD units.

(3) Includes a senior scientific adviser with the response organizations to serve as chief adviser on technical matters pertaining to the weapons.

(4) Provides public affairs liaison to the Joint Information Center (JIC), and liaison to the senior FEMA official at the scene.

h. The DOD—

(1) Provides worldwide military transportation, aerial photographic support, airborne survey platforms, logistical support services, and other support as requested, to the DOE for its response to DOD or DOE nuclear weapon accidents or significant incidents.

(2) Provides required administrative, medical, and logistic support (including communications and military transportation) for a response organization supporting a DOD nuclear accident assistance effort.

(3) Provides an OSC for a DOD nuclear accident or significant incident, as required.

i. The Secretary of the Army will become the DOD Executive Agent upon Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency(PL 93–288). If military support to civilian authorities is then requested by FEMA, it will be provided in accord with DOD Directive 3025.1 and AR 500–60.

j. OCONUS NAIRA operations areas under the jurisdiction of unified or specified commands will conform to the guidance of the appropriate unified or specified command where applicable. The reporting procedures outlined in this regulation will continue to apply for all Army components.

k. When accidents or incidents occur in an area that is not under the jurisdiction of a unified or specified command, the Service or agency with custody of the nuclear weapon or nuclear materiel will have NAIRA responsibility.

5–4. Responsibilities

a. The DCSOPS has HQDA staff responsibility for the overall coordination of Army NAIRA activities. The DCSOPS will—

(1) Review reports of all Army nuclear accidents and incidents to ascertain their cause and the adequacy of corrective action.

(2) Support requests received from the DOE, other military services, and DOD agencies for assistance in controlling and minimizing the effects of nuclear accidents or incidents. These requests may come directly from the agency involved or from the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC).

(3) Ensure that any nuclear weapon accident or incident is reported as prescribed in this chapter.

(4) Establish policies and criteria for NAIRA and monitor their implementation.

(5) Provide officers to the Army Operations Center (AOC) to assist in handling NAIRA activities.

(6) Establish internal, coordinated DA Staff procedures for the immediate processing of NAIRA reports.

b. ASA(RDA) will—

(1) Support requests for assistance in controlling and minimizing the effects of Army nuclear reactor accidents or incidents.

(2) Ensure that any Army reactor accident or incident is reported as prescribed by this chapter.

(3) Provide officers to the AOC to assist in handling NAIRA requests involving Army reactors.

c. The DCSLOG will—

(1) Issue instructions to the OSC concerning the disposition of nuclear weapons involved in an accident or incident.

(2) Replace weapons damaged in an accident or incident.

(3) Supervise the EOD program throughout the Army.

d. The Army Safety Office will convene accident investigation boards in accordance with AR 15–22.

e. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)will—

(1) Plan, establish, and maintain at least one Service Response Force (SRF) capable of responding to Army nuclear accidents and incidents in CONUS. The SRF will, as a minimum, be composed of the following:

(a) OSC and staff, which will consist of the following: OSC(general officer), deputy OSC, deputy for operations, operations officer, staff judge advocate (legal and claims), surgeon (medical officer), public affairs officer, protocol officer, security officer, engineer officer, communications officer, logistical officer, EOD officer (provided by FORSCOM), purchasing or contracting officer, health physicist, and a safety officer.

(b) Alpha survey and monitoring teams.

(c) Qualified nuclear capable EOD unit (provided by FORSCOM).

(d) Security forces (provided by FORSCOM for any Army accident not on an installation with a nuclear weapon or special nuclear materiel storage mission).

(e) Emergency medical team (provided by Health Services Command(HSC)).

(f) Contamination control and decontamination teams(decontamination control station).

(g) Public affairs team.

(2) Provide the Initial Response Force (IRF) and SRF to assume command and control of on–site activities at Army installations in CONUS which store nuclear weapons or SNM.

(3) Provide radiological control (RADCON) teams.

(4) Develop Memorandums of Agreement and coordinate nuclear accident response plans with FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC), HSC, and other major commands as appropriate.

(5) Conduct quarterly training exercises of response forces at nuclear facilities.

(6) Plan for, budget, and conduct a biennial exercise of the Army's SRF.

(7) Coordinate with civil authorities around fixed nuclear facilities per DODI 5100.52.

f. The Commanding General, FORSCOM will—

(1) Provide support requested by the OSC of the SRF responding to an Army nuclear accident.

(2) Provide for and dispatch a qualified EOD staff officer, a qualified nuclear capable EOD unit, and security forces to the scene of an Army nuclear accident.

(3) When directed, coordinate the use of DOD resources in support of civil authorities in off–site activities in accord with AR 500–60.

g. The Commanding General, TRADOC will—

(1) Provide support requested by the OSC of the SRF responding to an Army nuclear accident.

(2) When directed, coordinate the use of DOD resources in support of civil authorities in off–site activities in accord with AR 500–60.

h. The Commanding General, USAISC will provide, when directed by the AOC or upon request of the OSC, secure voice and secure record communications to the response force at the scene of a nuclear accident.

i. The Commanding General, HSC will—

(1) Maintain a trained emergency medical team (EMT) at each nuclear storage depot.

(2) Organize and maintain Radiological Advisory Medical Teams(RAMTs) capable of performing the functions prescribed in AR 40–13.

j. Commanders of MACOMs and Army components of unified or specified commands will ensure that all subordinate organizations with a specialized nuclear accident response capability keep the JNACC so informed. Response capability includes location, status, and composition of teams capable of responding to a nuclear weapon or reactor accident or incident. In the event of a nuclear accident, these teams may be tasked by the AOC to become part of an Army IRF (*k* below). Response capability reporting requirements are outlined in paragraph 5–12 and appendix D and are further amplified in the annual JNACC Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing (NARCL). A copy of the NARCL is furnished to each reporting unit.

k. When directed, commanders of Army installations will provide an IRF to a nuclear accident/incident occurring off–post in the vicinity of their installation. The IRF will provide immediate safety, security, rescue, and control at the accident scene, to save lives and reduce exposure to hazards (AR 500–60, para 2–1 *f*). An IRF will be comprised of available installation assets. Creation of specially trained and/or dedicated organizations is not required. The senior military member or designated civilian official of the IRF will be responsible for all actions at the nuclear accident/incident scene until arrival of the OSC, staff, and the SRF. A national defense area (NDA) will normally be established for an off–installation accident/ incident to protect classified defense information and DOD equipment or material. (See also AR 190–13.)

l. Commanders of Army installations within CONUS and its territories having the potential for an accident involving radioactive material shall include state and local governments in their emergency response planning and training. Installation commanders will cooperate, within the confines of current security classification guidelines, with state and local officials during response planning and training exercises.

5–5. Key personnel and emergency teams (RCS HQ–DNA–191M)

a. OSC. Upon arrival at an accident or incident scene, the OSC of the SRF has operational control of all Army forces and directs all operations at the scene. Operations will include but will not be limited to—

(1) Providing security and proper disposal of all classified materiel involved.

(2) Conducting surveys to determine actual and potential hazards.

(3) Taking action to minimize the hazards.

(4) Requesting required assistance beyond the capability of the OSC staff and response forces.

(5) Submitting required reports and public information releases.

(6) Processing claims.

(7) Controlling and providing support to observers and other authorized personnel.

(8) Requesting local intelligence units to conduct counterintelligence inspections and surveys.

(9) Establishing communications and conducting liaison with local government agencies.

(10) Establishing communications between the accident site and higher headquarters.

(11) Obtaining disposition instructions for nuclear weapons and nuclear material at the scene of the accident.

(12) Developing a plan for restoration of the site.

(13) Developing the weapons recovery plan for the accident site.

b. EOD units. Under the direction of the OSC, EOD units will—

(1) Identify weapons and determine their condition.

(2) Conduct render–safe and disposal procedures when necessary.

(3) Based upon observations made during initial entry, advise on survey methods and reference points and on the location of the hotline and command post.

(4) Identify and collect classified components of the weapon and associated material.

(5) Assume additional responsibilities, as prescribed in AR 75–15.

c. Alpha teams. AMC will establish local alpha contamination monitoring teams at AMC nuclear weapons storage and maintenance facilities and reactor installations.

d. RAMT. RAMTs are located at Walter Reed Army Medical Center(WRAMC), WASH DC, and the 7th Medical Command in Europe. RAMTs will assist and furnish radiological health hazard guidance to the OSC, other responsible officials at an accident site, and to local medical authorities.

(1) The RAMT will—

(a) Provide guidance relative to the potential health hazards to personnel from radiological contamination or exposure by ionizing radiation.

(b) Evaluate survey data in order to provide technical guidance to responsible officials regarding use of radiologically contaminated areas.

(c) Monitor medical facilities and equipment where contaminated patients have been evacuated.

(d) Advise the OSC regarding the potential health hazards from exposure to sources of ionizing radiation and the decontamination of personnel, medical treatment facilities, and medical equipment.

(e) Advise on early and followup laboratory and clinical procedures.

(f) Be prepared to assist with essential emergency medical care.

(2) RAMT assistance may be requested as follows:

(a) Through the JNACC, AUTOVON 221–2102/2103/2104/ 2105/2106.

(b) Directly from the Commander, WRAMC, WASH DC, HSHL–HP–RHM, AUTOVON 291–5107 or commercial (301)427–5107.

(c) From the 7th Medical Command through the USAREUR Operations Center, AUTOVON 370–8906 or directly from the 10th Medical Lab, AUTOVON 486–8113.

e. Provost marshal and physical security teams. MACOMs, when tasked by the OSC or the AOC, will provide a staff provost marshal and physical security team from local resources.

(1) The provost marshal will advise on physical security matters and traffic control. He or she will coordinate the use of security forces with the OSC, FEMA, and representatives of State and local governments or other Services.

(2) The physical security team will assist in securing the area and controlling traffic.

f. RADCON team. The RADCON team is a special team located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, organized to provide technical assistance and advice to the OSC in radiological emergencies.

(1) The RADCON team—

(a) Performs detailed radiological surveys for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation.

(b) Controls and supervises waste disposal measures.

(c) Provides health physics services.

(d) Controls and supervises radiological safety services.

(e) Supervises and provides technical advice for decontamination operations.

(f) Supervises and provides technical advice for the control and containment of the radiological contamination at an accident site.

(2) RADCON team assistance may be requested from the AOC, AUTOVON: 227–0218, or commercial: (202) 697–0218, extension 215, or through the JNACC, AUTOVON: 221–2102/2103 or commercial: (703) 325–2102/2103.

g. PAO. An individual, preferably a field grade officer or civilian equivalent, with knowledge and experience in public affairs activities and responsibilities, will be appointed as the PAO. The PAO will—

(1) Advise and assist the OSC with information policies.

(2) Respond to information requirements prescribed by AR

360–5. (Contingency news releases approved by DOD are provided in figs 5–1 thru 5–4.)

(3) Ensure all news releases are coordinated through the JIC.

h. Joint Information Center (JIC).

(1) A JIC will be established whenever an accident or significant incident involving nuclear weapons happens, or appears likely to happen, outside DOD or DOE facility boundaries. The JIC will include public affairs representatives from the DOD, DOE, and FEMA, as well as provisions for other Federal agency, State, and local participation.

(2) The JIC will be the single point of contact for the news media and will coordinate the release of all news information and responses to inquiries. It should be established away from the accident site to keep it separate from the accident site and afford easy access for media.

i. DOD and DOE NAIRA teams (RCS HQ–DNA–191M). The DOD JNACC is the central repository of information for all nuclear accident or incident assistance teams. Commands needing assistance in the event of a nuclear weapon or reactor accident, or serious incident, may request such assistance from JNACC. The JNACC will inform the requesting agency as to the assets available and their locations. The emergency (24–hour) telephone numbers for JNACC are as follows:

(1) Commercial: (703) 325–2102/2103/2104.

(2) AUTOVON: 221–2102/2103/2104.

j. The DOE Accident Response Group (ARG). The DOE ARG is composed of technical specialists and equipment. The DOE ARG is on continuous alert and prepared for dispatch to the scene of a nuclear weapon or reactor accident as soon as possible after notification. The group's specific composition in any given situation will be tailored to meet the needs of the OSC. Information related to DOE activities at the accident will be coordinated with the DOE representative before the ARG is released.

(1) After consultation with the AOC, the Director of Military Application, DOE, may authorize the DOE to dispatch an ARG and any necessary specialized equipment to the scene of an Army nuclear weapon or reactor accident.

(2) The ARG will be headed by a DOE staff member designated as the DOE representative and will include a senior scientific adviser(normally, a senior staff member of a DOE–operated weapons or reactor laboratory). The DOE representative will—

(a) Direct the activities of the DOE ARG.

(b) Ensure coordinated DOE support for the OSC in all matters pertinent to the group's mission.

(c) Advise the OSC if additional DOE response capabilities are needed and, when mutually agreed upon, will ensure their provision.

(3) The senior scientific adviser may be designated by the OSC to serve as his or her scientific adviser when the DOE representative concurs.

(4) The DOE ARG mission will include support to the OSC as follows:

(a) Technical advice and assistance in determining the extent of any radioactive hazards.

(b) Technical advice to minimize hazards to the public.

(c) Technical advice and assistance in collecting, identifying, and disposing of weapon or reactor components, weapon debris, and contaminated materiel.

(d) Technical advice and assistance in identifying and protecting nuclear weapon design information and other restricted data.

(e) Assistance in on–site discussions with foreign or local government officials on matters of special concern to the DOE.

(5) The OSC will provide administrative, medical, and logistical services (including communications and military transportation) to the ARG. The extent of these support services will depend upon location, environment, type of accident, and the self–supporting capability of the DOE group.

k. Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory (OEHL). The OEHL is located at Brooks AFB, TX. The OEHL provides analytical services, bioenvironmental engineering services, and technical services as follows:

(1) *Analytical services.*

(a) Specialized analyses of biological tissues and fluids, soil, water, air, gases, and other materials.

(b) Radio–assay services for all types of radionuclides found in biological, environmental, and industrial materials.

(c) Whole body counting capability to support routine and emergency evaluations of personnel accidentally exposed to radionuclides, wherein the individual may have inhaled, ingested, or experienced wound contamination by radioactive material.

(d) Consultation on chemical and radiochemical sampling techniques and procedures.

(e) Special collection containers required by the sampling agency.

(f) Radiation counting capability.

(2) *Bioenvironmental engineering services.*

(a) Guidance and assistance in health physics.

(b) Specialized environmental sampling and testing equipment for loan to installations.

(c) Advice and guidance regarding sampling equipment, instruments, methods, calibration, and interpretation of results which would be appropriate in establishing and evaluating radiological health programs.

(d) Methods for ionizing and nonionizing radiation control.

(e) Special studies and on–site surveys for resolution or radiation problems.

(f) Repository of information concerning techniques, procedures, and equipment for application in radiation control programs.

(3) *Technical services.*

(a) Master radiation exposure registry and plutonium deposition registry.

(b) Automated data storage, retrieval and analysis for evaluation of radiological health programs.

(c) Air transportable laboratory trailer to perform selected radiochemical analysis of environmental and biological samples to support investigations of nuclear accidents.

(4) *Requests for assistance.* Request for OEHL assistance can be made by verbal or written communication. Requests involving significant expenditures of laboratory resources and field surveys must be followed up by writing to Air Force Systems Command/SGP with information copies to Major Command/SGP and United States Air Force OEHL. The OEHL can be contacted during duty hours by calling AUTOVON: 240–2001/2002.After duty hours contact Brooks Air Force Base (AFB) Command Post, AUTOVON: 240–3278 and request the OEHL duty officer.

l. Air Transportable RADIAC Package (ATRAP). The ATRAP is located at Kelly AFB, TX. It is a collection of RADIAC equipment, spare parts, and trained instrument repair technicians maintained in an alert status by the Air Force Logistics Command for airlift to the scene of a nuclear accident or radiological incident. The ATRAP team is prepared to repair, calibrate, and issue radiac instruments to radiation survey teams at the scene of the accident on a 24–hour, 7–day–week basis.

(1) The OSC will coordinate support for the ATRAP and accompanying technicians.

(2) The ATRAP will move over the road to sites within 50 miles of Kelly AFB, TX. Beyond 3 hours driving time, the ATRAP will be airlifted by Military Airlift Command. For accident sites on inaccessible terrain or in water, ATRAP units will be moved by helicopter or by water/sealift means.

(3) The ATRAP is maintained in a fully ready status for deployment to the scene of a nuclear accident/radiological emergency within 4 hours after notification by the Air Force Operations Center. The ATRAP may be requested through the Air Force Operations Center (AUTOVON: 225–7220 or commercial: (202) 695–7220)or through the JNACC (AUTOVON: 221–2102/2103, commercial:(703) 325–2102/2103.

m. DNA advisory team. The DNA advisory team provides a core of specially qualified personnel to assist in the handling of a nuclear weapons accident or significant incident. Members of the team are on continual alert. Their mission is to supplement, as required, such areas as public affairs, health physics, legal, security. The team is

described in the NARCL and is alerted through the JNACC (AUTOVON:221–2102/2103 or commercial: (703) 325–2102/2103).

5–6. Reporting procedures (RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168 and RCS CSGPA–1559)

a. Nuclear weapon war risk accidents(flagword: OPREP–3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH), RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168. A NUCFLASH will be reported directly to the NMCC as soon as it occurs. Where possible, the facilities of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) will be used. A NUCFLASH report will be submitted by the lowest level of command having knowledge of the event and access to a communication network capable of relay into communications systems serving the NMCC. MACOMs will provide procedures for NUCFLASH reporting to the lowest level of command having access to the communications facilities. NUCFLASH reports will be in narrative format, transmitted by FLASH precedence.Reports will not be affected by MINIMIZE.

(1) The initial voice report will always be unclassified and will provide a narrative description of the event by the fastest means available, usually by unclassified voice or telephonic transmission to NMCC. Although immediacy is more important than content, the report should include time and location of occurrence, the unit responsible, the identification of the nuclear–capable weapon system involved, and indication of whether system is nuclear armed, aim point of missile or location of detonation, and a statement as to whether followup reports are anticipated. This will be followed by a FLASH precedence message, classified by content, containing the same information. The initial voice report will be identified by the flagword, OPREP–3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH. The initial message report will contain the following information in the header line: OPREP–3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH/UNIT DESIGNATION/001.

(2) If all required information was not provided in the initial report, amplifying reports will be submitted to NMCC within 5 minutes after the initial report. The voice report will be identified by the flagword, OPREP–3, PINNACLE NUCFLASH. The message report header line will be: OPREP–3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH/UNIT DESIGNATION/002.

b. Nuclear weapon accidents (flagword:OPREP–3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW), RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168. Nuclear weapon accidents (BROKEN ARROW), will be reported at once by voice to NMCC by the fastest means available. An amplifying report will be submitted by message within 4 hours after the initial report. Supplemental reports will be submitted to the AOC as of 1000 hours Zulu daily, or sooner, if significant information becomes available. The initial report will begin with the flagword, OPREP–3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW. All available information will be provided in accord with the format guidance given in appendix E.

c. Nuclear weapons significant incident(flagword: OPREP–3 BENT SPEAR), RCS DD–AE(AR)1168, and nuclear weapons minor incidents (flagword: DULL SWORD), RCS CSGPA–1559. A significant incident (BENT SPEAR) report will be submitted by electrical means immediately after the incident occurs.Notification by telephone is authorized, but must be justified by the severity of conditions. Any telephonic reports will be made to the AOC (commercial: (202) 697–0218, AUTOVON: 227–0218).All significant incident reports will begin with the flagword:OPREP–3 BENT SPEAR. A minor incident (DULL SWORD) report will be submitted by electrical means as soon as practicable, but not later than 5 days after the incident. Telephonic reports are not required for minor incidents.

d. Reactor occurrences.

(1) Reactor accidents (flagword: OPREP–3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD AE(AR)1168, will be reported at once to the AOC, Autovon:227–0218; commercial: (202) 697–0218 by the fastest voice means available. The initial report will begin with the flagword, OPREP–3 FADED GIANT. An amplifying report will be forwarded by electrical means within 4 hours. Supplemental reports will be submitted to the AOC as of 1000 hours Zulu daily, or sooner if significant information becomes available.

(2) Reactor seizure reports (flagword: OPREP–3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168, will be submitted by electrical means immediately after the incident occurs. Notification by telephone is authorized, if the severity of conditions justify. A telephonic seizure report, made to the AOC, will begin with the flagword, OPREP–3 FADED GIANT.

(3) Reactor significant incidents (flagword: OPREP–3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168, will be submitted by electrical means immediately after the incident occurs. Supplemental reports will be submitted to the AOC as of 1000 hours daily.

e. Report format and distribution. All reports will begin with the appropriate flagword, using the format at appendix E (para E–1 for weapons reports; and para E–2 for reactor reports). Supplemental reports will be submitted as required. Message reports of accidents and incidents will be addressed as follows:

(1) All accidents/incidents:

(a) DA WASH DC//DAMO–SWS/DAMO–ODL/DAMI–CIC/DACS–SF/DAIG–TI/DAMO–AOC//.

(b) CDRAMC ALEXANDRIA VA//AMCCN/AMCSF//.

(c) CDRAMCCOM DOVER NJ//AMSMC–MAY–(D)//.

(d) CDRAMCCOM ROCK ISLAND IL//AMSMC–SF/AMSMC–MAY–N//.

(e) CDRUSANCA FT BELVOIR VA//MONA–MS/MONA–SU//.

(f) CDRAMCCOM DOVER NJ//AMSMC–QAN/AMSMC–SR//.

(2) NUCFLASH and BROKEN ARROW incidents only: JCS WASH DC//J3NMCC//.

(3) For reports originating in CONUS: CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ3–T//.

(4) For reports involving missile system equipment: CDRMICOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL//AMSMI–ST–NB//AMSMI–SF//.

(5) For reports involving security incidents only, add also:

(a) DCDRINSCOM FT MEADE MD//IACSO//.

(b) CDRITAC ARLINGTON HALL STATION VA//IAX–TA–C//

(6) Commanders of unified or specified commands, if the incident pertains to the Army components of those commands.

f. Classification of reports. The initial voice NUCFLASH report will always be unclassified. All other reports mentioned will be classified by content in accordance with TB 9–1100–811–40 (for example, classify: if nuclear weapon presence is revealed at a specific location; if report can only pertain to nuclear weapons(BROKEN ARROW); or if report states a specified weapon is nonoperational.)

5–7. Release of information

Reports prepared in accord with the provisions of this regulation may contain information sufficiently sensitive to preclude release for use in legal proceedings or to the public. AR 360–5 governs the release of such information. (See also para 5–5 *g*.)

5–8. Technical investigation and analysis of nuclear weapons accidents/ incidents (RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168 and RCS CSGPA–1559)

The CG, AMC will establish procedures to ensure that a technical investigation and analysis is done for each significant incident (RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168(MIN)) or minor nuclear weapon system or reactor incident (RCS CSGPA–1559) and will provide immediate reports of investigation, supplemental information, and final reports promptly to the DCSOPS HQDA (DAMO–SWS) WASH DC 20310–0430. An information copy will be forwarded to Commander, USANCA, ATTN: MONA–MS/SU, 7500 Backlick Road, Bldg 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198. Similar technical investigation, analysis, and reporting will also be performed for nuclear weapon accidents, RCS DD–R&E(AR)1168(MIN) if the U.S. Army Nuclear Accident Investigation Board (AR 15–22) is not convened for such purposes. Copies of reports of investigations of nuclear–capable missile accidents, even though no nuclear warhead or joint–flight–test assembly (JFTA) is attached at the time of the

accident or incident, will be forwarded to HQDA(DAMO–SWS) WASH DC 20310–0430.

5–9. Nuclear Weapon/Reactor Accident Investigation Board

a. The U.S. Army Nuclear Weapons/Reactor Accident Investigation Board investigates Army nuclear weapons/reactor accidents occurring in CONUS. The provisions of AR 15–22 apply.

b. Similar boards will be appointed by oversea Army major commanders who have nuclear weapons within their commands. In the event of an Army nuclear weapon accident which occurs OCONUS, the responsible major commander will direct investigation of the accident by a board consisting of at least four members who are familiar with the technical aspects of the design, construction, and functioning of Army nuclear weapons, and who are experienced in accident investigation techniques.

c. Reports of investigations will be forwarded within 30 days of the completion of the investigation to HQDA (DAMO–SW), (DACS–SF), and (DAIG) WASH DC 20310–0430. Forwarding endorsements will contain a statement of concurrence or nonconcurrence in the findings, recommendations of the investigative authority, action taken, and other information or recommendations to prevent a like occurrence elsewhere.

5–10. Investigation of nuclear reactor accidents and incidents

All Army nuclear reactor accidents, incidents, and occurrences will be investigated according to command responsibilities listed in paragraph 5–8.

5–11. Observers

Agreements with the DOE and the military services provide for a limited number of observers on a reciprocal basis at the scene of a nuclear accident. The objective of having observers is to take maximum advantage of any accident experience to preclude repetition of operational or technical errors.

a. Observers (within CONUS) authorized at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident will—

(1) Be cleared for TOP SECRET or possess a " Q"clearance and will be authorized access to RESTRICTED DATA and CNWDI.

(2) Be provided transportation by their own headquarters to a point designated by the host headquarters.

(3) In case of Army observers, be technically qualified in nuclear weapons or reactor safety as appropriate, in order to take maximum advantage of this available experience.

b. Army component commanders OCONUS will establish a policy for handling U.S. and Allied nation observers in accordance with guidance provided by the unified or specified commander.

c. Requests for Army observer spaces at the scene of a nuclear weapon or reactor accident or significant nuclear weapon incident will be directed to the DCSOPS representative in the AOC. Normally, the number of observers is limited to two per Service, four from the DOE, and one from the DNA.

5–12. NARCL reporting

a. The serious nature of nuclear accidents/incidents, coupled with the need to rapidly identify and assemble assistance teams appropriate to the peculiar needs of the accident, make correct reporting of response assets to JNACC imperative.

b. In accordance with paragraph 5–4 *j*, organizations with a nuclear accident response capability will inform JNACC of this capability annually, as of 1 July, and as significant changes occur. This report is assigned RCS HQ DNA–191M.

c. To prevent duplicate listing of assets in the NARCL, if a single point of contact for assistance exists on an installation, that organization will consolidate the capabilities of all organizations on that installation and submit a single report. For OCONUS, this consolidation may be by sector or subsector. When multiple–tenant installations have response assets belonging to more than one MACOM, input will be consolidated and reported by each tenant command at the installation level. Since this will result in more than one input from an installation (or sector), each reporting command will ensure that they report only those assets in their own chain of command.

d. At a minimum, reporting elements will submit one copy of the information, without letters of transmittal or endorsements, directly to: DOD Representative, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, D.C. 20305–1000 (MACOMs may direct additional distribution of information.)

e. The information will be submitted using DD Form 2325,(Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report). This form is locally reproducible on 8–by 5–inch card stock. ***(A copy for reproduction purposes is located at the back of this regulation.)*** An example of a completed DD Form 2325, and preparation instructions are shown in figure D–1.

f. JNACC will collect, compile, and maintain a current NARCL, a copy of which will be provided to reporting units.

Chapter 6
Counterintelligence and Operations Security

6–1. General

This chapter establishes requirements for the following:

a. Counterintelligence (CI) support to nuclear weapons sites and activities.

b. The collecting and reporting of information affecting security at those sites.

c. OPSEC for nuclear sites.

6–2. Counterintelligence support

a. Site commanders will establish and maintain close coordination with supporting military intelligence (MI) units.

b. Military intelligence units will support nuclear sites by providing—

(1) Spot reports of potential or actual threats or incidents that may affect the security of a site.

(2) Investigation of incidents or suspected security violations reported by the nuclear units.

c. Site commanders will also establish and maintain contact with local civil and military police forces. Civil police authorities will be requested to provide timely information that may affect the security of the site and assist in investigating potential or actual violations of security occurring off the site.(MI units will be informed of all requests for civil police investigative assistance.)

6–3. Threat information collection and reporting

a. Routine information on threat groups/forces will be collected by U.S. Army MI units and routed through command channels to individual sites.

b. Specific information, particularly that which is time sensitive, will be passed to the affected sites by the fastest available measures commensurate with the security classification of the information. The chain of command and other unaffected sites will be informed as quickly thereafter as possible.

c. Site commanders will report all threat information received from local sources through command channels to the supporting MI units. Information will be used utilizing the spot report form as prescribed in AR 381–20.

d. The retention of information on actual and potential threats to nuclear surety materiel and weapons is authorized by AR 381–10 and AR 380–13.

6–4. Operations security

a. Site commanders will conduct site security and weapons operations in such a manner as to reduce or eliminate, as much as possible, a potential adversary's ability to collect audio or visual intelligence data from off site.

b. Methods of reducing hostile intelligence gathering include—

(1) Randomizing operations such as patrol patterns and numbers,

communications checks, perimeter light operations, manning of towers/fighting positions, bunker door openings and convoy moves.

(2) Setting up temporary screens to shield the view of outsiders during sensitive operations.

(3) Using subdued lighting in critical facilities such as the site security control center (SSCC), towers or other administration buildings.

c. Unit personnel will be periodically briefed on the threat to themselves and to the security of the site, installation, or activity. The dangers of establishing predictable patterns both on and off duty will be covered. Points such as reporting security violations and using the duress code word, and avoiding predictable patterns on and off duty will be stressed during these briefings.

6–5. Reporting of significant incidents

Any penetration, attempted penetration or other unexplained security degradation of site security will be reported through command channels to HQDA in accord with chapter 5 of this regulation.

Chapter 7
Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR)

7–1. General

This chapter establishes policy and procedures for the peacetime control of EMR hazards to nuclear weapons and security systems. EMR can degrade weapon system reliability and may cause site security systems to malfunction.

a. Weapons systems. Shipping and storage containers provide good shielding from EMR if they are properly closed. Disassembled weapons or weapons that have been ruptured in an accident are the most vulnerable to EMR hazards. TAKE SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS TO MINIMIZE EMR HAZARDS TO WEAPONS SYSTEMS DURING DISASSEMBLY OR NAIRA OPERATIONS.

b. Security systems. Although efforts are made to design IDS that are immune to EMR effects, their response is never entirely predictable. EMR levels that exceed design tolerances may cause false alarms, internal component failure, or system breakdown.

c. Tactical situations. In tactical situations, the EMR environment is constantly changing, and detailed EMR analysis is impractical. Commanders should consider and control EMR hazards to the maximum extent permitted by the tactical situation. (See FM 100–50.)

7–2. Responsibilities

a. Major Army commanders responsible for nuclear weapons storage or alert sites will—

(1) Ensure that all organizations and storage or alert sites involved in nontactical operations with nuclear weapons develop and implement plans to provide for the control of potential or actual EMR hazard conditions.

(2) Ensure that commanders of storage sites develop and submit initial and recurring EMR site survey reports (para 7–4).

(3) Notify the U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command (USAISEC) prior to introducing a new nuclear weapon system at, installing a new type of IDS at, or installing any EMR emitter in the vicinity of, a nuclear weapons storage site.

(4) Develop and prioritize command requests for scheduled EMR field measurement support (para 7–6 *b*).

(5) Provide required support to USAISEC field measurement teams, as stated in EMR measurement plans or schedules and coordinating messages, while these teams are performing actual field measurements.

(6) For each existing nuclear weapons storage or alert site, ensure that—

(a) A current EMR survey of the site and immediate area is on file at the unit, and a survey report has been forwarded to USAISEC.

(b) When necessary, a field measurement has been completed or is requested.

b. USAISEC will—

(1) Maintain a file for each storage or alert site. The file will contain a current EMR site survey report, a current EMR analysis, results of any EMR field evaluations and measurements made by USAISEC, and any recommendations for corrective actions that have been provided to the site.

(2) Conduct a timely EMR analysis for:

(a) Each initial EMR survey report submitted by a storage or alert site.

(b) Each changed EMR survey report submitted by a storage or alert site.

(3) Determine, for each EMR analysis, whether or not an EMR field measurement is required.

(4) In coordination with the appropriate MACOM, conduct initial and followup EMR field measurements as necessary, based on EMR survey reports, changes, updates, and unit or MACOM requests.

(5) Upon completion of analyses and any corollary field measurements, furnish recommendations to the storage or alert site commander regarding the elimination of EMR hazards, or, if hazards cannot be totally eliminated, how to operate in a manner that will reduce the effect of EMR hazards to an acceptable level.

c. The U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency will—

(1) Execute the EMR hazard control program for the HQDA program proponent (DAMO–SWS).

(2) Effect liaison and coordination with and between USAISEC and the MACOMs.

(3) In conjunction with the MACOMs, prioritize requests for EMR analyses when necessary and furnish the prioritized listings to USAISEC.

(4) Based on command–recommended priorities and overall criticality of need, prioritize requests for EMR field measurement support.

d. Nuclear unit storage or alert site commanders will—

(1) Submit site EMR survey reports as required (para 7–4).

(2) When deemed necessary, initiate requests for EMR field measurement support (para 7–6).

(3) Implement all recommendations listed in the current EMR analysis report provided by USAISEC, to either eliminate or reduce EMR hazards to an acceptable level.

(4) Maintain an EMR site file, consisting of—

(a) The current EMR survey report and any changes.

(b) The current EMR analysis report and any changes.

(c) Any pending requests for and all results of EMR field measurements.

(d) All corrective actions taken to reduce or eliminate EMR hazards.

7–3. New construction considerations

a. Before constructing a new nuclear weapons storage site, MACOMs will ensure that an initial site EMR survey has been completed by the site commander and furnished to USAISEC, along with a request for an analysis and USAISEC field evaluation or measurement. Analyses, evaluations, and measurement results provided by USAISEC will be considered during site construction and emitter positioning to ensure that EMR field intensities at critical facilities do not exceed permissible levels.

b. EMR analysis or measurement data will also be furnished by USAISEC to the appropriate District Engineering Office prior to design of any project involving a new IDS.

7–4. Electromagnetic radiation surveys (RCS CSGPO–444)

a. Site EMR surveys will be conducted by the nuclear storage or alert site commander. Survey results will be documented in a survey report (RCS CSGPO–444).

b. EMR survey reports will be prepared and submitted to USAISEC by the site commander—

(1) Prior to the introduction of a new nuclear weapons system at the site.

(2) Prior to the operation of a new emitter within 3 km of the site.

(3) Prior to any change (addition) in the type, antenna location, or number of emitters in operation at the site.

(4) Upon the deletion of any emitter at the site.

(5) As of 1 December each year, if no change has occurred since the last survey report. Such negative change reports will be forwarded to USAISEC not later than 10 days after preparation.

c. EMR survey reports will consist of a transmittal letter, all required emitter technical data, and a current sketch or map of the storage or alert site.

(1) The transmittal letter will include the types of weapons located at the site, and any other information deemed necessary to clarify any special items in the report.

(2) The following categories of transmitters (emitters) will be identified as part of the survey data:

(a) All emitters in normal operation at the site under the control or supervision of the site commander or site security forces. (Include both fixed and mobile emitters.)

(b) Any emitters that would operate only during an emergency situation. (Identify the number and conditions under which such emitters would operate.)

(c) Any other fixed emitters (military or civilian, U.S. or non–U.S.) located within 3 km of the site.

(3) Technical data will be listed on DA Form 5549–R (EMR Site Survey Data Report). DA Form 5549–R will be locally reproduced on 8½– by 11–inch paper. This form is located at the back of this regulation.

(4) For each nonradar emitter included in the survey report, the following required technical information will be listed in part I of DA Form 5549–R:

(a) System model/nomenclature. Report all emitters that are operated at the site. If multiple emitters of the same type will transmit simultaneously, all must be reported.

(b) Frequency range of emitter (as given in manual specifications).

(c) Assigned operating frequency range(s).

(d) Maximum power output (Watts) and modulation type.

(e) Antenna type/nomenclature.

(f) Periods of operation (24–hour, daily check, weekly check, preventive maintenance, emergency).

(g) Distance in meters from the emitter antenna to each quick reaction alert (QRA) pad, each missile storage barn, and each maintenance and assembly building on the storage or alert site. (If the emitter is mobile, specify the closest distance that it will approach each of the above locations.) If the site has a maintenance building, designate it as location " one" on the forms.

(5) For each radar emitter included in the survey report, the following required information will be listed as part II of DA Form 5549–R:

(a) System model/nomenclature.

(b) Frequency range of emitter (as given in manual specifications).

(c) Assigned operating frequency range(s).

(d) Pulse repetition rate (pulses per second).

(e) Pulse width.

(f) Duty cycle. (Report either pulse repetition rate and pulse width or the duty cycle, as appropriate.)

(g) Peak power.

(h) Antenna gain.

(i) Distance in meters from the antenna to each designated location specified in (4) *(g)* above. (Designated locations must be listed in the same order as for the nonradar emitters.)

(6) The sketch or map (not required to be drawn to scale) will clearly depict all buildings and areas listed above, all emitter antenna locations, and distances from the antenna to each building or area identified in the reporting requirements. Buildings and areas depicted on the sketch map will correspond to the numbered areas on DA Form 5549–R.

d. All initial, changed, and annual survey reports will be sent to the following addresses:

(1) Action copy to Commander, USAISEC, ATTN:ASB–SET–P, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613–5300.

(2) Information copy to Commander, USANCA, ATTN: MONA–SU,7500 Backlick Road, Building 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198.

e. Supplemental guidance is given below.

(1) DA Form 5549–R will be used to list all required transmitter technical data. (See *c*(3) and *c*(4) above.)

(2) Only the transmittal letter is required for an annual negative change report. DA Form 5549–R and sketches or maps will be omitted.

(3) For all other change reports, the transmittal letter will reference the survey report to which the changes are being submitted. DA Form 5549–R will clearly identify all emitters added or deleted in the change. Complete technical data (*c*(4) and *c*(5) above) is required for all added emitters. Sketch maps must also be updated to show added or deleted emitters and interactive distances. Technical data is not required for deleted emitters.

(4) Report all emitters that are operated at the site.Additional emitters on MTOEs/TDAs that will not transmit on site at any time will not be reported.

(5) Do not forward a report with incomplete emitter technical data. USAISEC cannot perform an EMR analysis with incomplete data.If the site commander, through coordination, cannot obtain the required data on nonmilitary or non–U.S. emitters, this fact must be clearly indicated in the transmittal letter.

(6) Do not submit prior USAISEC field measurement data, nor the results of site–completed EMR analysis worksheets generated prior to 1983, as a part of (or in place of) an EMR survey report.

(7) Submit IDS technical specification and location survey data only if the initial or change site survey report includes a request for EMR analysis or field measurement involving IDS equipment.

(8) Distances from emitter antennae to earth–covered igloos will not be reported.

(9) Either pulse repetition rate and pulse width, or the duty cycle, must be provided for radar emitters. Both sets of data are not required.

7–5. Electromagnetic radiation analyses

a. The objective of an EMR analysis is to identify any location within a nuclear weapons storage or alert site where excessive EMR levels may exist. This serves to alert commanders to potential hazards and provides a basis to establish control measures.

b. Upon receipt of an initial or changed EMR survey report, USAISEC will immediately perform an EMR analysis to determine calculated field strength intensities. Calculations will be compared to permissible field strength intensities previously established by HQDA, and to any previous analyses of, and field measurements at, the site.

c. Based on the analysis and comparisons, USAISEC will then provide the site commander with an EMR analysis report that includes the analysis results and a site EMR status indicating one of the following conditions:

(1) All emitters may be operated without restrictions.

(2) Certain emitters create an EMR hazard under current operating conditions. In this case, the emitter will be identified and recommendations will be provided to the site commander to eliminate the hazards, or else reduce them to an acceptable level.(Where possible, USAISEC will provide alternative recommendations to the site.)

(3) An on–site EMR field measurement is required. In this case, any appropriate interim limitations on emitter operations will be provided.

d. If the site survey report included a request for field measurement and it is determined during the analysis that a measurement is not required, USAISEC will include this item in the analysis report.

e. USAISEC will provide analysis reports to the requesting unit, appropriate MACOMs, and USANCA.

7–6. Electromagnetic radiation field measurements

a. EMR field measurements will be conducted by USAISEC teams that are specifically trained and equipped for this purpose.

Field measurements confirm the EMR intensity levels throughout the appropriate broad frequency ranges at those locations within the nuclear weapons storage site that are most vulnerable to EMR hazards. USAISEC measurement teams are also capable of providing limited on–site technical assistance in resolving, eliminating, or controlling hazardous EMR intensities. USAISEC team support requirements will be published in EMR measurement plans or schedules and coordinating messages.

b. Requirements for EMR field measurements may be generated by—

(1) Initial missions to measure intensities at locations proposed for new storage or alert sites.

(2) A USAISEC determination that a measurement is required, based on an initial or changed survey report or comparison of such a report to previous field measurements of the site.

(3) Requests from storage sites or MACOMs to investigate significantly changed circumstances, such as high IDS false alarm rates or new emitters at or near the site where large increases of electromagnetic energy are involved or suspected. (Normally, the addition of new MTOE/TDA emitters under the control of the site commander, while requiring submission of an EMR survey change report, will not generate a need for a field measurement. However, any change report may be accompanied by a request for field measurement if the commander deems appropriate.)

(4) Requests from storage sites or MACOMs, when implementation of restrictions generated by EMR analyses would seriously impact site mission requirements.

c. Requests for field measurement will be accompanied by submission of an initial or changed EMR survey report, and will include complete justification of the need for measurement. USAISEC will not schedule a field measurement until an analysis of the changed conditions has been completed.

d. EMR measurement support missions fall into the following two categories:

(1) *Scheduled support.* This category may include missions to proposed or new weapons storage sites, or missions required to investigate significantly changed circumstances at existing sites when long–term foreknowledge of the change is available.

(2) *Quick reaction support.* This category includes missions to investigate a high incidence of IDS false alarms; to investigate new EMR emitters at or near nuclear weapons storage or alert sites (particularly where significant increases of electromagnetic energy are involved or suspected); to resolve problems created by restrictions placed on emitters after an analysis; or other significant changes to the EMR survey.

e. Requests for scheduled EMR field measurement support will be processed as follows:

(1) Requests will be submitted each year, through command channels by the end of March to Commander, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, ATTN: MONA–SU, 7500 Backlick Road, Building 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198.

(2) Based on command–recommended priorities and overall criticality of need, USANCA will forward, by the end of May each year, a coordinated list, in order of priority to, Commander, USAISEC, ATTN: ASB–SET–P, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613–5300.

(3) USAISEC will publish a schedule of planned EMR field measurements and distribute it to the requesting command, to HQDA, ATTN: DAMO–SWS, WASH DC 20310–0430, and to Commander, USANCA, 7500 Backlick Road, Building 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198.

f. Requests for quick reaction support will be submitted simultaneously by electrical means to all addresses in *e* above.

g. USAISEC will furnish results of all completed EMR field measurements to the addresses in *e*(3) above.

h. If the field measurement results indicate a need for a change to the existing EMR analysis report and recommendations for site corrective actions (para 7–5), USAISEC will also prepare an updated site analysis report. This report will be distributed in accordance with paragraph 7–5 *e*.

Chapter 8
Evaluation and Qualification Requirements

Section I
General

8–1. Scope

This chapter applies to all AC and RC units and organizations having a nuclear related mission. It—

a. Establishes a standard nuclear surety inspection program for the evaluation and qualification of U.S. Army units and activities assigned a nuclear–related mission.

b. Delineates policy and assigns responsibilities for evaluation and qualification of U.S. Army units and activities with a nuclear related mission.

c. Establishes a rating system and reclama procedures for nuclear weapons technical inspections (NWTI).

d. Establishes a reactor facility inspection (RFI).

e. Establishes a limited scope surety inspection (LSSI) for organizations that are not evaluated under the NWTI system that directly support and implement the Army Nuclear Surety Program, to include headquarters of nuclear–capable units.

f. Directs all authorized Army elements to conduct the following nuclear surety program inspections:

(1) NWTI.
(2) Standardized external evaluations (SEE).
(3) LSSI.
(4) Minimum notice physical security inspections (MNPSI).
(5) Nuclear management evaluations (NME).
(6) RFI.

8–2. Objectives

The standardized evaluation and qualification system is designed to—

a. Enhance training and readiness by ensuring compliance with DOD and Army directives.

b. Evaluate the capability of an organization to accomplish its assigned nuclear mission while providing a safe and secure environment for nuclear weapons and SNM.

c. Evaluate the adequacy of support and guidance provided to units with a nuclear–related mission.

8–3. Policy

a. Nuclear qualification.

(1) To meet DOD requirements, all nuclear–capable units will be certified to perform nuclear tasks before being authorized to perform their nuclear mission with war reserve weapons or SNM.Until authorized to perform its nuclear mission, a unit may not—

(a) Have custody of or access to war reserve nuclear weapons or SNM on which it is not authorized to perform operations.

(b) Conduct any operation that involves a war reserve nuclear weapon, nuclear components, or SNM for which it is not authorized.(This restriction includes their use during the conduct of an NWTI.)

(2) MACOM commanders will determine each unit's ability to perform its nuclear mission or any portion of it and assign a qualification status (para 8–11) based upon inspection results and other operational readiness factors. Inspections that support this process will be administered as follows:

(a) Initial qualification. Nuclear–capable AC units requiring a nuclear surety inspection (NSI) or RFI will receive an initial inspection within 90 days of notification of the requirement to assume a nuclear mission.Noncustodial AC and RC nuclear–capable units must undergo a SEE/technical validation inspection (TVI) (see table

8–1) as soon as possible after notification to assume a nuclear capability.

(b) Periodic nuclear qualification.

1. All AC nuclear–capable units, less EOD, that have been evaluated and assigned a nuclear qualification status will be administered an NWTI or RFI at intervals not to exceed 18 months.(For nuclear–capable units authorized to use the SEE/TVI process, the TVI constitutes the final phase of the NWTI.) When the 18–month interval is exceeded, the unit's qualification status will be withdrawn until successful completion of an NWTI or RFI and the unit's qualification status is reinstated by the MACOM. (A defense nuclear surety inspection (DNSI) conducted by DNA per TM 39–25–1, a DNA/MACOM conducted joint nuclear surety inspection (JNSI), or an NWTI conducted by DA or MACOM IG satisfies this periodic inspection requirement.)

2. Once assigned a nuclear qualification status, EOD detachments will receive an ARTEP (may also include a TPE) and LSSI at intervals not to exceed 24 months. If an EOD detachment exceeds this interval, its nuclear qualification status will be withdrawn until the unit successfully completes the required ARTEP, TPE, and LSSI and its qualification status is reinstated by the MACOM.

3. All RC nuclear mission capable units will be administered a SEE/TVI every 3 training years (TY). If an RC unit exceeds an interval of 42 months, its mission capable status will be withdrawn until it successfully completes the required SEE/TVI and its qualification status is reinstated by the MACOM.

(3) MACOM commanders may withdraw, change, or limit a unit's qualification status at any time. When a unit's authorization to perform its nuclear mission has been changed or limited, the unit may not perform that portion of its nuclear mission until its qualification status is reinstated by the MACOM.

(4) With the exception of Service schools and training centers, nuclear weapons support branch (NWSB), EOD detachments, and reactor facilities, all AC nuclear–capable units that have been assigned a nuclear qualification status will be administered a DNA inspection (DNSI or JNSI) at least every 5 years but not more frequently than every 4 years. A DNA surveillance inspection (SI)satisfies this requirement.

(5) Units authorized to use the SEE/TVI process (AC noncustodial nuclear–capable units that have a DA approved ARTEP: ordnance companies; aviation units; 155mm, 8–inch, and Lance battalions and separate batteries; and all RC nuclear–capable artillery battalions and separate batteries)to satisfy NWTI requirements must first successfully complete the minimum SEE standards outlined in paragraph 8–3 *c* and then successfully complete a TVI to receive a nuclear qualification status. When a TVI is used to meet NWTI requirements, it will normally occur within 30 days for AC units and 60 days for RC units after successful completion of a SEE. With MACOM concurrence, this interval may be extended by the unit's next higher headquarters to 60 days for AC units and 90 days for RC units.

(6) MACOM commanders may permit an AC unit authorized to undergo a SEE/TVI to receive an NSI when scheduling or operational requirements prevent completion of the SEE/TVI cycle during the 18–month NWTI interval. Table 8–1 specifies the additional nuclear tasks that must be performed by such units.

(7) RC units are not authorized to receive an NSI and are not subject to DNA inspections.

b. Inspections.

(1) The following inspections are included in the U.S. Army NWTI system:

(a) NSI.

(b) SI.

(c) TVI.

(2) DA and MACOM IG teams conduct NSI, TVI, LSSI, and RFI per AR 20–1.

(a) NSI will be administered to all AC nuclear–capable units not authorized to use the SEE/TVI process. Paragraph 8–6 and table 8–1 provide NSI evaluation requirements.

(b) TVI will only be administered to those noncustodial nuclear–capable units listed in paragraph 8–3 *a*(5). Paragraph 8–6 and table 8–1 provide TVI evaluation requirements. Technical operations conducted during a TVI may be performed at a location designated by the inspected unit commander. It is not desired or required that technical operations be conducted in a simulated tactical environment. Only those personnel required to perform the operation being inspected need be present.

(3) DNA or DA IG teams may conduct an SI. Evaluation requirements for these inspections are the same as those for NSI and TVI.

(4) DA and AMC Inspector General (IG) teams conduct RFI. The evaluation requirements of these inspections, which will be conducted at intervals not to exceed 18 months, are provided in paragraph 8–5.

(5) Only DA and MACOM IG teams conduct LSSI. The evaluation requirements of these inspections, which will be conducted at intervals not to exceed 24–month, are provided in paragraph 8–7.

(6) DNA inspection teams conduct DNSI and JNSI and may conduct a DNA SI. Although DNA does not conduct TVI, it conducts a modified DNSI that is comparable to a TVI.

(7) Additions or deletions to evaluation requirements will not be made without HQDA, DCSOPS, approval.

(8) Prior to any inspection, the inspecting activity (DA or MACOM) will provide the unit or activity to be inspected an inspection trip plan. This plan will provide guidance for unit preparation, inspection procedures, and any support or information required by the inspecting activity. (Per TM 39–25–1, DNA provides similar information.)

(9) DA and MACOM IG conduct NME. These systemically oriented evaluations focus on determining the fundamental causes of problems affecting the nuclear surety program. Issues that cut across many levels of command or a number of issues involving a single command may provide the basis for an NME. In general, these evaluations are issue–oriented, rather than unit–oriented, and transcend multiple command and staff levels. The scope and conduct of NME are determined by DA or MACOM IG in coordination with appropriate staff elements.

(10) Essential operations and equipment will not be simulated.AC and RC units are required to use on–hand TOE/MTOE tools and equipment and those publications required to perform essential operations. Substandard conditions or shortages that would adversely affect safety or security may not be corrected by simulation. Local limitations, peacetime safety constraints, time available, or required travel distance may justify simulation of nonessential operations. The NWTI team chief or inspector must approve all unit simulations.

(11) A training warhead section, projectile, or nuclear component will be simulated to be a war reserve weapon throughout any NWTI technical operation unless otherwise specified by the NWTI inspector. When a training weapon is used for technical operations, operational differences between training and war reserve weapons will be explained to the inspector at the time they are encountered.When a required operation could cause damage to a trainer or when reject criteria exists, required procedures will also be explained before the operation may continue.

(12) Inspectors will not introduce situations or conditions during technical operations. This limitation does not prohibit the inspector from verifying test and measurement settings. Inspectors are not prohibited from introducing clear and direct situations and conditions or from questioning unit personnel before or after a technical operation to determine both their depth of knowledge and the overall state of training. If inspectors desire to evaluate a specific operation, they will ask to see it.

c. Standardized external evaluations/technical validation inspections (SEE/TVI).

(1) For units authorized to undergo a SEE/TVI to satisfy the NWTI requirement, the SEE is the initial portion of the NWTI. The SEE determines if unit training objectives have been met and provides training managers immediate feedback on training proficiency, strengths, and weaknesses. It also allows the commander and higher headquarters to determine the unit's capability to perform its assigned tactical nuclear missions. Along with the results of

the TVI, which is the remaining phase of the NWTI process, and other readiness data, it allows the MACOM to determine the unit's nuclear qualification status.

(2) SEE will be conducted in a simulated tactical environment.The evaluated unit must satisfactorily perform all ARTEP nuclear tasks and 80 percent of all mission essential task list (METL) tasks(see AR 350–41). The unit must satisfactorily complete its SEE prior to receiving a TVI. This may require that the TVI be rescheduled to allow time for additional training and reevaluation.

(3) *Additional guidance.*

(a) The field exercise during which the SEE is conducted will last a minimum of 72 hours. (Times for separate batteries and companies may be adjusted based on number of tasks required.)

(b) The scenario used during the SEE will fully integrate nuclear and conventional tasks throughout the exercise.

(c) The tasks, conditions, and standards contained in the unit's ARTEP provide the basis for the SEE.

(d) The command administering the SEE will publish an after–action report within 15 days AC and 30 days RC. This report will be signed by a commander in the grade of 06 or above. At a minimum it will document that—

1. A SEE was conducted and that nuclear tasks were integrated throughout a 72–hour field training exercise.

2. The evaluated unit satisfactorily completed all of its ARTEP nuclear tasks and 80 percent of all METL tasks.

(4) Nuclear air missions for field artillery (FA) units that undergo the SEE/TVI process can be satisfied by one of the options indicated below. The battalion must determine which option best supports the battalion's mission requirements. The option to be used will be included in the battalion's tactical SOP.

(a) The battalion may choose to have any subordinate unit(s)maintain separate and distinct air mission capabilities. If this option is selected, each unit assigned the mission must execute an air mission.

(b) The battalion may alternately elect to have a subordinate unit, with augmentation from battalion assets, as required, provide air mission support for all subordinate units. If this option is selected, air mission requirements may be satisfied by a single air mission during the SEE.

8–4. Responsibilities

a. HQDA(DCSOPS) will—

(1) Determine policy, evaluation, and qualification requirements for the conduct of inspections and evaluations established by this regulation.

(2) Determine the scope of evaluation requirements for nuclear–capable units.

(3) Review reports, summaries, and analyses of inspection and evaluation reports for identification and correction of systemic problems.

(4) Resolve inspection reclamas forwarded to HQDA.

b. TIG will—

(1) Conduct NWTI of nuclear–capable units, RFI of reactor facilities, LSSI of organizations that directly support the Army Nuclear Surety Program, and NME.

(2) Assign responsibilities for the conduct of nuclear related inspections to MACOM (AR 20–1).

(3) Establish standard inspection policies, procedures, and techniques for the conduct of nuclear related inspections by DA and MACOM inspection teams per this regulation.

(4) Establish procedures to notify units to be inspected of the administrative requirements for NWTI, RFI, and LSSI not later than 60 days before scheduled inspections.

(5) Coordinate inspection scheduling with MACOM and DNA.

(6) Establish procedures and requirements for reports; review and analyze such reports.

(7) Report number of inspections (by type) conducted, ratings, and overall results to HQDA (DCSOPS), the appropriate MACOM(DCSOPS), and DNA.

(8) Determine effectiveness of the inspection system through surveillance of MACOM conducted inspections.

(9) Establish qualifications for IG personnel conducting inspections established by this regulation.

(10) Monitor inspection reclamas and coordinate with HQDA(DCSOPS) the resolution of reclamas.

(11) Provide HQDA(DCSOPS) a semiannual analysis of NWTI results.This analysis should identify trends and potential problem areas.

(12) Conduct NME per AR 20–1.

c. MACOM commanders with assigned nuclear–capable units or organizations will—

(1) Conduct NWTI, LSSI, RFI, and MNPSI as directed by DA.

(2) Ensure assigned AC nuclear–capable units receive required inspections.

(3) Ensure assigned RC nuclear–capable units receive SEE/TVI, as required.

(4) Establish guidance for the conduct of SEE.

(5) Designate the level of command above battalion or equivalent to conduct SEE.

(6) Ensure that technical assistance visits (TAV) conducted by subordinate commands focus on increasing the combat readiness of organizations and not on the inspection process (i.e., TAV must not be viewed as an inspection or preinspection rehearsals).

(7) Coordinate inspection scheduling with TIG and, as directed, with DNA.

(8) Determine the nuclear qualification status of assigned organizations.

(9) Provide written authorization for units to perform nuclear missions (para 8–11).

(a) An AC unit's nuclear qualification status is valid for the 18–month period immediately following successful completion of an NWTI or RFI.

(b) An EOD unit's qualification status is valid for the 24–month period following successful completion of an LSSI.

(c) An RC unit's qualification status is valid for the 42–month period immediately following successful completion of a SEE/TVI.

(10) When required, withdraw, change, or limit an organization's authorization to conduct its nuclear mission.

(11) When required, withdraw, change, or limit the mission of activities providing external support to nuclear–capable units.

d. Commanders of nuclear–capable units and organizations that directly support the Army Nuclear Surety Program will use this chapter in preparing and planning for inspections.

Section II
Evaluation Requirements

8–5. Reactor facility inspection (RFI)

Each RFI will include a management review of the reactor facility's assigned mission and its capability to accomplish it. The following areas will also be inspected:

a. Physical layout. All aspects of the facility design, construction, use of space, working conditions, experimental setups, housekeeping, and physical security will be examined.

b. Physical components.

(1) All components installed as parts of the main, auxiliary, emergency, and support systems for the nuclear reactor facility will be inspected. Design, installation, modifications, technical specifications, reliability, backup, condition, use, maintenance, testing, calibration, and plans concerning incidents, accidents, and malfunctions will be reviewed.

(2) All equipment used in support of the facility including emergency power, backup systems, and material handling equipment will be inspected. A review similar to that for installed components will be conducted of radiation detection and measuring instruments, test and measuring equipment, handtools, radioactive source sets, and repair parts.

c. Document inspection.

(1) Written procedures, manuals, logs, supply and maintenance records, reports, and other facility operational documents will be evaluated for adequacy and adherence to standards established by

regulatory sources. Documents such as DA authorizations or approvals, safety analysis reports (hazards summary reports), technical specifications, and Army regulations will be used.

(2) Facility procedures and plans will be inspected pertaining to—

(a) Assignment of authority.

(b) Experiment and modification approval.

(c) Routine, nonroutine, and emergency operations of the reactor facility.

(d) Equipment and personnel.

(e) Health physics practices for control of radiation exposure and contamination including environmental monitoring.

(f) Supply, maintenance, and repair parts. (Includes physical inventory and authority for possession of SNM).

(g) Handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous materials(radioactive, toxic, explosive, or others).

(h) Accidents, incidents, and malfunctions.

(i) Core physics measurements.

(j) Reactor staff training and qualifications.

d. Operational inspection. All aspects of reactor facility operation will be observed to determine the reactor staff's knowledge and adherence to prescribed and safe operating procedures. Observation and questioning of the reactor staff will provide the basis for evaluation of—

(1) Technical operations required to perform the facility's mission.

(2) Emergency procedures during a simulated emergency situation. (These procedures must be coordinated with and approved by the installation commander.)

e. Reactor facility operational parameters.

(1) Operational parameters of the reactor facility will be checked against design parameters to determine if the reactor is being operated within prescribed limits. Operational parameters are established in documents such as the safety analysis report (hazards summary report), technical specifications, and the facility technical publications.

(2) An evaluation will be made of the operating data to include the history (records) and the current status of the reactor core.Examples of data to be reviewed include—

(a) Control rod calibration.

(b) Shutdown margin.

(c) Control malfunctions.

(d) Operating logs.

(e) Instrumentation data.

f. Personnel. The inspection will include examination of personnel qualifications, clearances, and the PRP.

g. External support. The inspection will include a review of the adequacy of support provided to the nuclear reactor facility by installation activities outside the control of the commander to which the reactor staff is assigned. Support activities include, but are not limited to: safety, medical, radiation protection, reactor safeguards, security, and fire protection.

h. Evaluation ratings and inspection reports and reclama procedures will parallel those used for NWTI. Reactor facilities will be given a failing deficiency when any of the following conditions exist:

(1) Inability of the nuclear reactor facility to perform its assigned mission.

(2) Operation of a nuclear reactor outside approved design concepts.

(3) A lack of adequate maintenance, equipment, repair parts, or personnel which adversely affects reliable operation of the nuclear reactor facility.

(4) Failure to provide a safe environment for operating personnel and/or the public.

(5) Failure to provide a secure environment.

(6) Failure to maintain the PRP per chapter 3 in a manner which could contribute to an unsafe or nonsecure environment for a nuclear reactor or SNM.

(7) A number of deficiencies or manner of performance which indicates unfamiliarity with or disregard for prescribed procedures.

8–6. Nuclear surety inspection (NSI) and technical validation inspection (TVI) evaluation requirements

a. NWTI evaluation requirements are determined by each unit or activity's TOE/TDA, mission statement, or other mission directives.Areas to be evaluated during NSI and TVI are listed in table 8–1. Additionally—

(1) All technical operations will be performed per applicable nuclear weapons technical manuals or publications.

(2) Custodial units are required to demonstrate live activation of the initiating system for emergency destruction.

(3) Extractors will be available for inspection, even though extraction is not required to be demonstrated during technical operations.

(4) Service–to–Service Technical Agreements (SSTA)delineate responsibilities for host and user nations in Europe.Because of these agreements, some deviations in requirements shown in table 8–1 may be required for both custodial and noncustodial units.

b. The following additional requirements pertain to TVI:

(1) The unit must demonstrate an approved tiedown procedure for each nuclear weapon system for which the unit has an assigned mission. Tiedown will be demonstrated in an area designated by the commander. (At least one of each nuclear weapon system assigned will be tied down.) Only personnel actively involved in the tiedown operation are required to participate. Except for its tiedown anchors, the vehicle used will not be inspected.

(2) The SEE report will be reviewed to ensure that required SEE standards were met.

c. Units having a weapons movement mission will demonstrate that capability during an NSI. Tiedown and movement of only one type weapon will be required for the transport exercise; however, both the adequacy of the tiedown and the serviceability of the transport vehicle or aircraft and tiedown components will be evaluated.Tiedowns of other type weapons for which the unit is responsible may be demonstrated in a static display. Except for its tiedown anchors, the vehicle or aircraft used will not be inspected.

8–7. Limited scope surety inspection (LSSI)

a. The inspecting activity will determine specific LSSI evaluation requirements based on the inspected unit's or activity's organization, mission statement, and functions. Areas to be evaluated are listed in table 8–2.

b. Evaluation ratings and inspection reports and reclama procedures will parallel those used for NWTI. Criteria for a failing deficiency also applies to programs established to implement the provisions of this regulation.

c. Of primary concern during an LSSI is the impact of the inspected activity's management of programs that directly affect subordinate or supported units or activities. An inspected unit or activity may be given a failing deficiency in a functional area listed in table 8–2 when it would probably result in a subordinate unit's or supported activity's inability to perform its assigned nuclear mission; result in an unreliable nuclear weapon;create an unsafe or unsecured environment for nuclear weapons in the custody of subordinate units; or create an unsafe or unsecured environment for a reactor facility.

Section III
Evaluation Ratings and Reclama System

8–8. Evaluation ratings

a. Inspected units and their external support organizations will be rated in each functional area (listed in table 8–1)inspected during an NWTI. (These ratings will also be used during RFI and LSSI. RFI functional areas are provided in paragraph 8–5; LSSI functional areas are provided in table 8–2.)As used in this rating system, the term " deficiency"includes" factors affecting operations."

b. Ratings will be assigned as described below:

(1) *No deficiencies or Deficiency(ies): Not(None) failing.* A rating of " No deficiencies" or"Deficiency(ies): Not (None) failing" will be given when a unit demonstrates that it can accomplish its critical nuclear tasks while providing a safe and secure environment in accordance with approved publications and directives.

(2) *Deficiency(ies): Failing, correction verified.* A rating of " Deficiency(ies): Failing, correction verified" will be given when one or more conditions found in paragraphs 8–5 or 8–9 existed but were corrected by the inspected unit or activity and verified as corrected by the inspection team.

(3) *Deficiency(ies): Failing, resolution and/or reinspection required.* A rating of " Deficiency(ies): Failing, resolution and/or reinspection required" will be given when one or more conditions found in paragraphs 8–5 or 8–9 existed but were not or could not be corrected for verification by the inspection team.

c. TM 39–25–1 provides DNSI ratings and outlines procedures for processing DNSI reports.

8–9. Criteria for NWTI failing deficiency

a. Nuclear–capable units (excluding Army schools and training centers) will be given a failing deficiency in the appropriate functional area or its external support when any of the following conditions exist:

(1) One or more deficiencies in technical operations that would probably result in an unreliable nuclear weapon.

(2) Failure to provide a safe environment for war reserve nuclear weapons or training weapons representing war reserve weapons.

(3) Failure to provide a secure environment for war reserve weapons or training weapons representing war reserve weapons.

(4) Failure to maintain the PRP per chapter 3 in a manner that could contribute to an unsafe or nonsecure environment for or to an unreliable war reserve nuclear weapon.

(5) A number of deficiencies or manner of performance which indicates unfamiliarity with or disregard for prescribed procedures.

(6) Shortages in personnel, tools, equipment, publications, or authorized repair parts that would prevent accomplishment of the unit's assigned nuclear mission.

b. Nuclear Weapons Support Branches (NWSB) will be given a failing deficiency when any of the following conditions exist:

(1) The NWSB is teaching technical procedures that do not comply with those in Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System(JNWPS) or DA publications which could result in an unreliable weapon or create an unsafe or unsecured environment for nuclear weapons.

(2) The NWSB is teaching nuclear weapons classified information that is not required (need–to–know) in the course being taught.

(3) The existence of deficiencies or manner of performance that indicates that the activity cannot satisfactorily accomplish its nuclear training or maintenance mission.

(4) Shortages in tools, facilities, equipment, publications, or personnel that would prevent successful accomplishment of its assigned mission.

c. U.S. Army Service Schools and Training Centers with nuclear–related missions will be given a failing deficiency when any of the following conditions exist:

(1) Failure to include required critical technical operations in the curriculum.

(2) Teaching technical operations that violate JNWPS or DA publications.

(3) Teaching nuclear weapons classified information that is not required (need–to–know) in the course being taught.

(4) A number of deficiencies or manner of performance which indicates unfamiliarity with or disregard for prescribed procedures.

(5) Shortages in tools, facilities, equipment, publications, or instructor personnel which would prevent successful accomplishment of its nuclear training mission.

d. External support will be given a failing deficiency(ies)when any of the situations in *a*, *b*, or *c* above or paragraph 8–5 exist but are beyond the capability of the inspected unit or activity to avoid, influence, or correct and are attributable to the supporting activity(ies).

8–10. Inspection reports

Inspection reports will be processed as follows:

a. When an inspected organization receives evaluation ratings of " No deficiencies,"" Deficiency(ies): Not(None) failing," or" Deficiency(ies): Failing, correction verified," regardless of the rating awarded to its external support, it will be provided a final report at the exit briefing. Although inspected units are not normally required to reply by endorsement to inspection findings, selected factors affecting operations or deficiencies noted may require such replies-.Copies of the inspection report may be provided to selected commanders or agencies.

b. When a unit receives a rating of " Deficiency(ies):Failing, resolution and/or reinspection required" regardless of the rating awarded to its external support, a draft report will be provided the inspected unit at the exit briefing. The inspecting activity will forward the final report within 30 days. When an external support activity is required to take corrective action, it will be provided appropriate extracts of the inspection report.Units and activities required to take corrective action will forward a written report of actions taken to correct noted deficiencies through command channels to the inspecting activity. (Each level of command will endorse the report of action taken and comment on its adequacy.) Reinspection of units receiving" Deficiency(ies):Failing, resolution and/or reinspection required" is required. Reinspections of AC and RC units will be conducted within 90 and 180 days, respectively, of the original inspection.Inspecting activities may limit the scope of a reinspection to functional areas in which failing deficiencies were noted. The MACOM will, when appropriate, modify or change the inspected unit's qualification status pending reinspection and successful demonstration of specified nuclear operations.

c. When external support is rated " Deficiency(ies):Not (None) failing,"" Deficiency(ies): Failing, correction verified," or" Deficiency(ies): Failing, resolution and/or reinspection required," a written reply stating corrective action taken will be required. The organization responsible for the deficient support will be provided appropriate extracts from the inspection report. A report of corrective action will be forwarded by the support organization through command channels to the inspecting activity. (Each level of command will endorse the report of action taken and comment on its adequacy.)

(1) A copy of the report of corrective action taken will be provided by the supporting organization to the inspected unit for filing with the inspected unit's report. When an inspected unit is also required to reply by endorsement to an inspection finding, that reply will not be delayed pending receipt of a report of corrective action taken by the supporting organization.

(2) When appropriate, reinspection of the support organization may consist of a review and acceptance of the report of corrective action. Inspecting activities may also limit the scope of a reinspection to the functional areas in which failing deficiencies were noted. MACOM will, when appropriate, modify or change the mission of the support organization pending reinspection.

d. A copy of HQDA (SAIG–TI) and MACOM inspection reports will be provided to HQDA (DAMO–SWS), Washington, DC 20310–0430 and Commander, USANCA (ATTN: MONA–SU), 7500 Backlick Road, Bldg 2073, Springfield, VA 22150–3198. MACOMs will also furnish a copy of inspection reports to HQDA(SAIG–TI), Washington DC 20310–1750. Copies of reports which pertain to nuclear weapon storage sites and reactor facilities will also be provided to HQDA (DAMO–ODL), Washington, DC 20310–0440.

8–11. MACOM nuclear qualification status reports

a. The inspecting activity will provide a copy of the inspection report to the MACOM (DCSOPS). The MACOM will evaluate the inspection results, consider other unit readiness data, and determine the inspected unit's nuclear qualification status.

b. One of the following qualification statuses will be assigned to

AC units and reported to the unit, HQDA(DAMO–SWS), and HQDA (SAIG–TI).

(1) Nuclear certified.

(2) Nuclear certified with limitations: (The specific limitation(s) will be listed.)

(3) Not nuclear certified.

c. One of the following qualification statuses will be assigned to AC EOD units and reported to the unit, HQDA(DAMO–SWS), and HQDA (SAIG–TI).

(1) Nuclear qualified.

(2) Nuclear qualified with limitations: (The specific limitation(s) will be listed.)

(3) Not nuclear qualified.

d. One of the following qualification statuses will be assigned to RC units and reported to the unit, HQDA(DAMO–SWS), and HQDA (SAIG–TI).

(1) Nuclear mission capable.

(2) Nuclear mission capable with limitations. (The specific limitation(s) will be listed.)

(3) Not nuclear mission capable.

e. The MACOM commander may withdraw, change, or limit a qualification status at any time.

8–12. Reclamas

a. Any commander in the chain of command of the inspected unit or external support activity may submit a reclama. Reclamas must be submitted not later than 60 days after receipt of the final report by the inspected unit.

b. Reclamas will be based on factual data and include supporting justification.

c. Each commander in the chain of command will review, comment on, concur or nonconcur with, and forward the reclama to the next higher headquarters.

d. Reclamas will be resolved at the command level conducting the NWTI by operations activities in coordination with other appropriate agencies. Those reclamas addressing a DA or DNA NWTI will be forwarded to HQDA (DAMO–SWS), Washington, DC 20310–0430, for resolution by DCSOPS.

e. Reclamas will be acted on and forwarded to the next higher command for resolution within 5 work days of receipt.

f. Final decision on all reclamas will be forwarded to HQDA(SAIG–TI and DAMO–SWS).

Section IV
Minimum Notice Physical Security Inspections (MNPSI)

8–13. Introduction

MACOMs will establish procedures for and conduct MNPSI of subordinate nuclear custodial sites and reactor facilities to ensure that physical security standards are being maintained during intervals between scheduled NWTI and RFI.

8–14. Scope

The areas to be inspected during MNPSI will be established by the MACOM. As a minimum, they will include those areas listed in table 8–1, item 5.

8–15. Frequency

MACOMs will conduct an MNPSI of each custodial site and reactor facility once during the period between regularly scheduled NWTI or RFI.

8–16. Notification

Custodial sites and reactor facilities will be advised of the MNPSI through their command channels not earlier than 72 hours prior to the inspection.

8–17. Reports

MACOMs will establish requirements and procedures for MNPSI reports. A copy of the MNPSI report will be forwarded to DAMO–SWS, DAMO–ODL, SAIG–TI, and USANCA(MONA–SU).

Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications

AR 40–14
Control and Recording Procedures for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation and Radioactive Materials. (Cited in para 5–2*e*(3)*(b)*.)

AR 40–66
Medical Record and Quality Assurance Administration. (Cited in para 3–18.)

AR 50–5–1
Nuclear Surety. (Cited in paras 2–1, 2–2, 4–3*b*,4–8*a*, 4–15*e*,4–20, 4–38,4–40, 4–42.)

AR 50–115
Safety Rules for Army Nuclear Weapons. (Cited in para 4–3*m*.)

AR 55–203
Movement of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Components and Related Classified Nonnuclear Material. (Cited in paras 4–3, 4–10*i*, 4–11*d*, 4–28.)

AR 190–54
Nuclear Reactor Security Program.(Cited in para 2–2.)

AR 360–5
Public Information. (Cited in para 5–3*d*.)

AR 380–67
Personnel Security Program. (Cited in paras 1–4*g*, 3–6,3–11*d*, 3–14*a*,3–22*c*, 3–24*j*.)

AR 385–40
Accident Reporting and Records.(Cited in paras 5–8, 5–10.)

AR 600–37
Unfavorable Information. (Cited in para 3–12*b*(1).)

AR 680–29
Military Personnel–Organizations and Type of Transaction Codes. (Cited in paras 3–3*j* and 3–4*a*(3).)

AR 700–65
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Material. (Cited in paras 4–1, 4–3, 4–5*a*, 4–10*i*, 4–10*j*, 4–11*e*, and 4–39*f*.)

DAM Pam 75–5
Index of Storage and Outloading Drawings for Ammunition. (Cited in para 4–41*c*.)

FM 100–50
Operations for Nuclear Capable Units. (Cited in paras 1–8 *d*, 4–1, 5–3*a*, 7–1*c*.)

TB 5–4200–200–10
Hand Portable Fire Extinguishers Approved for Army Users. (Cited in para 4–16*c*.)

TB 9–1100–811–40
Security Classification of Nuclear Weapons Information. (Cited in para 5–6*f*.)

TB 385–2
Nuclear Weapons Firefighting Procedures. (Cited in paras 4–7*b*, 4–21*e*, 4–16*a*, and 4–39*b*.)

TM 9–1300–206
Ammunition and Explosives Standards. (Cited in paras 4–16*a*, 4–17*b*, 4–24*b*, 4–16*a*.)

TM 39–20–7
Nuclear Safety Criteria. (Cited in para 4–24*b*(1).)

TM 39–20–11
General Firefighting Guidance. (Cited in paras 4–19, 4–21*e*,4–31*a*, and 4–39*b*.)

TM 39–50–8
Emergency Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. (Cited in para 4–3*e*.)

Section II
Related Publications

A related publication is merely a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this regulation.

AR 11–20
Army Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Survivability, Security, and Safety Program

AR 15–22
Nuclear Weapons Accident Investigation Board (CONUS)

AR 20–1
Inspector General Activities and Procedures

AR 40–13
Medical Support–Nuclear/Chemical Accidents and Incidents

AR 50–6
Chemical Surety

AR 50–111
Temporary Storage of Energy Research and Development Administration Nuclear Shipments at Military Installations

AR 55–228
Transportation by Water of Explosives and Hazardous Cargo

AR 55–355
Military Traffic Management Regulation

AR 75–15
Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal

AR 95–1
General Provisions and Flight Regulations

AR 95–27
Operating Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials

AR 190–13
The Army Physical Security Program

AR 190–28
Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties

AR 190–40
Serious Incident Report

AR 310–49
The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS)

AR 340–17
Release of Information and Records from Army Files

AR 380–13
Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations

AR 381–10
U.S. Army Intelligence Activities

AR 381–12
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army (SAEDA)

AR 381–20
U.S. Army Counterintelligence (CI)Activities

AR 381–45
Investigative Records Repository

AR 385–80
Nuclear Reactor Health and Safety Program

AR 500–60
Disaster Relief

AR 530–1
Operations Security (OPSEC)

AR 600–50
Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel

AR 600–85
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program

AR 611–112
Personnel Selection and Classification, Manual of Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties

AR 611–201
Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties

AR 600–200
Enlisted Personnel Management System

AR 640–10
Individual Military Personnel Records

AR 640–2–1
Personnel Qualification Records

DA Pam 310–20
Administrative Publications:Action Officer's Guide

DA Pam 600–8
Military Personnel Management and Administrative Procedures

DA Pam 600–8–1
SIDPERS Unit–Level Procedures

DA Pam 600–8–2
Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Military Personnel Office Level Procedures

DA Pam 600–8–10
Management and Administrative Procedures: Individual Assignment and Reassignment Procedures

DA Pam 738–750
The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS)

TM 39–4–1
Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms

TM 39–25–1
Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System

DODD 3025.1
Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the United States, Its Territories, and Possessions (USDP)

DODI 5100.52
Radiological Assistance in the Event of an Accident Involving Radioactive Materials

DODD 5210.41
Security Criteria and Standards for Protecting Nuclear Weapons

DOD 5210.41–M
Nuclear Weapons Security Manual

DODD 5210.42
Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program

DODI 7730.12
Notification Procedures for Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Reactors, and Radioactive Materials

USAF Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG)
(This guide can be requested from HQ USAF, WASH DC 20330, with an information copy of the request to DMAAC/ADAD, 1221 S. Fern Street, Arlington, VA 22002.)

Section III
Prescribed Forms

DA Form 3180–R
Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record. (Prescribed in para 3–9.)

DA Form 4515
Personnel Reliability Program Identifier. (Prescribed in para 3–18.)

DA Form 5549–R
EMR Site Survey Data Report.(Prescribed in para 7–4.)

DA Label 164
Nuclear/Chemical Personnel Record Label. (Prescribed in para 3–17.)

DD Form 2325
Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report (LRA). (Prescribed in paras 5–12 and D–1.)

Section IV
Referenced Forms

DA Form 2–1
Personnel Qualification Record–Part II

DA Form 873
Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination

DA Form 5247–R
Request for Security Determination

DD Form 365F
Weight and Balance Clearance Form F

DD Form 398–2
Personnel Security Questionnaire (National Agency Check)

DD Form 836
Special Instructions for Motor Vehicle Drivers

DD Form 626
Motor Vehicle Inspection

DD Form 1879
Request for Personnel Security Investigation

DD Form 1150
Request for Issue or Turn–in

DD Form 1911
Materiel Courier Receipt

DD Form 1348–1
DOD Single Line Item Release/Receipt Document

SF Form 600
Chronological Record of Medical Care

DA Label 164
Nuclear/Chemical Personnel Record Label

Appendix B
Contractor Requirements

The contract must require that contractor employees performing nuclear duties in positions designated as critical or controlled meet the reliability standards of the PRP. Contractors must—

a. Instruct appropriate personnel (i.e., managerial, supervisory, medical, and employees) in the purpose, standards, and procedures of the PRP.

b. Inform and instruct each employee, who will be assigned to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position, that they are subject to the standards and procedures of the PRP.

c. Ensure that employees assigned or to be assigned to a critical or controlled position undergo required medical evaluations.

d. Provide the certifying official with results of a medical evaluation of any contractor employee assigned or to be assigned to a critical or controlled position and immediately report any other information about such employees relevant to standards for assignment under the PRP.

e. Ensure that contractor supervisory personnel of employees assigned to PRP positions have sufficient contact with such employees so that they can adequately assess their reliability.Responsibility for the continuing evaluation of contractor employees assigned to an Army activity under the direct supervision of an Army certifying official will be the responsibility of the certifying official.

f. Assign to critical or controlled duty position only those employees determined by the certifying official to be suitable for the PRP.

g. Temporarily remove an employee from a critical or controlled PRP position immediately upon receipt of information that is, or appears to be, reason for disqualification from the PRP.

h. Notify the certifying official immediately of such temporary removal and the reason for it.

i. Notify appropriate activities so that entry authority and access lists may be updated to bar disqualified personnel.

j. Immediately remove an employee from a critical or controlled position upon notification by the certifying official that the employee has been temporarily or permanently disqualified from the PRP.

k. Provide to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office(DISCO), Columbus, Ohio 43216, a list of all contractor employees assigned to PRP positions. Update lists as warranted. The lists will include full name and social security number, plus name and address of the employing contractor facility and the title, address, and AUTOVON telephone number of the certifying official.

Appendix C
PRP–Related Military Occupational Specialties

C–1. The duties of the military occupational specialties listed in table C–1 normally require assignment to critical nuclear duty positions. These MOSs will be withdrawn should the member lose MOS qualification or be permanently disqualified from the PRP.

Table C–1
PRP–related MOSs

SUBHEAD=: Warrant Officers
MOS Code: 130A **Title:** PERSHING Missile System Technician
MOS Code: 140C **Title:** Custodial Systems Technician
MOS Code: 911A **Title:** Nuclear Weapons Technician
SUBHEAD=: Enlisted personnel
MOS Code: 15E **Title:** PERSHING Missile Crew Member
MOS Code: 21G **Title:** PERSHING Electronics Material Specialist
MOS Code: 24U **Title:** NIKE–HERCULES Custodial Mechanic
MOS Code: 55D **Title:** Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist
MOS Code: 55G **Title:** Nuclear Weapons Specialist

C–2.
Individuals holding an MOS listed in table C–1 must maintain MOS qualification as stated in AR 600–200 at all times.

a. Individuals that lose MOS qualification while assigned to a nuclear duty position will be permanently disqualified (para 3–24) and reclassified per AR 600–200.

b. An individual with an MOS in table C–1 that is not currently assigned to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position need not be placed undercontinuing evaluation . However, if at any time the commander of individuals with these MOSs determines that an individual has lost MOS qualification by the obvious presence of one or more of the disqualifying factors in paragraph 3–11, the commander will initiate permanent disqualification and upon approval reclassification actions per AR 600–200. AsDA Form 3180 will not exist in such cases, one must be prepared. Mandatory entries are: Part I (individual's name, grade and SSN), part IV (complete), and part VIII (Complete). Additional entries may be made if deemed necessary to substantiate the reason for disqualification. The individual's immediate commander will be the certifying official and the first field grade officer in the chain of command will function as the reviewing official. These personnel do not have to be in the PRP. With the exception of these points, all other requirements of paragraph 3–24 apply.

c. Personnel disqualified under the above provisions will not be reported as part of the Annual PRP Status Report data (para 3–29).

Appendix D
Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report

D–1. Requirements

a. All units with a specialized nuclear response capability will inform the JNACC of this capability annually, as of 1 July(para

5–12). This report is assigned RCS HQ DNA–191M.Reports will be made using DD Form 2325.

D–2. Special reporting guidance

a. Inherent with reporting a capability listed in figure D–1 is the ability to make that capability available for movement to an accident site if directed to do so, even if the accident occurs off the installation.

b. Consolidation of capabilities among multiple tenant units, as well as within subordinate elements of a single tenant, is covered in paragraph 5–12.

c. Instruments listed in figure D–1 may not be all inclusive. Report other equipment or personnel if deemed applicable.

Appendix E
Nuclear Accident and Incident Reports

E–1. Reporting format guidance for nuclear weapon accidents, incidents, and occurrences

Reporting format guidance for nuclear for weapon accidents, incidents, and occurrences is shown below. A summary of required reports is at table E–1.

a. Header and classification. (See para 5–6 *f.*)

(1) For accidents: " This is a nuclear accident report(RCS DD–AE(AR)1168)."

(2) For nuclear incidents: " This is a nuclear incident report (RCS DD–AE(AR)1168 or CSGPA–1559)."

b. Date and time of the event.

c. Location to include UTM coordinates.

d. Quantity and type of weapon(s) or component(s).

e. Property damage and personnel casualties.

f. Type of operation (for example, alert, exercise, maneuver, logistic movement, or inspection).

g. Cause of accident or incident (for example, equipment failure, personnel error, procedural error).

h. Description of the event.

i. Existing nuclear hazard and radiation levels, if applicable.

j. Condition of weapon(s).

k. Measures taken to ensure safety and security.

l. If available, text of news release or substance of information given in response to news media queries.

m. Other pertinent information including known public reaction or political implications; reference specific procedures being used at the time of occurrence (for example, paragraph in appropriate technical manual or point of contact.) (Care must be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosures. See contingency news release(s) in figs 5–1 through 5–4.)

n. Corrective action recommended if appropriate.

o. If the event concerns seizure, theft, or loss, the following statements should also be answered if applicable.

(1) Known or suspected route of diversion or escape.

(2) Recovery measures in progress.

(3) Composition of recovery forces and augmentation or reinforcement plans.

(4) Immediate controlling authority for recovery actions.

(5) Communication links established or being established with recovery teams.

(6) Assistance required.

Table E–1
Report summary

RCS No: DD–AE(AR)1168
Type: Weapon Accident (NUCFLASH and BROKEN ARROW) (para 5–2 *a* and *b*)
How: Voice and Message using WWMCCS where possible
When: Immediately
To whom: NMCC initially and information addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

Table E–1
Report summary—Continued

RCS No: DD–AE(AR)1168
Type: Weapon Significant Incident (BENT SPEAR) (para 5–2 *c*)
How: Message (voice if severity demands)
When: Immediately
To whom: Addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

RCS No: CSGPA–1559
Type: Weapon Minor Incident (DULL SWORD) (para 5–2 *d*)
How: Message
When: Within 5 working days
To whom: Addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

RCS No: DD–AE(AR)1168
Type: Reactor Accident (para 5–2 *e*(1))
How: Voice and message
When: Immediately
To whom: AOC initially and information addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

RCS No: DD–AE(AR)1168
Type: Reactor seizure (para 5–2 *e*(2))
How: Message (Voice if severity demands)
When: Immediately
To whom: Addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

RCS No: DD–AE(AR)1168
Type: Reactor significant incident (para 5–2*e*(3))
How: Message
When: Immediately
To whom: Addressees in paragraph 5–6 *e*

E–2. Reporting format guidance for nuclear reactor accidents, seizures, significant incidents, and occurrences(RCS DD–AE(AR)1168)

Reporting format guidance for nuclear reactor accidents, seizures, significant incidents, and occurrences is shown below.(See para 5–6 for examples.)

a. Report code name and number. Number reports sequentially on a calendar–year basis.Number supplementary reports using alphabetical identifying letters following the principal report number. Report will begin with the appropriate code word (OPREP–3 FADED GIANT). (See para 5–2 *e*)

b. Report date. Date of (a) report submitted and (b) occurrence.

c. Facility. Name and location of facility.

d. Identification of occurrence. Identify the reactor occurrence by a short title which identifies the type of occurrence and the system component or event involved.

e. Conditions prior to occurrence. Use the applicable caption, followed by a description or prior plant status. Include major plant parameters.

f. Description of occurrence. Describe chronological sequence of events in an objective manner. Include the following:

(1) Method of detection and time of detection.

(2) Step–by–step sequence of events identifying all protection system actions and operator and security force actions(as appropriate) to control the situation.

g. Designation of apparent cause of occurrence. The single apparent cause should be identified and narrated. When other causes contributed to the occurrence, discuss the single cause assigned and the contributing causes. Types of causes may be as follows:

(1) Design.
(2) Manufacture.
(3) Installation or construction.
(4) Operator.
(5) Procedure.
(6) Steady–state power level.
(7) Super–prompt critical pulse.
(8) Refueling shutdown.
(9) Routine start–up operation.
(10) Unusual service condition including environmental.
(11) Component failure.

(12) Seizure or attempted seizure.
(13) Other (specify).

h. Analysis of occurrence. Analyze the occurrence for safety and/or security implications. The analysis of effects and consequences should include the following information, as applicable:

(1) Maximum and minimum conditions during temporary fluctuations (transients).
(2) Equipment malfunction.
(3) Operator error.
(4) Damage to systems, components, and structures.
(5) Personnel injuries.
(6) Personnel exposures.
(7) Quantity and composition of radioactive materials released.
(8) The consequences or potential consequences on public health and safety.
(9) Location, condition, and security status of all special nuclear materiel.
(10) Current system status.

i. Correction action. corrective action taken or planned to prevent repetition.

j. Failure data. Where equipment failure is the probable cause or equipment failed as a result of an accident, incident, or occurrence, provide the following information as applicable:

(1) Record of previous failures and malfunctions of the affected systems and components or of similar equipment.
(2) Equipment identification (for example, component manufacturer, name plate data).

Table 3–1
PRP PSI and clearance requirements

PSI Time Requirements

Type of assignment	Age of PSI: 5 Years or Less	Age of PSI: More Than 5 Years
Initial assignment	Investigation valid	New investigation required
Consecutive PRP assignments	Investigation valid	Controlled position: Investigation valid Critical position: Periodic reinvestigation required
Assigned to PRP duties *within the last* 5 years	Investigation valid	Controlled position: Investigation valid Critical position: New investigation required
Last assigned to PRP duties *more than* 5 years ago	Investigation valid	New investigation required
Break in active duty military service or DOD employment of *more than* 1 year (see note 1)	New investigation required	New investigation required

PRP Clearance and PSI Requirements (see note 2.)

Position	Security Clearance (see notes 3, 4, 5)	Minimum PSI Required: Interim Assignment (see note 6)	Minimum PSI Required: Final Assignment (see note 6)
Critical PRP	Commensurate w/access (normally S or TS)	ENTNAC/NAC (see notes 3, 5, 7)	BI (See note 5)
Controlled PRP (see note 8)	Commensurate w/access (normally S)	ENTNAC/NAC (see notes 3, 5, 9)	ENTNAC/NAC (See notes 5, 10)

Notes:

[1] For PRP purposes, attendance at a military Service academy may be considered as "active duty military service"in determining the validity of the PSI.

[2] Refer to AR 380–67 for detailed procedural information regarding requests for PSI and clearances.

[3] Request for a final clearance or request for a new PSI (as appropriate) must be initiated and forwarded to CCF or DIS, respectively, prior to granting an interim security clearance and interim assignment to a nuclear duty position.

[4] Whenever an interim clearance is granted, DA Form 873 will be issued reflecting the interim clearance. Supporting documentation required to grant an interim clearance will continue to be filed in the individual's MPRJ or OPF along with the DA Form 873 granting an interim clearance pending receipt of the computer generated DA Form 873 granting a final clearance from CCF.

[5] Local records check must be favorable (see AR 380–67).

[6] If an individual has had a break in active duty military service or DOD employment in excess of 1 year, interim or final assignment is not authorized'.

[7] Existing PSI: ENTNAC/NAC 5 years old or less; or BI, favorable, over 5 years old.

[8] Screening and evaluation for the chemical PRP per AR 50–6 is commensurate with that for assignment to a controlled nuclear duty position.

[9] Existing PSI: ENTNAC/NAC over 5 years old.

[10] Existing PSI: ENTNAC/NAC 5 years old or less; or ENTNAC/NAC over 5 years old but individual has been in the nuclear or chemical PRP within the last 5 years.

Table 8–1
Areas to be evaluated in NSI and TVI

	AC TVI[1]	RC TVI	U.S. PER[2]	SF[1]	OCONUS ORD CO	CONUS DEPOTS	PAL DET	AVN/ TRANS	SVC SCH	WSD–K	FA DETS	NWSB[3]
1. Nuclear technical proficiency												
a. Receipt inspection	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
b. Verification inspection	X[4]				X	X						
c. Unpackage and package	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
d. Modified periodic or periodic inspection	X[4]				X	X						
e. Storage monitoring			X		X	X					X	
f. Premate, assembly, and test	X	X	X		X	X				X	X	X
g. Maintenance and repair	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
h. PAL operations	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X
i. Nuclear safety	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
j. Prefire or emplacement procedure	X	X	X	X						X	X	X
k. Command disablement	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X
l. Delayed, changed, and canceled fire	X	X	X	X						X	X	X
m. Emergency disarm			X	X	X	X					X	X
n. Emergency destruction	(*)			(*)	X					X	X	X
o. Nonviolent disablement	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
p. Records and reports	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
q. Maintenance calibration	X[4]				X	X						X
r. Equipment maintenance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
s. Maintenance reporting	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X
t. Stockpile emergency verification procedure			X		X	X					X	
u. DOD safety rules	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
v. Weapon tiedown	X	X	X		X	X		X		X	X	X
w. Mating operations	X		X								X	
2. Personnel												
a. Manning	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
b. Reliability program	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
3. Operations												
a. Mission (statement or analysis)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
b. Shop office operations	X[4]				X	X						
c. Plans and SOP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
d. Site recapture plans			X		X	X					X	
e. Field storage locations opens	(*)		X		X[5]					X	X[5]	X
f. Publications	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
g. Operations security (OPSEC)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
h. NAIRA			X		X	X					X	
i. NAIRA (tactical SOP)	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X
j. General safety	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
k. Records and reports	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
l. Peacetime logistical movements					X	X		X				
m. Tactical weapons movement (air/ground)	(*)		X		X			X		X	X	
n. Training	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
o. Trainer storage	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
p. Nuclear command and control (NC[2])	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X
4. Logistics and facilities												
a. Submission of electromagnetic radiation survey data			X		X	X					X	
b. Tools; test and handling equipment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
c. TOE/TDA equipment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
d. Custody			X		X	X					X	
e. Accountability	X[4]				X	X						

Table 8–1
Areas to be evaluated in NSI and TVI—Continued

	AC TVI[1]	RC TVI	U.S. PER[2]	SF[1]	OCONUS ORD CO	CONUS DEPOTS	PAL DET	AVN/ TRANS	SVC SCH	WSD–K	FA DETS	NWSB[3]
f. Repair parts (PLL/ASL)			X		X	X		X[6]			X	X
g. War reserve maintenance			X		X	X					X	
h. War reserve storage			X		X	X					X	
i. Vehicles/aircraft tactical or logistical	(*)		X		X	X		X		X	X	
j. Records and reports	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X[7]	X	X	X	X
k. Custodial facilities			X		X	X					X	
5. Security												
a. Storage site security			X		X	X					X	
b. Security lighting			X		X	X					X	
c. Power sources			X		X	X					X	
d. Communications			X		X	X					X	
e. Site security plans			X		X	X					X	
f. Intrusion detection system			X		X	X					X	
g. Training			X		X	X					X	
h. Records and reports			X		X	X					X	
i. Survivability measures			X		X	X					X	
j. Administration			X		X	X					X	
6. Instructional programs												
a. Program of instruction									X			
b. Manuscript									X			
c. Lesson plans/training outlines							X		X			X
d. Security measures for classroom instruction									X			X
e. Student input vs quotas									X			
f. Training aids/materials							X		X			
7. External support	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes:

[1] Units that are authorized to receive an NSI instead of a SEE/TVI must also perform requirements identified by an asterisk (*).

[2] When a battery is responsible for storage site operations, the requirements listed in item 5 will be inspected.Additionally, batteries that are not responsible for storage site operations at the time of the inspection will be evaluated under item 3*e*.

[3] Will evaluate, as appropriate, internal operations and training assistance functions.

[4] Applies to CONUS based ordnance companies.

[5] Normally consists of review of plans and SOP for those units with peacetime custody. However, if a U.S. custodial unit (ordnance or artillery) supports multiple host nation (HN)units and some of those HN units do not perform duties in support of peacetime custody, such units and the supporting U.S. unit slice will be fully evaluated under item 3*e* in this table per applicable SSTAs.

[6] PLL/ASL of supporting aircraft.

[7] Includes review of DA Form 1352 (Army Aircraft Inventory, Status and Flying Time).

Table 8–2
Areas to be evaluated during an LSSI

		EOD detachments	EODCC	HQ/support[1] activities
1.	Personnel			
	a. PRP	X	X[2]	X
	b. PRP management		X	X
	c. Manning	X	X	X
	d. Levy management			X
2.	Operations			
	a. Mission statement	X	X	X
	b. Plans/SOPS	X	X	X
	c. Publications	X	X	X
	d. Publications management			X
	e. Surety program management		X	X[3]
	f. SEE/TVI program management			X
	g. ARTEP/TPE program		X	X
	h. NAIRA	X	X	X
	i. OPSEC	X	X	X
	j. Records and reports	X	X	X
	k. Records and reports management		X	X
	l. Weapon movement management			X
	m. Safety program	X	X	X
	n. Safety program management		X	X
	o. Training	X	X	X
	p. Nuclear command and control (NC^2)			X
3.	Logistics and facilities			
	a. TOE/TDA equipment	X	X	X
	b. CTA equipment	X	X	X
	c. Tools; test and handling equipment	X	X	X
4.	External support	X	X	X

Notes:

[1] As applicable.

[2] Only if assigned an improvised nuclear device mission.

[3] Includes $NSNFS^3$ program implementation.

S324001A

Figure 3-1. Sample of a Completed DA Form 3180

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

(Personnel Screening and Evaluation)

AUTHORITY: Internal Security Act of 1950 (Pub L.81–831)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To evaluate the qualifications and suitability of an individual for assignment to certain sensitive duties under the nuclear weapon personnel reliability program.

ROUTINE USES: To control and record steps taken in the screening and evaluation process and the certification or denial/withdrawal of certification of acceptability. Information disclosed during screening of records and files and during interviews with the respondent is weighed and evaluated to determine qualifications and suitability for assignment to a Critical or Controlled nuclear weapon position. The individual may be denied certification or later decertified (disqualified) and administratively relieved of nuclear weapons duties, should his or her reliability become suspect.Information may be disclosed to appropriate authority should disciplinary or further administrative action be indicated by the circumstances.

DISCLOSURE OF REQUESTED INFORMATION IS VOLUNTARY. HOWEVER, FAILURE TO PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE REQUESTED INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN NONSELECTION FOR DUTIES UNDER THE PRP.

Figure 3-2. Privacy Act Statement

Prior to departure

- Security personnel issued travel orders (if required).
- Security personnel property equipped.
- Security personnel have appropriate security and reliability clearances.
- Escort personnel briefed.
- Strip map routing provided, including checkpoints;contact points for military, State and local authorities; authorized stops.
- Administrative documents obtained.
- Escort vehicles inspected (as required).
- Chain of command designated.
- Appropriate directives on transportation, safety, firefighting, and security obtained.
- Guard and transport personnel properly armed and equipped.
- Transportation equipment inspected by consignor.
- Consignor briefing for security personnel.
- Loading and blocking of materiel.
- Materiel signed for DD Form 1911 (Materiel Courier Receipt).
- Driver or aircrew issued instructions (DD Form 836(Special Instructions for Motor Vehicle Drivers) or DD Form 1387–2 (Special Handling Data/Certification).
- Bill of lading and shipping documents obtained.
- Authorized recipient identified.
- Convoy formed.
- Departure time required.

En route

- Convoy discipline maintained.
- One guard present in addition to driver in cab of commercial or military carriers.
- Two–person concept in force at all times.
- Reports of progress submitted to appropriate headquarters.

Figure 4-1. Sample checklist for courier officers—Continued

At consignee's station

- Arrival reported.
- Vehicles inspected by consignee.
- Authorized recipient adequately identified.
- Equipment unloaded under adequate security.
- Receipt for materiel signed (DD Form 1911) by recipient.
- Billeting, messing, and return transportation arranged.

Figure 4-1. Sample checklist for courier officers

Contingency Release No. 1

'No Danger to the Public'

(Confirms to reduce public alarm)

(Format of sample release to be used when no danger to the public from contamination or blast exists, but when confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon or nuclear components significantly prevents or reduces widespread public alarm.)

A U.S.***(type)*** aircraft***(other type of transportation)*** carrying***(hazardous materiel, classified cargo, or unarmed nuclear weapon, or weapons)***crashed ***(or other circumstances)*** approximately ***(location and time).***

The public is requested to stay out of the area under surveillance by guards to preclude any remote possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional high explosives detonation) and to aid removal operations. There is no need for evacuation. There is no danger of nuclear detonation.

Figure 5-1. Sample format for Release No. 1

Contingency Release No. 2–A

To notify local and state officials

'When Public Is Possibly in Danger'

(Neither confirms nor denies)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require notifying local and State officials that hazardous cargo has been involved in an accident, the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or explosion, and details are unknown.)

Minimum Announcement A U.S. ***(type)***aircraft***(other type of transportation)*** carrying hazardous material crashed ***(or other circumstances)*** approximately***(location)*** at ***(time).***

Visitors are warned to stay out of the area of the accident in the interest of public safety. Fire, rescue, and other emergency services personnel should approach the area with caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. Use of water directly on the aircraft should be avoided unless needed to save property or lives. Any local official at the scene of the accident who can provide details on the situation should make a telephone call to this number: ( ). Current information from the accident scene will assist in evaluating the accident and providing additional public safety guidance.

Figure 5-2. Sample format for Release No. 2–A—Continued

Expanded Announcement

If there is no immediate threat to life, and the fire cannot be extinguished immediately (5 minutes), the fire should be contained and allowed to burn out. Water as a firefighting agent should be used with caution due to the possible adverse reaction with materials involved in the fire.

Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site and picking up fragments of the plane ***(vehicle)*** or its cargo. If any fragments already have been picked up, avoid further contact or handling.Notify ***(authorities)***for retrieval and proper disposition.

Military personnel have been dispatched***(will be dispatched)*** and will arrive (are scheduled to arrive) soon at the site.

Notes:

1. If contact with the accident scene is established, determine the following:
   a. Condition of aircraft (such as burning, evidence of explosion, or extent of damage).
   b. Condition of accident site (such as fire or blast damage).
   c. Evidence of obvious cargo (such as shapes or containers).
2. Determine the need for a public announcement of nuclear weapon involvement based on the responses to the above.

Figure 5-2. Sample format for Release No. 2–A

Contingency Release No. 2–B

To notify the general public

'When Public Is Possibly in Danger'

(Neither confirms nor denies)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require making a PUBLIC RELEASE that hazardous cargo was involved in an accident, the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or explosion, and details are unknown).

A U.S. ***(type)*** aircraft***(other type of transportation)*** carrying hazardous material crashed ***(or other circumstances)*** approximately***(location)*** at ***(time.)***

The public is warned to stay out of the area***(under surveillance by guards)*** in the interest of safety and to aid operations at the accident scene.

A U.S.***(military service)***team from ***(name of installation)*** is en route to***(has arrived at)***the scene of the accident.

We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties or property damage.

Further announcements will be made as more information is known.

Figure 5-3. Sample format for Release No. 2–B

Contingency Release No. 3

'When Public Is Possibly in Danger'

(Does confirm)

(Format of sample release to be used if public safety considerations require announcement that a nuclear weapon has been involved in an accident and contamination is likely because of fire or conventional high–explosive detonation of the weapon.Make the following statement locally or from competent authority if no local authority is available.)

An/a***(aircraft/railroad train/truck/other)*** accident occurred***(state time and location).***The accident involved a nuclear weapon that contains conventional high explosives and radioactive material.

There is no danger of a nuclear detonation.

The public is warned to stay out of the area***(or indicate the area) (now under surveillance by guards)*** because the conventional high explosives in the weapon***(have detonated, are burning, or may detonate).*** Again, there is no danger of nuclear detonation but there is a danger from the conventional high explosives in the weapon that***(have detonated, are burning, or may detonate).***

An experienced Federal response team has been ordered to the scene of the accident.

The most immediate danger in an accident of this kind is the effect of blast caused by detonation of the conventional high explosives in the weapon. Local scattering of nuclear material in the form of finely divided dust may have resulted near the accident site and downwind from the explosion ***(fire).***This poses little risk to health unless taken into the body as by breathing or swallowing, and it is considered unlikely that any person would inhale or swallow an amount that would cause illness. As a precaution and until further evaluations are made, anyone within a ***(to be filled in by OSC)*** radius of the accident site, particularly downwind from this site***(specify boundary where possible),*** is encouraged to remain indoors.

(NOTE: If appropriate, the following shall be included in the release).

The following precautionary measures are recommended to minimize the risk to the public.

The most appropriate initial action is to remain calm and inside homes or office buildings. Turn off fans, air–conditioners, and forced air heating units. Drink and eat only canned or packaged food that have been inside. Trained monitoring teams will be moved through the area wearing the special protective clothing and equipment issued to these teams to determine the extent of any possible contamination. The dress of these teams should not be interpreted as indicating any special risk to those indoors. If you are outside, proceed to the nearest permanent structure. If you must go outside for critical or lifesaving activities, cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring up and breathing any dust. It is important to remember that your movement outside could cause greater exposure to yourself and possibly spread contamination to those already supervised and protected.

(If plutonium is involved): One of the materials involved is plutonium. Plutonium is both a poison and a radiation hazard. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles that do not have sufficient energy to penetrate buildings, most clothing, or even the outer skin. Therefore, short–term exposure to contamination outside the body will pose negligible health risk.

(If uranium is involved): One of the materials involved is uranium. Contamination by uranium fragments or small particles dispersed by conventional ***(chemical)*** explosions or burning of a weapon is primarily a chemical health hazard (heavy metal poisoning similar to the lead poisoning associated with some paints), not a radiological hazard.

The public is asked to stay out of the area***(under surveillance or closed off by guards)*** (and if true) until a monitoring team, now en route to the site of the accident, can survey the ground and determine the exact area affected by the accident. As a result of the explosion***(fire),*** any fragments found near the scene of the accident may be contaminated and should be left in place. If fragments have been picked up, avoid further handling and notify ***(authorities)*** for proper retrieval and disposition.

Continuous announcements will be made as more information is known. It is expected that these immediate protective precautionary actions will be required for the next 4–6 hours.

A U.S.***(military service)*** team from ***(name of installation)*** is en route to ***(has arrived at)*** the scene of the accident.

Figure 5-4. Sample format for Release No. 3—Continued

We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties ***(or give numbers only of civilian and military casualties)*** or property damage.

The ***(type of carrier)*** was en route from***(name of facility)***to***(name of facility).***

The cause of the accident is under investigation.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY:

Question: 'Are nuclear weapons stored at***(name of facility)***or ***(name of facility)***?' Reply: 'It is Department of Defense policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any particular location.'

Figure 5-4. Sample format for Release No. 3

1. Self–explanatory.

2. ''A'' indicates an Army unit. (Note:N=Navy, F=Air Force, M=Marines, C=DOE)

3. Self–explanatory.

4. Self–explanatory.

5. Always as of 1 July.

6. Report PAC–15, AN/PDR–60, and AN/PDR–56 E & F. State approximate number as well as capability. (See note 1.)

7. Report AN/PDR–27 and AN/PDR–43. State approximate number as well as capability.(See note 1.)

8. Report AN/PDR–27T, AN/PDR–43, and IM–174 PD. State approximate number as well as capability. (See note 1.)

9. Report any portable air sampler capable of detecting the radioactive gas tritium. State approximate number as well as capability. (See note 1.)

10. Self–explanatory. Also list EOD(CC) information in block 33.

11. Report high volume Staplex (10–70 ft3/min).

12. Field operable, mobile unit capable of decontaminating personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

13. Self–explanatory.

14. Personnel trained and qualified in the use of deadly force, crowd control, and securing a National Defense Area.

15. Personnel specifically trained, licensed or recognized as reactor operators.

16. Personnel professionally trained in the protection of people and environment from the effects of radiation.Health physics technicians may be included.

17. Personnel involved in the design or modification of a specific weapon warhead.

18. Medical personnel specially trained in the care and treatment of contaminated/irradiated patients.

19. Personnel trained in working with news media and authorized by regulation or policy to speak for the commander.

20. Personnel professionally trained and certified to practice law, especially claims litigation.

21, 21a, 21b, & 21c. Self–explanatory.

22. Capability to measure radioactive material from contamination or scatter by aerial platform. In item 33, differentiate capability to detect Alpha contamination caused by dispersed special nuclear weapons material, from other sources.Battlefield detectors are normally not considered adequate for low level weapon accident material detection.

23. Self–explanatory.

24. A transportable radiac instrument repair unit, complete with spare parts and technicians.

25 & 26: Self–explanatory.

27, 28 & 29. Add any special information or capability not listed above.

30, 31, and 32. These items are reserved to list duty hour telephone number(s) and emergency telephone number(s). Nonduty/emergency telephone numbers should be that of local organizations having a 24–hour mission. Home numbers should not be provided. The prefix for each capability (AUTOVON, commercial, FTS, etc) should also be listed.

33. Self–explanatory.

Notes:

1. Change the footnote number for items 6, 7, 8, and 9 to a ''2,'' as shown on figure D–1. These capabilities will be approximate numbers of instruments that could be made available in an accident (based on what is usually operational at the unit on a daily basis). Minor changes in these numbers are not required to be reported outside the annual report.

2. If a particular capability does not exist at the reporting unit, leave that block on DD Form 2325 blank.

3. On reverse of DA Form 2325, type the name and telephone number of the person making the report.

Figure D-1. Instructions for preparing DD Form 2325

S324002A

Figure D-1. Sample of a Completed DD Form 2325

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AC
Active Component

ADA
air defense artillery

ADAPCP
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program

ADT
active duty for training

AFFF
aqueous film forming foam

AFOC
Air Force Operations Center

AG
Adjutant General

AIT
advanced individual training

AMC
U.S. Army Materiel Command

AOC
Army Operations Center

ARDEC
Armaments Research, Engineering, and Development Center

ARG
Accident Response Group

ARSTAF
Army Staff

ARTEP
Army Training and Evaluation Program

ASA(RDA)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

ASI
additional skill identifier

ATRAP
Air Transportable RADIAC Package

BI
background investigation

C2
command and control

CCF
U.S. Army Central Personnel Clearance Facility

CDPR
chemical duty position roster

CG
commanding general

CI
counterintelligence

CNWDI
critical nuclear weapons design information

CONUS
Continental United States

COR
contracting officer's representative

CPA
Chief of Public Affairs

CPO
civilian personnel office

DA
Department of the Army

DCII
Defense Central Index of Investigations

DCSINT
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DCSLOG
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

DCSOPS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DCSPER
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DIS
Defense Investigative Service

DISCO
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office

DNA
Defense Nuclear Agency

DNSI
Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection

DOD
Department of Defense

DOE
Department of Energy

DOMS
Director of Military Support

DOT
Department of Transportation

DS
direct support

DS/GS
direct support/general support

EAP
emergency action procedures

ED
emergency destruction

EMR
electromagnetic radiation

EMT
emergency medical team

ENTNAC
Entrance National Agency Check

EOD
explosive ordnance disposal

ETA
estimated time of arrival

FA
field artillery

FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency

FORSCOM
Army Forces Command

FPM
Federal Personnel Manual

GS
general support

HSC
U.S. Army Health Services Command

IDS
intrusion detection system

IFR
instrument flight rules

IG
inspector general

IND
improvised nuclear devices

IRF
Initial Response Force

IRR
U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository

JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFTA
joint–flight–test assembly

JIC
Joint Information Center

JNACC
Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center

JNSI
Joint nuclear surety inspection

JNWPS
Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications System

LLCE
limited–life component exchanges

LSSI
limited scope surety inspection

MACOM
major Army command

METL
mission essential task list

MI
military intelligence

MNPSI
minimum notice physical security inspection

MOS
military occupational specialty

MPRJ
Military Personnel Records Jacket, U.S. Army

MSC
Military Sealift Command

MTDA
modification table of distribution and allowances

MTMC
Military Traffic Management Command

MTOE
modification table of organization and equipment

MUSARC
Major U.S. Army Reserve Command

NAC
National Agency Check

NACI
National Agency Check and Written Inquiries

NAIRA
nuclear accident and incident response and assistance

NARCL
Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDPR
nuclear duty position roster

NG
National Guard

NEST
nuclear emergency search team

NMCC
National Military Command Center

NME
nuclear management evaluation

NSI
nuclear surety inspection

NSNF
Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces

NSNFS3
Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces Survivability, Security, and Safety

NWSB
nuclear weapons support branch

NWTI
nuclear weapons technical inspection

OCONUS
outside the continental United States

ODCSOPS
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

OEHL
Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory

OIC
officer in charge (of)

OJT
on–the–job training

OMPF
official military personnel file

OPSEC
operations security

OPF
official personnel folder

OSC
on–scene commander

PAC
personnel administration center

PAL
permissive action link

PAO
public affairs officer

PCS
permanent change of station

PERSCOM
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

PMCT
PAL Management Control Team

PR
periodic reinvestigation

PRP
personnel reliability program

PRPA
personnel reliability program assignment

PSC
Personnel Service Center

PSI
personnel security investigation

QASAS
Quality Assurance Specialists (Ammunition Surveillance)

RADCON
radiological control

RAMT
Radiological Advisory Medical Team

RC
Reserve Component

RFI
reactor facility inspection

ROTC
Reserve Officers Training Corps

RPC
Regional Personnel Center

SBI
special background investigation

SCI
sensitive compartmented information

SEE
standardized external evaluation

SI
surveillance inspection

SIB
SIDPERS Interface Branch

SIL
U.S. Army Surety Information Letter

SIMOS
space imbalanced military occupational specialty

SNM
special nuclear materials

SOP
standing operating procedures

SRF
Service Response Force

SSN
social security number

SSTA
Service to Service Technical Arrangements

STRAF
U.S. Strategic Army Forces

STS
stockpile–to–target sequence

SWOG
Special Weapon Overflight Guide

TAV
technical assistance visits

TDA
table of distribution and allowances

TIG
The Inspector General

TOE
table of organization and equipment

TPE
technical proficiency evaluation

TRADOC
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TS
top secret

TSG
The Surgeon General

TVI
technical validation inspection

TY
training year

UCMJ
Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAIRR
U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository

USAISC
U.S. Army Information Systems Command

USAISEC
U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command

USANCA
U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

USAR
United States Army Reserve

VFR
visual flight rules

WADS
weapons access delay system

WRAMC
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

WO
warrant officer

WWMCCS
Worldwide Military Command and Control System

Section II
Terms

Access
a. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon. Normally, a person would not be considered to have access if an escort or guard were provided for either the person or the weapon when the person is in close proximity of it.

b. The capability and opportunity to obtain, alter, or substitute the internal values of SAS or PAL material used in the release/execution of nuclear weapons and authenticators used to authenticate nuclear control orders, including wrapped packages of authenticators. NOTE: A person does not have access if the ability to obtain, alter, or substitute the internal values is prevented by observation by a person who is authorized access or by physical controls that prevent access.

c. Close physical proximity to a nuclear reactor or SNM in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage the reactor or to steal SNM. Normally a person is not considered to have access if an escort or guard were provided for either the person, the reactor, or the SNM when the person is in close proximity.

Administrative certification
For a person on orders directing reassignment to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position or to training leading to the award of a nuclear–related MOS (appendix C), a determination by the losing organization that the person is acceptable for the PRP.

Accountability
The obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation of an officer or other person for keeping accurate records of property, documents, or funds. The person having this obligation may or may not have actual possession of the property, documents, or funds. Accountability is concerned primarily with records, while responsibility is concerned primarily with custody, care, and safekeeping.

Accountable officer
The person at nuclear special ammunition units designated in writing to maintain a stock record account for nuclear weapons and associated materiel. The accountable officer may or may not have physical possession of the weapons or materiel.

Army movement monitor
A CONUS or theater area command representative designated specifically to follow the progress of a nuclear weapon movement in a specific geographical area of responsibility and to provide assistance as required.

Certification
A determination by a certifying official that an individual meets the criteria established for assignment to a PRP position.

Certifying official
For military and DA civilian personnel, the commander (or, if civil service, the director) who is responsible for the operation or security, or both, of nuclear weapons and who has sufficient personal contact with all personnel to permit continual evaluation.The certifying official certifies that personnel being considered for assignment to nuclear duties meet the qualification requirements of the PRP. For Army contractor personnel, the Army official so designated in the contract is the certifying official.

Commander
Senior military supervisor of a unit, organization, activity, or depot.

Continual surveillance
A close watch or observation, either electronic, electrical, mechanical, human, or any combination sufficiently frequent and adequate to make known any attempt to gain access to or unauthorized possession or control of a nuclear weapon.

Controlled nuclear duty position
A position to which any of the following applies because of the incumbent's assigned nuclear duties:

a. Has access but not technical knowledge; or

b. Controls entry into an exclusion area, but does not have access or technical knowledge; or

c. Is armed, assigned duties relating to nuclear security, and in a direct line of sight to a nuclear weapon and could inflict damage upon the weapon or, when joined, to its delivery system; or

d. Has been designated as a certifying official with identified PRP positions at the controlled level only.

Critical nuclear duty position
A position to which any of the following applies because of the incumbent's assigned nuclear duties:

a. Has access and technical knowledge; or

b. Can, at battalion level or below, either directly or indirectly cause the launch or use of a nuclear weapon; or

c. Controls or uses sealed authenticators, permissive action link (PAL) materials, related codes, and missile computer tapes for nuclear capable systems; or

d. Has been designated as a certifying official in activities with identified critical PRP positions.

Custodian
The commander of a unit assigned responsibility for custody of nuclear weapons.

Custodial agent
An officially appointed individual acting in behalf of and for the custodian in maintaining control of access to U.S. nuclear weapons and/or maintaining control of weapons employment prior to release.

Custody
The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, weapons and components. Custody may include the maintenance of accountability of weapons and components.

Deadly force
The physical force that a person uses, such as firing a weapon, to cause, or that is likely to cause, death or serious bodily harm (AR 190–28).

Defense nuclear surety inspection
An NWTI conducted by DNA per TM 39–25–1.

Deficiency
A variance from procedures or criteria prescribed in technical manuals or other applicable regulations or publications.

Duress system
A method by which security force personnel who control entry into and vouch for or escort visitors into a limited and/or exclusion area can covertly communicate a situation of duress to other operating or security personnel.

Emergency
Unexpected circumstances that justify deviations from procedural safeguards for nuclear weapon systems. The circumstances can result from accidents, natural events, or extensive combat losses of normally required personnel and/or equipment. Deviations from procedural safeguards are actions to protect, handle, service, transport, or expend nuclear weapons. Deviations from a safety rule is permitted in an emergency only if that specific safety rule is authorized to be temporarily suspended.

Emergency evacuation
Any movement of a nuclear weapon(s) or nuclear component(s)that has been directed to maintain U.S. custody or to prevent loss because of fire or natural disaster, etc.

Exclusion area
A designated area immediately surrounding one or more nuclear weapons/systems. Normally its boundaries are the walls, floor, and ceiling of a structure, or are delineated by a permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive measures, access into the exclusion area constitutes access to the nuclear weapons/systems.

Factor affecting operations
A situation, condition, or deficiency that may or may not be attributable to the inspected unit but which significantly affects the unit's ability to accomplish its nuclear mission. It may pertain to such matters as command guidance, adequacy of support, availability or condition of facilities, or the status of personnel, equipment, supply, maintenance or training; or the provision of a safe and secure environment for nuclear weapons.

Fixed storage or alert site
An area or operational alert site that has been certified to store nuclear weapons or nuclear components.

Flynet
A nickname assigned to expedite air movement in CONUS of NAIRA emergency teams to the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident. Its use during training exercises is prohibited.

Heavily populated area
Any urban or industrial area whose size would preclude aircraft in an emergency from reaching a suitable emergency landing area from any position en route at the altitude being flown by the aircraft.

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
A device incorporating materials designed to result in either the dispersal of radioactive material or the formation of a nuclear yield. Such devices may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an unauthorized modification to a U.S.or foreign nuclear weapon as the result of sabotage, seizure, theft, or loss of custody.

Initial Response Force
A force from the nearest DOD organization or facility, regardless of size, that responds to a nuclear accident and takes immediate emergency, humanitarian, and disaster control measures within the capability of the force. The IRF provides a Federal presence pending arrival of a Regional or Service Response Force.

Interim certification
Same as " certification," except performance of duty is subject to the restrictions of paragraph 3–6 *a*(3) or 3–6 *b*(3) pending receipt of the results of a new PSI.

Intrusion detection equipment system
A security system consisting of a sensor(s) capable of detecting one or more types of phenomena, signal media, annunciator(s), and energy source, for signaling the entry or attempted entry of a person or other target into the area protected by the system.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center
A combined DNA and DOE centralized agency for exchanging and maintaining information on radiological assistance capabilities and coordinating assistance activities, when called upon, in connection with accidents involving radioactive materiel's.

Limited area
A designated area immediately surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally, this is the area between the boundaries of the exclusion areas and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter security system.

Limited life components
A component used in a nuclear weapon that decays with use and must be replaced on a periodic basis.

Logistic movement
The transport of war reserve nuclear weapons and nuclear components by an appropriate noncombat delivery vehicle.

Limited scope surety inspection
A DA or MACOM IG conducted inspection that evaluates the surety program of organizations directly supporting the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

Maintenance facilities
Those buildings or structures used primarily for nuclear weapons inspections, assembly, or maintenance operations.

National defense area
An area established on non–Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information, or protecting DOD equipment or material. (See AR 500–60.)

National security area
An area established on non–Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified or restricted data information, or protecting DOE equipment or material.

Nonnuclear component
A part of a nuclear weapon or weapon system that does not contain fissionable or fusionable materiel.

Nuclear–capable unit
A unit or activity assigned responsibility for assembling, firing, delivering, maintaining, transporting, or storing war reserve nuclear weapons, or assigned nuclear–related missions.

Nuclear cargo
Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and class II components of nuclear weapons containing nuclear materiel prepared for logistics movements.

Nuclear component
A part of a nuclear weapon that contains fissionable or fusionable materiel.

Nuclear management evaluation
An evaluation conducted by the TIG or

MACOM IG of nuclear operations with inquiry into the nuclear functions and responsibilities of staff agencies, inspection teams, major and intermediate command levels, and assistance teams to determine management, systemic, or functional problem areas in the Army nuclear programs attributable to any echelon.

Nuclear qualification
A determination by a MACOM commander that a nuclear–capable unit is capable of performing its nuclear mission and has been authorized to do so.

Nuclear reactor accident or incident
Any unplanned or unauthorized event involving a nuclear reactor that results in an actual or potential hazard to life or property or that may cause adverse public reactions. (AR 385–40)

Nuclear reactor system
Any equipment or device, except a nuclear weapon, capable of neutron multiplication through nuclear fission of special nuclear material. This definition includes nuclear reactors, subcritical assemblies of special nuclear material, and the supporting associated equipment or devices (if any).

Nuclear surety inspection
An NWTI to examine the capability of specified nuclear–capable units to perform specific tasks involving nuclear weapons and associated equipment, to provide a safe and secure environment for nuclear weapons and nuclear components and to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons. An NSI also determines if essential administration and support is provided the unit.

Nuclear weapon
A device in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion or both.

Nuclear weapon accident and incident
Any unplanned or unauthorized event involving a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component that results in an actual or potential hazard to life or property or that may cause adverse public reaction.

Nuclear weapons technical inspection
A Service or DNA inspection of a nuclear–capable unit conducted to examine nuclear weapons technical assembly, maintenance, storage functions, movement, handling, and safety and security directly associated with these functions. The NWTI system includes the following inspections:

a. Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection conducted by DNA.

b. Nuclear Surety Inspection conducted by the Army.

c. Technical Validation Inspection conducted by the Army.

Off–site
That area beyond the boundaries of a DOD installation including the area beyond the boundary of a NDA or NSA that has been, or may become affected by a nuclear accident or incident.

On–scene commander
A general officer who has operational control of emergency forces and supervises all onsite operations at the scene of a nuclear accident or incident.

On–site
That area around the scene of a nuclear accident or incident that is under the operational control of the installation commander, on–scene commander, or DOE team leader. The on–site area includes any area that has been established as an NDA or an NSA.

Permissive Action Link
A device included in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming and/or launching until the insertion of a prescribed discrete code or combination. It may include equipment and cabling external to the weapon or weapon system to activate components within the weapon or weapon system.

Primary electrical power source
The source that provides power to the site facilities daily.

PRP/Surety Considered
An annotation in Part III, DA Form 873, indicating that CCF has determined that a PSI is devoid of potentially disqualifying information.

Reactor facility
A nuclear reactor system, the associated buildings, auxiliary equipment, and the staff required for operation, maintenance, security, and support of the nuclear reactor facility.As used in this regulation, this term includes both power and research nuclear reactor systems.

Reactor facility inspection
A DA or MACOM IG inspection that includes examination of the capability of a nuclear reactor facility to perform specific tasks involving the nuclear reactor and associated equipment, to provide a safe and secure environment for the nuclear material and reactor, and to determine if essential administration and support is provided the unit.

Reliable nuclear weapon
A nuclear weapon prepared and maintained with strict adherence to safety and technical procedures prescribed in approved technical manuals and directives so that (assuming the weapon is properly launched, emplaced, or fired) it will detonate at the designated place and time with the specified yield.

Render–safe procedures
The application of EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of explosive ordnance items to preclude a detonation or munition function.

Restricted area
Any area that entry to is subject to special restrictions or controls for reasons of security or safeguarding of property or materiel, exclusive of those designated areas over which flight of aircraft is restricted.

Reviewing official
The commander or director at the command level immediately above the certifying official who is responsible for operations involving nuclear weapons.

Safety certification of equipment and procedures
A determination by the Services or DNA, based on engineering evaluation, that equipment and/or procedures meet required safety criteria and are approved for use with a nuclear weapon. Equipment includes vehicles, helicopters, trailers, test and handling gear, and any other specialized equipment necessary to support the system. Certification is considered complete when specified in the appropriate technical publications.

Safe environment
The condition that exists when all operations pertaining to nuclear weapons and reactor facilities are performed in accordance with applicable procedural and safety publications. Any deviation that could cause physical damage to or otherwise degrade the reliability of the nuclear weapon or nuclear reactor would cause a condition that would be considered an unsafe environment.

Sealed authenticator
A single copy from an edition of a sealed authentication system. It contains authenticator values sealed in plastic and is classified TOP SECRET CRYPTO or SECRET CRYPTO. Each copy in an edition is identified by a unique register number.

Secure environment
The condition that exists when nuclear weapons, reactor facilities, and their surrounding environment meet the security criteria established by applicable publications.

Service or Agency Response Force
A DOD or DOE response force that is appropriately manned, equipped, and capable of performing the initial response force tasks and coordinating all actions necessary to control effectively and recover from a nuclear accident or significant incident.

Simulations
Hypothetical conditions or situations necessary to permit certain inspection phases to be completed as realistically as possible.

Special nuclear material
a. Plutonium, uranium 233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope

235, and any other material that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or

b. Any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing but does not include source material.

Standardized external evaluation
An evaluation of field artillery battalions and separate batteries initiated and conducted by higher headquarters (normally the unit's next higher headquarters) to diagnose the state of training proficiency of those units. It evaluates the accomplishment of ARTEP nuclear and mission essential task list (METL) tasks assigned as part of the unit's overall mission.

Standby emergency power source
A separate and distinct source of power, internal to the site and in addition to the site's primary electrical power source.

Surety
Those controls, procedures, and actions which contribute to the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of nuclear weapons and nuclear materiel, and to the assurance that there will be no nuclear accidents, incidents, or unauthorized weapon detonations. (The survivability aspects of surety are covered in AR 11–20.)

Surveillance inspection
An NWTI to observe and evaluate a Service or MACOM inspection team conducting an NWTI as well as the inspected unit.

Tactical movement
Any movement of a nuclear weapon(s) or nuclear component(s)from their normal storage or alert location made to support an emergency evacuation or an increased condition of defense readiness or alert posture.

Technical knowledge
Knowledge, however obtained, that would allow an individual to tamper with a nuclear weapon or nuclear component in a manner that such tampering would not be detected during normal prefire operations or weapon–monitoring (storage monitoring)inspections and could cause, then or later, unauthorized prearming, arming, launching, firing, releasing, or detonation of a nuclear weapon or degradation of weapon performance.

Technical proficiency evaluation
A DA directed event conducted by USAOMMCS as the proponent for standardized EOD training and evaluation. It consists of a graded evaluation of unit, team, and individual technical operations utilizing ARTEP 9–520, Soldier's Manuals, TM 9–1185 and TM 60 series publications and other technical references. It occurs in a field environment and is 4 to 5 days in duration.

Technical validation inspection
A standardized inspection to examine the capability of specified noncustodial nuclear–capable units to perform selected critical nuclear operations and determine if essential administrative and logistics support is being provided the unit. The TVI is the final phase of the NWTI process for units authorized to receive the SEE/TVI.

Training item
A training nuclear warhead section, component, or projectile, including containers. Explosives are not contained in training items and no nuclear reaction hazard exists; however, they may contain radioactive material.

Two–person concept
A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed. (Also referred to as the two–man rule, two–man policy, or two–person rule.)

Two–person control
The close surveillance and control of materials at all times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed and each familiar with established security requirements.

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